FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG

By Max Radin

THE word most frequently used of the trial at Nuremberg and of some of its details is "unprecedented." Unprecedented it certainly is, if that word means merely that never before in history, so far as we know, has a court been constituted of professional judges from four allied and victorious nations to try individuals and organizations belonging to a defeated nation. But it is not in the least unprecedented for an international court to be established nor quite unprecedented to find individuals charged with war crimes arraigned before it.

The court at Nuremberg is not a casual or extemporized body. The necessity for its existence was recognized at a conference held at St. James's Palace, London, in January 1942 by the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Free France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Jugoslavia, at which Great Britain, the four self-governing British Dominions, India, China, the Soviet Union and the United States were guests. As a final result of this conference and of the declarations made later at Moscow by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, the court at Nuremberg was established.

I shall assume the details of its organization to be well known. To deny that this is, "properly speaking," a court is either to beg the question or to indulge in a game of definitions. Any group of persons declared to be a court by competent political authority indubitably is one, and it is hard to see why the authority should become incompetent because several political units act together in exercising it. What is a more difficult matter is a question which is much agitated among lawyers but which is likely to leave laymen quite cold. It is called "jurisdiction."

Has the International Military Tribunal, established by an

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agreement of four nations at London on August 7, 1945, "jurisdiction" over the 22 men on trial before it? The question of physical power may be disregarded. The term "jurisdiction" as used here involves a moral judgment. May the court without violating a real standard of justice — which is another way of saying a recognized standard of right conduct — exercise the physical power it so clearly possesses? If it may do so, it has jurisdiction in every sense that is relevant for our purpose.

What standard of substantial justice is violated when these 22 men, all of them former citizens of the German Reich, are subjected to the control of the International Military Tribunal? They have not been kidnapped and brought there in violation of international law. They have not been seized in violation of the laws of war. As a recognized nation, the German Reich has ceased to exist. Even if it had not, the occupation of German soil by hostile armies subjects all persons within the zone of occupation (quite in accordance with organized law) to the primary legal control of the nations to which the occupying forces belong. That alone is a sufficient basis in justice for exercising jurisdiction over these men.

Article 7 of the Charter establishing the court states:

> The official position of defendants, whether as heads of state or responsible officials in government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

The question of jurisdiction over "heads of state" is thus disposed of by the act creating the court. The claim to immunity is a vestige of the sacrosanctity of an anointed monarch and is absurd under modern law. No principle of justice is violated in abolishing it. To make a legal dogma out of it for modern conditions is nothing less than irrational.

But if there can be no just objection to the fact that the Tribunal assumes to try these men, is it equally certain that it may properly examine into all the acts of which they are accused? The crimes charged in the conference of 1942 and in the declarations that followed it were acts of violence against the civilian populations of the countries occupied by the German armies. The crimes which are charged in the indictment, authorized by the international agreement of August 1945 and to which the 22 accused men at Nuremberg are required to plead, are put into three groups: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against

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humanity. Of these, the first presents the greatest difficulties and will therefore be taken up last.

War crimes are defined in Article 6b of the Charter of the Tribunal, published August 8, 1945, as follows:

> Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

These acts are not newly created crimes. The term "violation of the laws and customs of war" is an established term of international law. It occurs in the Treaty of Versailles and was the basis for the wholly abortive attempt to punish Germans who had been guilty of such violations in the war of 1914–1918. It is used in international practice and has been abundantly defined in such international treaties and agreements as the Hague Conventions of 1906.

In regard to war crimes there would be nothing unprecedented in the fact that either a national or an international tribunal takes jurisdiction of them. The details of organization and procedure in which, in this respect, the Tribunal strikes out new paths are insignificant and do not affect its lawful authority to act. But in the matter of "crimes against humanity"a new term is created and a new path is entered upon.

In the report which Justice Jackson made to the President, released on June 7, 1945,[1] the offenses that are declared to be "crimes against humanity" are given only a second place. But in popular estimation they are the ones that have excited most horror, and in the brilliantly eloquent speech with which Justice Jackson opened for the prosecution the dreadful character of these acts inspired a deadly summation: "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated."

What these wrongs against civilization, these crimes against humanity, are, does not lack precise description. They have been presented to the court at Nuremberg in the horribly graphic form of motion picture records, records made by Nazis themselves, for their own evil gratification. The only thing unprecedented about

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, June 10, 1945, p. 1071 *et seq.*

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the crimes is their number and their concentrated fury. Any one of these acts has doubtless been committed before, but there is no evidence that ever before in history have so many been done within so brief a period and under so coldly deliberate a program. Even where wholesale extermination of groups of men have been carried out in times past, this never before reached such proportions or was attended with such inhuman incidents. No one can reasonably question the statement that if any acts deserve to be punished capitally, these do.

If these inhuman incidents were disregarded, and we were dealing simply with acts of murder and robbery, and if the number of the victims had reached no such portentous total as it demonstrably did, the acts would still by the custom of those civilized nations we know best, by what the Romans called the *ius gentium*, be capital crimes subject to the death penalty. If we thus reduce these crimes against humanity to their lowest terms, they remain the most serious crimes that our penal system knows.

Most of the acts, even those committed by former German nationals outside of the borders of Germany, could probably have been tried by German courts under German doctrines of international law. But there are no German courts, except local and newly constituted courts of limited jurisdiction created by the Allied Military Government and responsible to it. Again, if there had been German courts, the striking experience of the last war would make it very likely that whether these acts were "simple" murders or murders aggravated by horrible acts of cruelty, their perpetrators would either wholly escape punishment or receive inadequate punishment. So far as most of the 22 defendants arraigned at Nuremberg are concerned, this result would be next to certain.

If the occupying Powers, therefore, had not established a special court to try these men for their crimes, it is probable that they could not be tried at all; or, if any trials took place, that no punishment would follow. If it can be correctly said that nonetheless a court with power to deal with them is "unprecedented," the only reply is that it is high time that a precedent was set. We need really not trouble ourselves to find analogies in international procedure, such as the jurisdiction over pirates, the *communes hostes generis humani* — a proper enough designation for those Nazis who have openly and defiantly denied any obliga-

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tion to their fellow men. Other analogies could be shaken out from dusty cupboards of the law. It is hardly worth while to do so. Lawyers as well as non-lawyers must be reminded that, despite an inveterate popular belief to the contrary, the mere absence of a precedent has never by itself been controlling in developed systems of law.

We may be content with the opening statement of Lord Justice Lawrence at the beginning of the trial on November 21, 1945: "The trial which is about to begin is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world. It is of supreme importance to millions of people all over the world."

Critics of the proceedings at Nuremberg have been of several types. Some are open or covert sympathizers with the Nazi movement, even when they profess to repudiate its brutalities. For them, the defeat of Nazi Germany is merely a military setback. They would, perhaps, accept as justified the terms ordinarily imposed on a defeated nation, that is, indemnities and partial occupation until the indemnities are paid, although they might cry out even at that. But they would be willing to expunge everything else and allow Germany the earliest and most complete chance of reëstablishing herself fully.

Others are humanitarians and pacifists to whom every form of bloodshed whether in war or by capital punishment is equally objectionable. They are represented by President Felix Morley, of Haverford College, who in *Human Events* of December 21, 1945, speaks of the entire proceedings as a "travesty of justice." Something very much like that is the position of Professor Milton R. Konvitz, as expressed in the January 1946 edition of *Commentary*. And in one form or another it underlies the objections presented by Professor Sidney Hook and others who have discussed the matter in the New York *Nation*. It is curious that this point of view is often associated with a qualified approval of lynching. Mr. Morley declares that lynching would be "more honest and forthright" and specifically states in the publication cited: "There could have been little or no objection if these men had been shot by military firing squads when captured." Professor Joad of Cambridge and other Englishmen of high standing have similarly declared that lynching of the Nazi leaders would be preferable to a formal trial.

At the bottom of their minds, evidently, these gentlemen are less concerned with who is punished and why than that it be done

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quickly. Lynching is a form of human sacrifice which can be expeditious because like most such sacrifices it is indifferent about the actual victim. One will do as well as another, as in the *Gallus Galla, Graecus Graeca* immolation which the Romans thought belonged to their savage past and of which they had the grace to be ashamed, *mos minime Romanus*. The gods appeased by this type of sacrifice are rather primitive spirits, and it is a little disturbing to be asked to propitiate them in the name of a higher morality.

We may recur to the opening words of Lord Justice Lawrence: "The four signatories having invoked judicial process, it is the duty of all concerned to see that the trial in no way departs from the principles and traditions that give justice its authority and the place it ought to occupy in the affairs of all civilized states." It is easy enough to scoff at these words as facile and insincere generalities. But if those who have so far attacked the trial at Nuremberg have nothing better to offer than the suggestion of lynching or than bitter gibes at our hypocrisy, we may be forgiven if we prefer to believe that an honest attempt is being made to make the day of reckoning a day of justice.

Does this trial violate one of the fundamental "principles and traditions that give justice its authority" in that it proposes to inflict punishment *ex post facto?* Even those who do not understand all the elements of this technical legal term have no difficulty in accepting as fundamentally just the rule that no acts can be made punishable which were not punishable when committed.

What in the United States is implied in the Constitutional inhibition of *ex post facto* laws has in Continental systems been formulated in a legal maxim, a relatively recent maxim, *nulla poena sine lege*. It was much employed by the penal reformers of the eighteenth century, Beccaria, Montesquieu, Filangieri, as a protest against arbitrary arrest and arbitrary punishment "in the interests of the state."

So far as this defense might be offered for the defendants at Nuremberg in the case of crimes against humanity, it can be rejected on two grounds. One is that the Germans themselves who might offer it have for a long time rejected it.

The rejection of the *nulla poena sine lege* doctrine was made a fundamental matter by the first Nazi legal conference. But refusal to accept it is older in Germany and in Italy than that date.

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The most eminent of German penologists of the late nineteenth century, von Liszt, declared the doctrine to be the "Magna Carta of criminals," and among many other jurists of high repute the principle was challenged and in most instances denied.

But the fact that it has been so denied by the very men who now stand at the bar of the court does not of itself deprive them of the right of asserting it. It is our idea of justice, not that of the Nazis, or of the pre-Nazi Germans and Italians, which is being administered in Nuremberg. We on our part are committed to the prohibition of *ex post facto* punishment not merely by the Constitutional provision, which deals with legislation only, but by the adoption of its underlying principle in all our penal systems. No man may be charged in the United States with a crime unless the charge can be referred to an explicit statute or ordinance by which the crime was defined and the punishment declared. There are no "common law" crimes.

But it is substance and not form which is of moment here. Every one of the acts described in the indictment as crimes against humanity would be punishable by the penal codes of every one of the United States, the penal codes of France and of the Soviet Union, and of the eight other nations which with France took part in the London Conference, the penal codes of the British Dominions and of India which were guests at that Conference. And they would be equally punishable in Great Britain which has only recently and partially codified its penal law. No one of the countries directly or indirectly concerned with the Nuremberg trials would fail to punish "crimes against humanity," however they might classify and name them, if they were committed within their own jurisdiction. Nor is the Tribunal applying to these men in respect of these charges an arbitrary accusation which would be dismissed in the courts of the signatory powers. The injustice of *ex post facto* punishment consists in making penal an act which when committed seemed innocent or at least indifferent. Can that be said of the crimes against humanity? And since it cannot, can there be any injustice of punishing what the consensus of civilized nations has regarded as punishable?

Indeed, the obvious criminality by civilized standards of certain acts has been recognized as basis for punishment in most countries, without code or statute. Those who are moved only by precedents need merely consider the history of criminal law in

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both civil law and common law countries. Codification — the express definition of crimes by formal enactment — is late. Yet, conduct in contravention of obvious human rights in person and property was for centuries punished without such enactments. This in large measure is still the case in Great Britain, and this was the case in all American states until the movement for codification got a real momentum in the nineteenth century. Nowhere did the absence of a statute in itself seem to mean that punishment was an unjust application of governmental power. That murder, rape, robbery or mayhem was a *turpis felonia* seemed clear enough to the English administrators at the Assize of Clarendon in 1164, the Assize of Northampton in 1176, and is clear enough now.

It has been suggested that in order to make an act punishable not only must its character as an outrage against human rights be clear but the perpetrator must be aware that if caught he would be punished under existing law. Under this theory, the 22 defendants, — and indeed all the persons engaged in the horrors of Dachau and Belsen — would go scot-free. They could confidently have expected that if Germany was either victorious or retained its position as a state they would never be called to account for any of their acts, no matter how savage and brutal these were.

Evidently, this could be asserted by any highwayman or gangster who hoped to escape punishment, and who in some cases had reasonable ground for believing that he would escape punishment. The seizure of political power by such a group of gangsters — and that is very much what happened in Germany in the Nazi revolution — could then be taken as a complete moral justification of any acts which Nazi leaders would decline to punish in their accomplices and instruments. To state the suggestion this way is to refute it; and it is hard to see how it can be stated otherwise.

The greatest prominence among these crimes is given in Justice Jackson's report neither to crimes against humanity nor to crimes against the laws and customs of war, but to crimes against peace. And it is to these crimes that the largest part of the formal indictment is directed. Count One charges a common plan or conspiracy for all three types of crimes. Section E of Count One charges the acquiring of totalitarian control in Germany for the purpose of planning and mobilizing for ag-

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gression. Section F charges the utilization of such control for aggression, first by violating the Treaty of Versailles, next by invading Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Jugoslavia, Greece and the Soviet Union, and by collaborating with Italy in aggression against France, Greece and Albania, and with Japan in an aggressive war against the United States. Count Two lists the particulars of these named aggressions, as well as of the wars prepared, initiated and waged against Great Britain, France and the United States. Most of the controversy that Justice Jackson's report aroused when it was published concerns and will concern itself with this extremely important element in the Nuremberg trials.

The absence of a precedent need detain us here no more than in the other cases. If other objections can be met, the court might well determine to set a precedent instead of discovering one. The objections in this case are of a wholly different nature.

The essence of the crimes on this count is war itself. It has from time immemorial been recognized that there can be such a thing as an unjust war, and, *e contrario*, a just one. Men have sometimes used this last term as though it meant a war "declared" in formal terms and conducted according to elaborately fixed rules, like the code of duello. But the contrasting term, "unjust war," has at least since Greek and Roman times been used often enough to mean a war without moral justification, a war begun for sheer lust of conquest, for rapacity or for cruelty, a *bellum impium et iniustum*. In the case of an unjust war, the offender is of course the nation itself — in the sense of a collective group, not in that of a fictitious entity — despite the famous and incorrect dictum of Burke that an indictment cannot be drawn up against a nation. Punishment of a nation, however, can be inflicted only through another war or through hostile actions that normally lead to war. A third nation more powerful than either of the nations already at war may intervene, or other nations may combine against the aggressor.

And this sort of punishment of an unjust war — called in these proceedings an "aggressive" war — is, we may note, precisely the way in which under the San Francisco Charter it is proposed to punish an aggressor by act of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is not the German nation, however, which stands at the bar

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of the court at Nuremberg, but 22 individuals. Can they be guilty of the acts which in the case of a nation constitute the crime of war? I find myself in complete agreement with Mr. Jackson when he declares that all acts are acts of men, of real men, persons of flesh and blood, and are not acts of an abstract entity. When it is said that a nation is guilty of war, it is not the abstraction, Germany, Italy, Japan, which is so guilty, but the great majority of Germans, Italians or Japanese who have demanded the war or acquiesced in it. It is these persons who are in actual fact and not by metaphor punished — together, to be sure, with the minority which was unable to prevent the war — whenever a nation is punished, as in the past nations have been punished, and as in the future it is proposed to punish nations under the San Francisco Charter.

Justice Jackson, for the United States, Sir Hartley Shawcross for Great Britain and M. François de Menthon for France have presented the case for the prosecution on behalf of their respective countries. The speeches they made and the testimony they advanced have sufficiently stressed the "crime of war." I think we may say, however, that the sustained eloquence of their speeches gains its quality from the enumeration of crimes against humanity rather than from the detailed revelation of how the Nazi government planned its wars. General Roman Rudenko, who opened the prosecution for the Soviet Union on February 8, stressed crimes against humanity rather than crimes against peace, which were taken up the following day by the assistant Soviet prosecutor. Mr. Rudenko in his carefully and soberly worded indictment of 70 pages listed mass murders, robberies and acts of destruction which he declared far transcended anything the Nazis had done in Germany or western Europe. The defendants most frequently mentioned by him were Jodl, Keitel, Rosenberg, Goering, Sauckel and Ribbentrop.

No one can deny that war is an unqualified horror both as it has been carried on during the last war and as it is likely to be carried on in future wars. Unfortunately it is a fact that in horror and destruction, an aggressive war is scarcely to be distinguished from a defensive war, an "unjust" war from a "just" one. And it does not follow that what makes a war a national crime — punishable at the national level by subjugation which might take the form of permanent annexation and even wholesale deportations — also makes it a crime of individuals.

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As applied to crimes against humanity, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot, I think, be substantially challenged on the basis of the *ex post facto* rule. But in the question of individual responsibility for crimes against peace it will be much more difficult to meet the challenge. I do not think that in the many discussions of the matter by Mr. Jackson and others the challenge has been met.

The wars which Germany planned after 1933 and which she waged after September 1939 were, beyond reasonable question, aggressive wars, and therefore punishable as offenses by nations may be punished. There would obviously be nothing *ex post facto* in doing so. But to make it a crime for individual citizens to instigate an aggressive war is very definitely to attach criminality to acts which could not have been reasonably regarded as criminal by those who committed them nor by the public opinion at the time of commission. The jurisdiction of the court to do this must depend entirely on its power, a basis which I am constrained to believe is not quite a satisfactory one, if it is the exclusive basis.

It may be admitted that the *ex post facto* rule is not absolute, as no legal rule is absolute, and that there may be a situation in which, in the furtherance of basic world interests, the rule may be disregarded. But if we are to depart from the "traditions and principles that give justice its authority," which Lord Justice Lawrence said we are not to do, it is well to be aware of our acts and to render a reason that will do something more than satisfy the necessities of a plausible brief.

The basic interest which can be served by holding the 22 defendants criminally responsible for what in general public opinion was not a personal crime when committed can only be the additional effect this might have for the prevention of future wars. A victorious nation has in past time taken drastic steps to forestall a future war of retaliation by the vanquished. How far it may go will be differently assessed. If the conquered nation was the obvious aggressor — as by documentary evidence Germany was in the case of Poland, Holland, Russia — the public opinion of the world would tolerate severities in dealing with it that would not be approved if the reverse were the case. It may be that this world opinion would not always be overwhelmingly effective, but it would have some effect and would be added to the imponderables like those which twice in our generation frustrated a highly organized scheme of military domination.

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All this may be conceded, but it still makes the basis of punishing individuals for crimes against peace a "reason of state," a higher reason of state than that against which Montesquieu and Beccaria directed their attacks, but of the same kind. In an earlier phase of the discussion of war crimes, Sir John Fischer Williams scoffed at the idea of a future Hitler, confident of success, being deterred by the fate of his unsuccessful predecessors. Justice Jackson admits that we cannot assume deterrence in such a case, but holds that the formal establishment of the doctrine that crimes against peace are punishable is nonetheless vital.

We might go further than Justice Jackson and admit that scientific penology has long ago raised doubts about the deterrent quality of any kind of punishment. But unless we are willing to abandon the policing of our communities altogether, we are committed to a system by which socially harmful acts subject those who do them to punishment which in extreme cases may be capital. Social development creates new crimes and modifies the public attitude toward old ones. The law, however, can scarcely anticipate public judgment on whether an act is a crime or how it is to be punished.

Had public opinion in 1938 or later reached the point at which the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances" (which is Article 6 of the Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal) become a crime for which individuals may be punished? Has it now? Justice Jackson, in his report to President Truman, rests his case largely on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, although that is only the thirteenth of twenty-six violations of treaties or agreements listed as "charges and particulars" in Appendix C of the formal indictment. By that Pact, Germany among many other nations formally renounced war as a means of international policy and vigorously denounced all wars of aggression. But whatever may have been the statements of individual statesmen and publicists, those who recall the circumstances in which the Pact was made will only with difficulty be persuaded that at that time any sanction was contemplated in public opinion, other than, at the most, an economic boycott, and, at the least, the moral disapproval of the world. The word "international crime" used about an aggressive war in the Geneva Protocol of 1924 cannot be rated

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higher now than it was rated then, as a rhetorical term — a noble rhetoric, to be sure — but not a term with definite legal content.

If the violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact or of the Geneva Protocol constitutes a crime, either for the nation or for the persons instigating it, then the conduct at the time of all the Powers that joined in creating the Tribunal at Nuremberg puts them in the unfortunate light of having acquiesced in what they now denounce as criminal. No official protest was made by these Powers when acts violating the Pact were committed. The personal indignation of such high-minded men as Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State when Japan invaded Manchuria, was shared, so far as our records go, neither by the President nor the Congress. And if it was shared by the majority of the people, there is abundant reason to hold that at that time no substantial number of Americans would have approved of war on Japan because of it.

Did the United States, did Great Britain, France and Russia become accessories after the fact in these crimes when they declined to treat them as crimes and continued close relations both with the nations that had committed them and the persons who had instigated them? It is hard to understand why that conclusion does not follow.

The question of individual guilt in those who urged or instigated Japan to violate its pledge then, or Germany to violate its pledge later, was, if discussed at all, chiefly heard from the lips the very humanitarian pacifists who today would reject these trials altogether, even for crimes against humanity and war crimes proper. It is impossible to determine with certainty whether public opinion at the present time supports the doctrine of individual guilt for crimes against peace. The impossibility is due to the fact that the three types of crimes are inevitably fused in the public mind by being combined in a single trial. To reject any one of the three creates the impression of defending men whose vicious actions seem to place them quite beyond the reach of any sort of clemency.

This transfer of the evil character of one accusation to another accusation of a wholly different kind is unjustified but hard to avoid. The men who committed crimes against humanity — these 22 defendants, if they are proven guilty — are men for whom nothing can be said in extenuation of their acts or in mitigation of their punishment. But although we can only with difficulty prevent the emotional transfer, we might make the

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attempt to conjecture what the public attitude would be if no crimes against humanity and no war crimes had been committed. We can gain some idea about it by asking what the attitude would be if any individual soldier or officer who had done no more than fight in the war were arraigned among the 22 defendants. They have "waged a war of aggression" as declared in Article 6, and both they and all our prisoners of war are criminals, if we take that phrase of Article 6 literally, as of course no one proposes to do.

I think we can say with some confidence that there would be little or no public support for making criminals of them, and I think this would be true of Keitel and Jodl and Doenitz and Raeder if they were not charged with complicity in war crimes and in crimes against humanity but only with being commanders in the armed forces of our enemy. Nor would the public feel appreciably different about them if it were shown that as members of the German General Staff they "planned, prepared and initiated" this war.

It would, I think, have been far better, if the court had confined itself to a consideration of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and allowed crimes against peace to be dealt with in a different way and by a different tribunal. These last are offenses in which values and the judgments based on them are determined in a way peculiar to themselves. We enter a different universe of discourse. Men who commit crimes against humanity are like those who commit murder, rape and robbery. The normal person is not likely to heroize them. But to prepare a scheme for dominating the world is a grandiose undertaking, however evil, and it might have glamor for weak eyes. It affords a dangerous enhancement for these men to charge them with crimes of such monstrous magnitude. Justice Jackson speaks of them as "twenty-odd broken men," "miserable men," whose "fate is of little consequence to the world." Their proper place is in the criminals' dock with their ruffianly kind, for the acts of brutality, torture, rape, murder, robbery and kidnapping which they are charged with committing, ordering, acquiescing in or permitting.

Suppose that they were tried only for these crimes, would they be convicted? Those who sneer at the trial assure us that there is no possible chance that they would be acquitted, and that the trial is a farce for that reason alone. I see no reason to think that

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the judgment is predetermined. To judge by what has already been brought forward, the evidence is likely to convince most unprejudiced persons, unless it is rebutted by equally strong evidence on behalf of the defendants.

As far as procedure is concerned, the trial is unimpeachable. The prosecution has not spent itself in denunciation. The evidence has linked each one of the defendants to specific acts. For example, Major-General Erwin Lahousen testified on November 30, 1945, that Keitel himself, not some subordinate, took part in the meetings in which it was determined that certain prisoners of war were to be put to death, and again that both Keitel and Ribbentrop informed the witness of the plan made as early as September 1939 for the systematic extermination of Poles and Jews, plans carried out afterwards with such dreadful thoroughness. The statements were denied and Lahousen was severely cross-examined without his testimony being shaken. The final question will then be, as in all criminal trials, whether the witness or the defendant is to be believed. Confirmation of either will be tested in the usual fashion in which weight and sufficiency of testimony are examined. The technical rules of evidence, which are so striking a characteristic of Anglo-American law, are of course not employed. These technical rules were never in force on the Continent and have been partially abandoned in the United States, especially in administrative procedure. Truth or falsity, probability or improbability, need not be made to depend on technicalities. Reason and experience furnish adequate canons.

The utmost care has been taken to enable all the defendants to present the fullest defense for themselves. They have been given complete copies of the charges against them and have had access to the documents on which the charges were based. They have counsel of their own choosing or counsel provided by the court and agreeable to them. Arrangements are made that they may understand every word said in the proceedings, whatever language is used by the court, the prosecutors and the witnesses. The witnesses have testified against them in open court and have been cross-examined. They will call witnesses on their own behalf. They and their counsel may address the court and have frequently done so. They will be allowed a final statement — the last statement of the trial — to the court.

If there is anything lacking to make this the fullest grant of due process it is hard to see what it is. The oft-quoted statement of

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Marshall in the Dartmouth College case (17 U. S. 58) defines due process as "the procedure which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." All of these things are present here.

It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that the judgment in the case of all 22 defendants will be condemnation. Nor is it certain that if condemned they will all be sentenced to death. Of the three prosecutors who have so far prosecuted their cases, neither Justice Jackson for the United States nor Sir Hartley Shawcross for Great Britain has specified the penalty or penalties he will propose. M. de Menthon for France has declared that he will demand the death penalty. Section 8 of the Charter, while it rejects "superior orders" as a defense, allows it as an element in mitigation of punishment. Whether such minor defendants as Sauckel or Speer will allege it, or even such major ones as Keitel, Jodl or Seyss-Inquart, remains to be seen.

The judgment of the court on the defendants will be final. The Allied Control Council may decrease or modify the penalty, but it may not change the verdict nor may it increase the punishment. The court itself, Justice Jackson declares, will be judged by history. So far as its will to do justice is concerned, the labors for eight months of a highly trained personnel under eminent guidance, labors that required a continent to be ransacked and thousands of persons and documents to be examined, furnish ample warrant that history will not condemn it. Nor will there be any doubt about the significance and value of the trial for the law of the future world community. I have ventured to set forth my opinion that the value would be even greater if the court had declined to consider a question which world opinion is not yet demonstrably ready to place before a criminal court.

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STRATEGIC AIR POWER

Fulfillment of a Concept

By General Carl Spaatz

WORLD WAR II might have ended differently had our enemies understood and made correct use of Strategic Air Power.

In the elation of victory it is well for us to remember the year 1942 when the conquests of the Axis Powers reached their apogee. Europe was a Nazi fortress, mined and ribbed with the latest improvements in surface defense, over which the Luftwaffe reigned supreme. In the German view, science had made that fortress impregnable. Astonishing feats of logistics had enabled the Wehrmacht to stretch from the Pyrenees to the Volga and the Caucasus; and Italian contingent armies in North Africa approached the Nile. Japan also was a fortress; and outside it, the Japanese reach extended from Burma in a vast arc to the Aleutians.

The outlook for the Allies was grim. By all time-tested and "proven" methods of warfare the combined might of the Axis Powers seemed unconquerable. Their resources in manpower and matériel were such that they could ward off exhaustion for an indefinite period of time. Sea blockade, therefore, could not be counted on to have the strangling effect it produced in World War I. Our land and sea forces, supported by air, could be expected to contain the most advanced echelons of our enemies, and gradually to drive back their main armies into their heavily fortified citadels. But the essential question remained. How was their military power to be crushed behind their ramparts without undertaking an attritional war which might last years, which would cost wealth that centuries alone could repay and which would take untold millions of lives? The man in the street asked, with reason: "How can we ever beat them? With what?"

The development of a new technique was necessary. Some new instrument had to be found, something untried and therefore "unproven," something to "spark the way" to early and complete victory. The outcome of the total war hung in the balance until that new technique had been found and proved decisive in all-out assault. The new instrument was Strategic Air Power. In 1942 it was already in the process of development.

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II. THE GERMAN STRATEGIC FAILURE, 1940

The effectiveness of the new technique had been given negative demonstration by Germany's history-making mistake in 1940. After Dunkirk, Hitler stood on the threshold of his goal, the domination of all Europe. Which way would he strike next? France was prostrate; Spain was not unfriendly. Two trained German parachute divisions were on the alert to drop on Gibraltar, the capture of which would have corked up the western exit of the British Mediterranean fleet. The war on Britain's life stream of shipping could then have been increased to unbearable intensity. On the other hand, there, just across the Channel, lay Britain, without the thousand new field guns which the B.E.F. had left behind in Belgium. Guarding the narrow strip of water were powerful elements of the British Navy, and an unknown number of British fighter airplanes. Hitler made his choice: it was to let Gibraltar wait, and to try for a "knock-out" blow against Britain from the air as a preliminary to turning on Russia. It was his historic opportunity, which was never to return.

Fortunately for us, neither Hitler nor the German High Command understood the strategic concept of air power or the primary objective of a strategic air offensive. The Germans had air supremacy on the Continent. They also had air superiority in numbers over Britain; but they were unable to establish control of the air, and this was essential to carry out sustained operations. The German bombers were lightly armed. The German fighters were used in close support of the bombers. The British had the surprise of radar and eight-gunned fighters. Technically and tactically the R.A.F. was superior. Air control can be established by superiority in numbers, by better employment, by better equipment, or by a combination of these factors. The Germans might have gained control of the air if their fighters had been used in general support instead of close support of the bombers, or if their bombers had done more accurate and effective bombing (*e.g.* on the British airfields), or if all the German air force had been directed against Britain.

It was apparent to observers in 1940 [1] that the German leadership was wedded to the old concept that air power was restricted

[1] *Editor's Note:* General Spaatz, then a Lieutenant-Colonel, was air observer, attached to the American Embassy in London, from May to September 1940. His official report that the Blitz would fail through German misuse of air power was one of the influential predictions of the war.

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to support of fast-moving ground troops and that it did not have an independent mission of its own. This tactical concept had been successfully implemented against Poland and France by the Stuka-Panzer combination, under conditions of German air supremacy. The bombing of Britain, on the other hand, was a strategic task, for the successful accomplishment of which German control of the air first had to be established. The Germans disregarded this absolute necessity. First, they had not built heavy bombers which could carry enough armament to be relatively secure. The lightly-armed Ju 88's, He 111's and Do 17's which carried the bombs were no match for the British eight-gunned fighters, aided by the warnings of secret radar. They were shot down in swarms. Second, the German fighters outnumbered the R.A.F. Hurricanes and Spitfires. Their proper function was to destroy R.A.F. fighters. Instead, they kept close formation to cover the inadequately armed bombers — a defensive rôle which could never win control of the air.

Viewed historically, the German failure in the Blitz demonstrated the wrong technique for strategic bombing. The German mistakes were: 1, inadequate armament on the bombers; 2, no capability for precision bombing; 3, use of the fighters in close support of the bombers instead of in general support.

Germany had the industrial capacity and skill to build properly armed heavy bombers before and during the early years of the war. The four-engined Focke-Wulfe was in operation, but was used against shipping from Norway and France. The He 177, with two propellers on four motors, was a failure, and wasted two years of effort. Consequently, the Luftwaffe attempted the strategic reduction of Britain from the air with means which could have been successful only through the proper use of German fighter superiority. But the Nazi war leaders (to whom the Luftwaffe was completely subservient, which meant that independent air thinking was in abeyance) did not grasp the strategic concept. If they had understood it, and had built heavy well-armed bombers, and had used their fighters to gain control of the air, they could actually have reduced Britain to a shambles in 1940. Later, by applying the strategic lessons, they probably would have been able to hold the line of the Volga by bombing Russian war plants in the Urals and beyond. Once the success of strategic air warfare had been demonstrated, it is conceivable that Hitler would not have declared war on America when he did. In any case, we would

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have been too late for this particular war, and we would have been deprived of the use of the United Kingdom as a base when the time came for us to fight.

The historic penalty paid by the Nazis for their mistake was that they have passed into oblivion and Germany lies in ruins.

III. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT: THE IDEA AND THE WEAPON

Strategic bombing, the new technique of warfare which Germany neglected in her years of triumph, and which Britain and America took care to develop, may be defined as being an independent air campaign, intended to be decisive, and directed against the essential war-making capacity of the enemy. Its immeasurable advantage over two-dimensional techniques is that its units (heavy bombers and fighter escorts) are not committed to position in battle; on the contrary, they carry out their assigned missions, and then return to base to prepare for fresh assault.

What makes strategic bombing the most powerful instrument of war thus far known is its effective application of:

1. The principle of mass, by its capacity to bring all its forces from widely distributed bases simultaneously to focus on single targets. Such concentration of combat power has never been possible before.

2. The principle of objective, by its capacity to select for destruction those elements which are most vital to the enemy's war potential, and to penetrate deep into the heart of the enemy country to destroy those vital elements wherever they are to be found. These main objectives, reached during hostilities by strategic bombing following the establishment of control of the air, have not been attained historically by surface forces until toward the end of field campaigns.

3. The principle of economy of force, by its capacity to concentrate on a limited number of vital target systems instead of being compelled to disperse its force on numerous objectives of secondary importance, and by its capacity to select for destruction that portion of a target system which will yield the desired effect with the least expenditure of force.

Strategic bombing is thus the first war instrument of history capable of stopping the heart mechanism of a great industrialized enemy. It paralyzes his military power at the core. It has a strategy and tactic of mobility and flexibility which are peculiar

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to its own medium, the third dimension. And it has a capacity, likewise peculiar, to carry a tremendous striking force, with unprecedented swiftness, over the traditional line of war (along which the surface forces are locked in battle on land and sea) in order to destroy war industries and arsenals and cities, fuel plants and supplies, transport and communications — in fact, the heart and the arteries of war economy — so that the enemy's will to resist is broken through nullification of his means.

British air leaders had this strategic concept in mind at the beginning of the war. But they lacked the means to carry it out. Their daylight raids on German industrial targets in 1940 resulted in prohibitive losses. Accordingly, the R.A.F. turned to night bombing, which was feasible despite the Luftwaffe's air supremacy over Germany because effective night fighters had not yet appeared. The British developed the most effective heavy night bomber, the Lancaster, which went into action in 1943 and remained the greatest load-carrier of the air war in Europe.

The strategic concept had also been the focus of studies and planning in the United States Army Air Forces in the 1930's. The American version was built around the B-17 for precision bombing by daylight. Daylight bombing was still regarded with skepticism in some quarters because of the German experience in the 1940 Blitz and the British experience over German targets. Both our weapon and our organization remained untried. It was feared that the losses in daylight bombing would be prohibitive. Accordingly, there was an inclination on the part of experienced war leaders to put all Allied strategic bombers on the night run.

The critical moment in the decision whether or not this should be done came on January 21, 1943. On that date the Combined Chiefs of Staff finally sanctioned continuance of bombing by day and issued the Casablanca directive which called for the "destruction and dislocation of the German military industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." To implement this directive there was drawn up a detailed plan, "The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan," which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, June 10, 1943, and issued to British and American air commanders. Strategic bombing at last had the green light; and it possessed a plan of operations of its own, with an approved order of priorities in targets, to achieve the objectives of the Casa-

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blanca directive. That plan called for bombing by night and by day, round the clock.

IV. FULFILLMENT OF THE CONCEPT

As far back as the time of Pearl Harbor the Army Air Forces had the Idea; but the Idea still remained to be worked out by experiment in the grim practice of war. In order to do this we first had to "forge" the weapon, develop the proper technique to make it decisive in battle, prepare the necessary bases within operational range of the proposed targets, and then establish control of the air before proceeding to the all-out assault. All these things took time. The building of the Air Forces with sufficient striking power to carry out the strategic tasks, as ultimately outlined in the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan, required a national effort of unprecedented magnitude, and two and a half years of time. Those years were provided by the unwavering resistance of our Allies to our common enemies.

It took time to "forge" the weapon. The portion of America's industrial power devoted to the manufacture of airplanes and their equipment had already been stepped up by British and French war orders. This capacity was shifted to fulfillment of our own needs. Constant technical research made for improved designs and for modifications, based on experience in battle, to arrive at an all-weather weapon capable of self-defense. At the peak of our strength, in 1944, there were nearly 80,000 airplanes of all types under the control of the A.A.F., of which more than half were in combat. The heavy bombers, the B-17's and the B-24's, along with the fighters (P-51, P-47, and P-38) which provided the long-range escort beginning in the autumn of 1943, accomplished the decisive strategic task in Europe. The B-29, the most powerful airplane ever built, accompanied by the P-51, was equally decisive in destroying Japan's capacities to wage war. The quantity production of the heavy bomber in three types and of the necessary long-range fighter escorts was an achievement which will stand to the historic credit of America's industrial genius in support of air power.

It took time to acquire a new technique for the effective employment of the chosen weapon. There never had been a strategic air war on the scale projected. The proper methods had to be learned by experiment. The Army Air Force, which had 1,300 flying officers of the Regular Army on active duty in 1940, ex-

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panded to reach a total of 2,300,000 personnel in 1944. Technical training was necessary in the organization of air and ground crews (the backbone of an air force) to man the 220 groups projected, as well as in intelligence and target selection, in communications, weather, radio, radar, tactical air doctrine, etc. Gradual mastery of the new technique kept pace with production of the weapons.

It took time to prepare bases within operational range of the enemy's vital war potentials, and to build up the supply system and the supplies necessary to sustain operations. In its global war the A.A.F. needed bases in such widely distributed theaters that the allocation of matériel was a constant problem. The European theater was given top priority in airplanes, but circumstances at times dictated diversions to the Pacific. The base in the United Kingdom had to be established in spite of the enemy submarine menace in 1942. The "Torch" operation in North Africa in November 1942 depleted the Eighth Air Force, both as to airplanes and personnel, but led one year later to the creation of a second strategic base in Italy. The activation of the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy in November 1943 made possible the coördination of bombing attacks from two theaters on the same German targets, thus implementing the principle of mass. In the Pacific, bases for the B-29's were first in China, and later were moved to the Marianas and Okinawa as the surface attack on Japanese forces closed in on Japan proper. The A.A.F. operational air bases around the world represented a triumph of American engineering ingenuity, whether by the laying of huge runways for the super-bombers, or by the conversion of swamps and deserts into air strips by means of steel mats.

Finally, it took time to gain control of the air, the absolutely necessary prerequisite for sustained strategic bombing. The German Air Force, although designed primarily to support ground troops, was a formidable defense — a fighting wall in the air. The task was to smash the wall, not only in order to clear the way for our heavy bombers over Germany, but also so as to remove the threat of air attack on our surface forces during and after the planned invasion. The duel with the German Air Force ensued.

In July 1943 an effort was made to get on with the first big task — the destruction of the German fighter system. These battles were a slugging match. A decision might have been forced if the Allies had had enough strength to continue beyond the one

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week of concentrated attack. During this period the line of battle was pushed back by whittling tactics of attrition from mid-Channel to the interior of Germany. Toward the end of 1943 there was at last sufficient force in hand. The long-range fighters needed to combat the enemy fighter defenses had been perfected, equipped with additional fuel tanks. Other equipment had likewise been modified under battle conditions. The Strategic Air Forces were ready to smash the German air wall, and then to proceed with the Combined Bomber Offensive.

On February 20, 1944, there began six days of perfect weather which were utilized for a continuous assault on the widely-dispersed German aircraft-frame factories and assembly plants. This sustained attack, called "The Big Week," fatally reduced the capabilities of the Luftwaffe. German aircraft production recovered; but the Allies retained control of the air throughout the remaining 14 months of hostilities.

In the minds of our air leaders the Big Week was the turning point in the war. That is, the success of the Big Week confirmed belief in the strategic concept. What had been in doubt was now a certainty. We knew now that we could destroy the German capacity to make war.

Having achieved control of the air, the Strategic Air Forces were employed on a twofold mission: 1, preparation for D-Day by the systematic destruction of the enemy's transport and communications; and 2, progressive destruction of his synthetic oil plants and other elements immediately vital to his continued resistance.

On April 16, 1945, the Headquarters of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces issued an order ending strategic bombing. The strategic air war in Europe was over; the concept had been fulfilled.

The lessons learned in the air war over Germany were applied with increasing vigor over Japan. The B-29 assault on the war industries in Japan proper began in the summer of 1944 with small attacks from China; these were augmented by attacks of similar weight from the Marianas beginning in November. The all-out mass offensive by the Twentieth Air Force began with the first low-level incendiary attack of March 9, 1945, and continued at accelerated frequency and intensity until Japan's capitulation on August 14, 1945. An invasion by the surface forces was not necessary. This air campaign will remain the classic prototype of the strategic concept as fulfilled in World War II.

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V. APPRAISALS

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, after nearly a year of study and six months of investigations in Germany, issued the following over-all judgment: "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe." Certain authoritative enemy judgments may be cited in support of this view.

The German reaction was well summed up by Lieutenant General Linnarz, Commander of the crack 26th Panzer Division, when he was interrogated on June 26, 1945, as follows:

> The basic conception of winning a war through strategic air power is sound. Historically, the strategic objective of any war has been to destroy the enemy's armies in the field. With increasing technological development, however, and the military fact that wars are no longer exclusively decided by generalship and battles, but by a nation's material might and war potential, it is obvious that in the future the first strategic objective in war cannot be the destruction of the armies in the field, but the destruction of the enemy's resources and war arsenals. Without these, the armies in the field are doomed to eventual defeat. A war might conceivably start with the attempt to destroy a nation's material power through employing a powerful weapon of long-range striking power. In this war, such a weapon was the long-range heavy bomber. In the future war it could conceivably be a type of perfected V-bomb.
>
> In my opinion, you might have won the war through strategic bombing alone — granted adequate bases, tactically secured. Since you wanted to end the war quickly, you did not rely on strategic bombing alone; you fought the war in combined operations on land, sea and air. At the beginning of the war we failed to see that the material power of the coalition against us was strong enough to destroy our war industries by strategic air attacks, even if we took the whole Continent. As our leaders couldn't see this, and as you were unwilling to rely entirely on strategic bombing, you brought the war to an early and successful close by both strategic and tactical use of air power.

Professor Willi Messerschmitt, designer of the famous Me 109, 110, etc., stated when interrogated:

> One of the strategic mistakes was the failure to construct a fleet of long-range bombers to supplement submarine warfare in the Atlantic and thereby to deny the United States the ability to set up an operating air force within range of German industrial centers.

Albert Speer, Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production, said:

> The planned assaults on the chemical industry (synthetic oil) which began on May 12, 1944, caused the first serious shortages of indispensable basic products and therefore the greatest anxiety for the future conduct of the war. Actually, this type of attack was the most decisive factor in hastening the end

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of the war. . . . The attacks on the synthetic oil industry would have sufficed, without the impact of purely military events, to render Germany defenseless. Further targets of the same kind were to be found in the ball-bearing industry and in power stations. . . . The dispersal of important industries from west and northwest Germany to central and eastern Germany was carried out in 1942 and 1943. From 1944 onward, vital key industries were transferred to caves and other underground installations. Production was hindered not so much by these dispersals as by the shattering of transport and communication facilities. Consequently it can be said in conclusion that a bomb load is more effective if it is dropped upon economic targets than if it is expended upon towns and cities.

VI. LESSONS OF STRATEGIC AIR POWER

What are the chief lessons of our experience with the strategic use of air power in this last war? (Note the restricted field covered; consideration of the tactical use of air power in support of ground forces would require additional space beyond the scope of the present article.)

1. One lesson is that the time we were given to make our preparations was an absolutely essential factor in our final success. We had warning in 1939, and by 1941 had made notable progress. Following Pearl Harbor, with the United States actually at war, we had two and a half years more to build the striking force necessary to fulfill the strategic concept. The total time allowed us to prepare for the final all-out assault was four and a half years. It is unthinkable that we should ever again be granted such grace.

The time lag is illustrated by the accompanying chart. Under the A.A.F. expansion program after Pearl Harbor, the total personnel, the number of combat groups and the number of aircraft mounted steadily. On the other hand, the tonnage of bombs dropped in a month did not begin to rise significantly until early in 1944. It reached a peak around D-Day, only to slacken off during the winter fogs of 1944–45, before attaining the all-time high prior to V-E Day. The gap between expansion in planes and personnel and the actual dropping of bombs tells the story of preparation for battle, of training, of technical supply, of adaptation and modification, of experimentation, of winning control of the air. It represents the time lag between the formation of tactical units and their conversion into striking power over the targets.

Had our peacetime air force been maintained during the 1930's at the level it attained even as early as the date of Pearl

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Harbor, and had it in consequence been prepared to act in the first year of war on the level it attained in mid-1942, then the tremendous and costly effort of the next two and a half years would have been enormously lessened. We would have struck at the heart of the enemy much earlier. It is even conceivable that the fact of an American air force in being, with full potential in 1939, might have prevented the outbreak of war.

In the next war, should there ever be one, four and a half years will not be allowed us in which to build up an air force, insured by the resistance of our Allies to common enemies. America will be Target Number 1; we will stand or fall with the air force available in the first crucial moment.

2. Air power in this war developed a strategy and tactic of its own, peculiar to the third dimension. It achieved the principle of mass, in the highest degree ever known, by its capacity to concentrate all its available units of striking power from widely distributed bases over one point — the enemy's heart. Any other force, operating in two dimensions, must strike at the periphery, the traditional line of war, and can reach the enemy's heart only after successful field campaigns. Air power at full potential overcomes the advantage of interior lines which centrally located countries previously enjoyed. It is not committed to battle, but returns to its base in preparation for a renewal of the assault. No other instrument of war has equivalent characteristics.

3. The first and absolute requirement of strategic air power in this war was control of the air in order to carry out sustained operations without prohibitive losses. The strategic offensive would not have been possible without the long-range fighter escort.

4. We profited by the mistakes of our enemies. The Germans were land-minded. In planning their aggression they did not allot their air force an independent mission of strategic offensive. Consequently they failed to meet their one historic opportunity to win decisively and quickly in 1940. Possibly their military leaders were fatally handicapped by the Nazi dictatorship. At any rate, they never recovered the advantage of air superiority in numbers over Britain, which later was to become the American base. They discovered too late the fatality of their lack of heavy bombers. They had been diverting plant capacity from making fighters to making V-1's and V-2's. But these arrived too late to affect the course of the war. Had they used the V-1 against ship-

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ping in the British ports prior to D-Day the invasion might perforce have been postponed for another year. After our inspection of their underground installations, we realized that their manufacture of jet fighters, and even jet bombers, could have reached dangerous proportions in another six months. These had been assigned first priority on the dwindling German oil supply. Given the super-speed of the jet-fighters, and given a sufficient supply of them (planned production: 1,200 per month), the Germans might have regained control of the air over Germany while we were waiting for our own jet production to catch up. In that contingency anything might have happened. Certainly, the end of the war would have been delayed.

To rely on the probability of similar mistakes by our unknown enemies of the future would be folly. The circumstances of timing, peculiar to this last war, and which worked out to our advantage, will not be repeated. This must not be forgotten.

5. Strategic Air Power could not have won this war alone, without the surface forces. The circumstances of timing did not permit. The full potential of sufficient striking power was attained only in the winter of 1943–44. By 1944 much of German war industry was going underground. Further, the invasion by land was necessary in order to force the diversion of German manpower from production, and even from manning the Luftwaffe. Thus, this war was won by the coördination of land sea and air forces, each of the Allies contributing its essential share to the victory. Air power, however, was the spark to success in Europe. And it is interesting to note that Japan was reduced by air power, operating from bases captured by the coördination of land, sea and air forces, and that she surrendered without the expected invasion becoming necessary.

Another war, however distant in the future, would probably be decided by some form of air power before the surface forces were able to make contact with the enemy in major battles. That is the supreme military lesson of our period in history.

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POSTWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By Eduard Beneš

IN JANUARY 1942 I wrote an article for FOREIGN AFFAIRS dealing with the organization of Europe after the war. I indicated that it was premature at that time to go into the subject in detail, since any such discussion would necessarily partake of the nature of propaganda rather than a scientific study of postwar conditions, the further continuation of the war being bound to change the situation in Europe fundamentally. Subsequent developments proved this caveat correct; only some of the things I wrote about in the article materialized as I had foreseen them.

On the whole, the victory which has been achieved is far more complete than I foresaw. But the subsequent organization of Europe as a whole is being planned and is taking place much as I supposed would be the case, even though the German situation is far worse than was to be expected, and will become worse still. When I wrote the article, it was supposed that the principle of federation would be far more generally applied in Central Europe. However, I emphasized very clearly that there would be great revolutionary changes in that region, that there would be no room in it for the Hapsburgs and other monarchies, and particularly that the problem of the German and Hungarian minorities as well as many economic questions would have to be solved radically. This diagnosis naturally concerned the Czechoslovak Republic primarily.

What is the state of affairs today in 1946, after the victorious conclusion of the Second World War?

First of all, any hopes that monarchies may be restored are definitely at an end. This is particularly true of the Hapsburgs, as I foresaw in 1942; but other old monarchies are disappearing also. There are two reasons for this process: the revolutionizing of internal conditions in all the Central European states and the immediate proximity of the Soviet Union.

This proximity has facilitated the national unification of the Ukrainians, *i.e.* the joining of Czechoslovak Carpatho-Russia with the Ukraine. Geographically speaking, the Soviet Union itself is now a part of Central Europe. Czechoslovakia could not on principle oppose this union, and did not do so. As far back as

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1918, President Masaryk and I regarded Czechoslovakia as only a trustee of that land, and we were willing to relinquish this trusteeship to the Ukraine as soon as the Ukrainian people were nationally united. This occurred when Eastern Galicia became a part of the Ukraine, and thereby of the Soviet Union. Our attitude thus respects the principle of national unification as applied to the Ukrainians. This fact — *i.e.* the participation of the Ukraine in political life south of the Carpathians — *a priori* excludes a Hapsburg restoration in the neighboring countries of Hungary and Austria.

The same factor also affects substantially the second problem, that of federation. Now that the Soviet Union has become territorially a part of Central Europe through the merger of Carpatho-Russia into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic it cannot now be ignored when questions of a new political constellation in this area arise. As is well known, the Soviet Union even during the war expressed its reserve toward the formation of large federative complexes of states in Central Europe, feeling that they might develop into the prewar type of "cordon sanitaire" and might separate or isolate the U.S.S.R. from the rest of Europe.

In considering the formation of some greater Central European confederation in the period between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia and the other states concerned were anxious above all to find a way to survive. They were afraid of German expansion. This reason, it is generally admitted, has now been removed for a long period to come. Moreover, for some states — Czechoslovakia, for example — the new proximity of Russia is added reason not to fear Germany so much. As a result, the year 1946 as compared to 1942 speaks against the idea of a confederation in Central Europe in its original form, so much so that it now is scarcely ever mentioned in political plans.

The foregoing is a plain statement of fact regarding political life today in the region called Central Europe. I say the region "called" Central Europe designedly, for the concept of Central Europe itself was open to controversy even before the war. It is a third reason why the problems here under discussion are formulated differently today than used to be the case.

It was always a controversial question which states should be considered Central European states. There was never any doubt about the inclusion of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, and no controversy about Jugoslavia and Rumania. There was

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doubt, however, concerning the necessity of Poland's being included, as well as about Bulgaria and some others. Next to the position of Poland, that of Germany was most in doubt. But since the intention in uniting these countries was to create a barrier against Germany, she was excluded. Naturally Germany was opposed to this conception, as was Italy, whose expansionist policy aimed at Jugoslavia and the Balkans. Germany wished to be considered a Central European state in order to facilitate her penetration of Central Europe and in order to create conditions favorable to her "Drang nach Osten," the forerunner of her attack on Southeastern and Eastern Europe.

All this has been substantially changed by the simple fact that the Soviet Union has geographically become a Central European state through Eastern Galicia and Carpatho-Russia. The result is that since the Second World War the concept of Central Europe is more a geographic than a political concept.

The fact that the Soviet Union today is a part of Central Europe will have a great influence on this region's future policy and development. Czechoslovakia became an ally of the U.S.S.R. for 20 years in 1943. Rumania and Hungary will both be affected also. In particular, Hungary must understand that in future she cannot become a tool of a German aggression, as happened twice in the last 25 years. Poland must definitely choose between Russia and Germany. The changes in her territory (the loss of her eastern provinces and the acquisition of a large portion of German territory) are bound to force her to decide definitely and clearly for an eastern orientation, *i.e.* for coöperation with Russia, although this will not mean that she will not be able to coöperate with the Anglo-Saxon states and with France as well.

Such is the prospect for the reorganization of Central Europe. I consider it, following the fall of Austria-Hungary after the First World War, as a necessary solution of the entire Central European problem, one far more logical and reasonable, moreover, than all other attempts which have been made in that direction, despite the fact that it completely and fundamentally changes earlier traditions and political concepts concerning the fate of Central Europe. It corresponds realistically to the actual given ethnic and geographical situation and to the inevitable future ethnic development of Central Europe generally. For the first time in the history of this region, the principle of nationality is adhered to almost to the limit; that is to say, each state is so

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constituted that its territory can contain either one people or several closely related peoples which belong together. Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are examples of the latter condition.

II

In international affairs Czechoslovakia never followed a policy of aggression or made national or state demands that were unreasonable or unfair. It always was consistent in defending to the limit the principles on which the future organization of the world for peace — or rather, security — can be built.

Czechoslovak foreign policy appraises all situations coolly. For example, it follows carefully the development of Hungary's internal policy, as enunciated by her new political and official leaders. It notes that they declared recently that Hungary is doing all she can to achieve peaceful coöperation among the nations in that part of Europe; and it notes that as yet they have taken few actions to convince Hungary's neighbors that the principles of democracy have really replaced the Arrow-Cross policy and have become the political creed not only of the Hungarian people but also of their government representatives.

The territorial status in Central Europe is recognized in principle as being that which prevailed before the aggression of Germany and her totalitarian satellites (Hungary, be it remembered, being not the last in line among them). In my opinion, it is inadmissible, under present conditions, to allow the question of revisionism to be opened. The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia with Hungary, Austria, Germany and Poland are intact. No political, military or economic considerations can change this reality. After what happened to her in 1938, Czechoslovakia has a right to complete moral satisfaction. The Soviet Union and Great Britain made this clear before the end of the war. The United States was not bound by the Munich dictate and never recognized it.

The choice is between the concept of a national state and the formerly recognized Wilsonian concept of a state of nationalities, with all that involves. In a national state there is no room for minority problems. The rule applies just as much to the Germans as to the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia; and it concerns not only Czechoslovakia but also Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania and Poland. Even the Great Powers have recognized that in the interest of peace in Europe there remains no other solution but

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the removal of the Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. The Potsdam Conference solemnly and definitely recognized this principle and notified the Czechoslovak Government of it. Poland and Hungary were also notified by the Powers of their decision in regard to Germans living in their territory, and both of them accepted this essential change.

As far as the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia are concerned, the removal will be carried out on a reciprocal basis: they will be exchanged for Slovaks from Hungary. The minority problem between Germany and Hungary on the one hand, and all their neighbors on the other, must be solved finally and irrevocably on a purely national basis. Members of minorities who refuse to return to their national state (for example, Slovaks who stay in Hungary and Hungarians who stay in Czechoslovakia) will be definitively sacrificed and given up to national assimilation in the other state.

Czechoslovakia has clearly shown her desire to come to an understanding with Hungary concerning this exchange. Hungary, on the other hand, although she intends to transfer her German population to Germany, hesitates to recognize and accept these principles and their consequences (principles, incidentally, which are internationally accepted for Germany). I am convinced, however, that she will come to the conclusion that there is no other solution, either for herself or for her neighbors. In recognizing this fact, she could facilitate the development of sincere, peaceful collaboration among the smaller Central European states, notwithstanding the obstacles created by the fact that she fought to the bitter end alongside of Germany against the Soviet Union, or that her troops invaded Jugoslavia alongside the Germans, or that she served as a springboard for German armed forces against Slovakia at the time of the Slovak revolt at Banskà Bystrica.

The Hungarian revisionist policy nevertheless seems to live on, despite a second political and military débâcle. It might well be included in the term "hostile aggression" as defined in the Briand-Kellogg Pact, one of the legal bases of the Nuremberg indictments of the war criminals. It was under the banner of revisionist ideology that Hungary went to war in company with Germany against her neighbors and against Russia, the United States and Great Britain. I repeat: I believe that Hungary will recognize the error of this, and that in the end she will come to an

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understanding with her neighbors. To fail to do so would mean a new threat to her own future.

I consider it necessary, in endeavoring to achieve closer collaboration in Central Europe, to create a firm and lasting relationship with another of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, Poland. The Beck ideology in that country was not very far removed from the political doctrine of Nazi Germany; and it so deeply infected a certain section of the Polish people that although they themselves were in mortal danger they would not understand that there exist certain limits in the field of political morality which a state cannot and must not overstep under any circumstances. The Beck régime brutally overstepped the bounds with regard to Czechoslovakia in 1938. It was as bad as, if not worse than, the aggression against us by the Hitler régime at that time. Its results must now be wholly undone. It seems likely that there will be a thorough understanding of this on Poland's part and that she will act accordingly. It then would be possible to arrive at a direct and lasting understanding between the two Slav states, linked together by the fact that Germany is an equal threat to both of them.

This kind of agreement is in the interest of a lasting peace among nations and hence is preferred by the Great Powers concerned, especially the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Should it not materialize, Czechoslovakia is determined to defend her point of view before the Peace Conference and to demand a full share in the eastern part of Upper Silesia detached from Germany. Let the rest of the world, the Great Powers, decide this question justly. The uncompromising insistence of Czechoslovakia on her prewar boundaries with Poland in the Teschen region, like those with Hungary, is supported equally by the argument that they are economically vital to her and by arguments based on international law and generally recognized political morality.

I do not exclude the possibility that danger of the German "Drang nach Osten" will compel Czechoslovakia and Poland to a closer collaboration in the political as well as the economic field, in full accord with the Soviet Union. I personally would welcome such a development.

Such is my view of Czechoslovak international relations after the Second World War. The conception which I have outlined points to a final and definite solution of the problem of minorities

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and nationalities in Central Europe, as indicated in my article in the pages of this review in 1942.

III

A further basic problem facing Czechoslovakia after this war is the question of the relationship of Czechs and Slovaks. Both peoples know that what happened in 1938–39 must never be repeated. They belong to each other; and the national existence of each cannot be solved in any other way. The Slovaks, numbering about three million people, cannot exist as an independent state, politically or economically. If they tried to do so, they would inevitably become the victims of their much stronger neighbors. Now that they are direct neighbors of Soviet Russia it is even less possible for them to think of this than it was before. On the other hand, the Czechs must and do understand that they cannot oppose the Slovak demand for broad decentralization and local government. They agreed to it fully, freely and democratically; and in the discussions of June 1945 the present government of Czechs and Slovaks decided that the constitution should be adjusted accordingly. Naturally, there are many details which are not yet settled. There is no doubt, however, that a full accord based on the accepted principles will be reached and incorporated in the definitive constitution of the Czechoslovak state.

The Slovaks as a whole, progressives and Catholics alike, approve this development (I received, for instance, a delegation of all the Slovak clergy, headed by the Archbishop of Nitra). The religious questions which concern them will be solved just as liberally as was done in the Czech area. The political development of Slovakia is not so far advanced as is that in Bohemia. The situation being more complicated in Slovakia, the postwar consolidation there will take longer than in Bohemia and Moravia. But in its main principles the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks is already solved; and after the elections of the National Constitutional Assembly take place in the spring, the solution will be incorporated into the constitutional laws of the Republic.

It is not necessary to add that these national elections will be absolutely free and will be carried out in the spirit of Masaryk's democracy. They will be universal, direct, secret and proportional. The configuration of the political parties in the Republic is more or less stabilized. There are four political parties in the Czech lands, and Slovakia will probably have the same number.

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I do not think, however, that the party development is ended. During the war, I personally recommended that the former system of too many political parties should be superseded by a system of three really democratic parties in both the Czech lands and in Slovakia.

Another problem facing us today is the punishment of the war criminals — all the war criminals, German, Hungarian, Czech and Slovak. The guilty Germans and Hungarians will be punished within the framework of the transfer of population. There is not one among the 11 million Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia today who would believe it possible to live together in one state with the Germans and the Hungarians. Since it is impossible to return either to the Munich territorial dictate or to accept a territorial revision in favor of the defeated countries, there is only one solution of the problem and that is the transfer. It also will accomplish the punishment of hundreds of thousands of Germans and Hungarians for their Fascism and for their betrayal of the state in 1938–39. The Nazi war criminals are gradually being tried by special tribunals, established for the purpose, strictly in accordance with our existing laws and according to the principles of justice and equity. In addition, it was decided by law that special national courts should be constituted to try guilty Czechs and Slovaks, particularly members of the Hácha Government in the Czech lands and of the Tiso Government in Slovakia. The Slovaks will judge the Slovak criminals. This national purge is necessary for both Czechs as well as Slovaks, because it signifies the liquidation of all forms of Fascism and Nazism in Czechoslovak life and the return to the pure essence and forms of Masaryk democracy.

Another great problem presents itself in the field of financial reconstruction. I do not wish to review here all our postwar difficulties and our plans for the reorganization of a healthy national and private economy. I shall mention only a few basic factors in the terrible inheritance left us from the German occupation. During their seven years of occupation the Germans plundered Czechoslovakia, sapping its financial and economic strength and leaving it considerably impoverished. Fortunately the wartime destruction did not strike us with the same force that it did other countries, and we did not suffer so much ruin and devastation as they. The result is that although we are today financially and economically very exhausted, we can begin

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with our own means to reconstruct and reorganize our industry and agriculture and thus restore to a great degree our country's prewar prosperity and wealth. In combating inflation, we face the task of putting our finances in order. We must reduce the 120 billion crowns left by the Germans to 30 billion Czechoslovak crowns and bring into equilibrium the other economic figures — on the one hand, the level of wages and salaries and, on the other, the price level of industrial and agricultural products. Until recently these were based on the banknote circulation of 1938, amounting to eight billion Czechoslovak crowns.

One of the most serious of our financial difficulties arises from the fact that the Czech banks were completely ruined during the German occupation. During the seven years that it lasted, the Germans forced all Czech banks to accept German notes, German government securities and various other German stocks and bonds amounting to hundreds of billions of Czechoslovak crowns, thereby exhausting the real assets of these banks and their depositors. Today these German securities are not worth the paper they are printed on. Hence all our banks without exception, and all their deposits, are without cover. This means that the banks are ruined. Realizing that it was impossible to count on receiving any real German reparations, the Czechoslovak state set itself to find some solution of the problem in order to save hundreds of thousands of its citizens from financial ruin.

After long deliberations, the Government decided that the easiest, best and most economical way to save the Czech banks from general bankruptcy (along with the entire financial structure of the state) would be to nationalize them. This also serves as an example of the kind of situation that must be dealt with today by the financially and economically mature states which have been plundered during the years of German occupation.

Many economic and technical difficulties resulting from the war were of a temporary character and are in process of liquidation. Take, for instance, the transportation problem. In 1938, the Czechoslovak Republic owned more than 100,000 railway cars. After the liberation in May 1945, only 15,000 remained. The rest had been stolen by the Germans and sent to Germany, Poland, the Balkans and elsewhere. Today we are already able to manufacture and repair cars. The American Army was helpful in rounding up for us those that had been dispersed throughout Europe, so that we now have more than 50,000. This means that the trans-

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portation difficulty has almost been overcome and that by next year our railroad communications will be back to normal. Railroad tracks and bridges damaged in the course of the fighting, particularly in Slovakia, are being quickly put into order. Some important railway constructions, *e.g.* bridges across the Danube to Hungary, were repaired or rebuilt with the help of the Red Army.

Our supply of food and raw materials also passed through a crisis, which now has been largely overcome. We introduced a strict system of rationing which functions satisfactorily in the whole state with the exception of some districts in eastern Slovakia. UNRRA has helped us effectively, so that we can safely say that there will be no absolute hunger, and no social unrest because of hunger. We have no surpluses, not even the smallest reserves, but with the help that UNRRA will give us in 1946 we can survive until the next harvest and shall be able to feed our people modestly and provide them with clothing and shoes.

The raw materials imported with the help of UNRRA, and the others which we receive in return for our exports of sugar, malt, beer and some products of our metallurgical industry, are sufficient to set our industrial production into motion slowly. The morale of our labor is far from what it was in 1938; but it is steadily improving. The nationalization of certain of our industries was also effected in order to bring the workmen back to the factories and gradually improve their working morale. There is a great lack of coal for heating homes, but next year the coal output will be normal.

In transportation, industry and foreign trade we are today hindered, slowed down and sabotaged not by events in our own country but solely by the economic, financial and transportation difficulties in neighboring states and by the political disorder and unrest prevailing there. Our geographical position is unfortunate. We are surrounded by Germany, Austria and Hungary, states which fought against us, which lost, and which today are in a state of almost total upheaval. This sets a handicap on our speedy consolidation. In spite of it, and although we fought Germany and were occupied by her, we have succeeded in extricating ourselves from disaster after the hostilities were over by our own power, by the work of our citizens and by our own political and economic efforts. Such has been our progress toward consolidation that, in economic health, we stand with Belgium at the top

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of the list of European nations which underwent enemy occupation. Czechoslovakia will be the first among all the Central European states to find its normal way in 1946.

IV

I would also like to say a few words about the problem of nationalization or socialization of our industry. First of all, I wish to stress that while we are carrying out the nationalization of some of our industries, we do not claim the necessity for this in other states. We have no desire to meddle in these vital questions of other states. In my previous article I pointed out that all these questions would certainly have to be solved in Czechoslovakia after the war on the basis of socialization. I realized then that Europe's evolution would follow that line, and subsequent events have proved me right.

Whether there should or should not be socialization depends, of course, upon the political, economic, geographic and ethnic situation of each state and upon its tradition and history. In other words, the possibility and need of carrying out socialization reforms arise exclusively from the individual situation of particular countries and cannot be generalized. The conditions in Czechoslovakia after this war were such as to make the nationalization of certain industries possible, or even necessary.

It is a fact that the Second World War produced an internal political revolution in most of the occupied or warring European states and also greatly affected economic problems and made necessary the rebuilding of prewar democracy into something substantially changed. The shortcomings of Europe's prewar liberal-bourgeois democracy contributed greatly to the rise of the prewar dictatorships — first the development of Fascism, then of Nazism. The changes in liberal democracy are being carried out in accordance with the conception that political democracy must be transformed into social and economic democracy.

The internal evolution of European society which began at the time of the French revolution was necessarily different from the evolutionary development in the United States. European international political disunity, the result of natural conditions, has no historical analogy in the United States. That is why the national and nationality development within European society followed other patterns than the evolution in America and cannot be measured in all respects from the point of view and ex-

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perience of America, just as the American situation cannot be analyzed and judged exclusively from the European point of view.

The Second World War has set European society toward a social rebirth. The United States certainly will consider the results of the social-revolutionary changes now under way as a contribution toward a new and more just organization of Europe and toward the establishment of a more just and lasting peace, based on better social and economic conditions. The socializing tendencies of reconstructed democracy are going to facilitate this type of organization. Should the tendency also bring about a revaluation of spiritual and moral values, represented by the newly deepened and broadened democratic type of régime, this also would certainly contribute toward the moral rebirth of mankind as a whole.

These are theoretical reflections concerning the future social evolution of Europe generally. I will take Czechoslovakia as an example, to show how the actual development of political and economic conditions produced the necessity for the nationalization of the country's industry.

German interference in Central Europe, and above all the establishment of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, assumed in a great measure the form of *economic* subjugation. The Germans took over the control of all key industries and banking. German big business concerns and trusts practically expropriated all large Czech properties, and in this way automatically prepared the nationalization of Czechoslovak industry from the economic point of view. The Czechoslovak state after its liberation could not satisfy numerous individuals by returning to them the properties they formerly had owned; often they had sold them voluntarily to the Germans. There also were instances in which great properties had been stolen from Jews, who afterwards were killed or perished without leaving any heirs. And there were many other similar cases. It was impossible to return this sort of property or to distribute it to individuals. It seemed more advantageous, then, to leave the property in the ownership of the state, even though it was decided that it would be administered in accordance with the principles of private enterprise.

If Czechoslovakia is to be a truly national state, and if it carries out the necessary transfer of Germans as decided at the Potsdam Conference in an organized and humanitarian way, the question

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arises what should be done with the big industries and the banks which belonged to the "Sudeten" Germans who were guilty of treason against the Republic. (For instance, the paper and porcelain industry was in the hands of "Sudeten" Germans belonging to the Nazi Party.) There is no better solution than to take this property, the profits of which paved the way economically and financially for Munich, and transfer it to the state as the confiscated property of traitors.

The nationalization of a part of Czechoslovak industry does not merely reflect contemporary political tendencies; it also conforms to what seems a correct appraisal of future evolution. Political tendencies in Great Britain and the result of the elections in France leave no doubt as to the growing influence of the socialistic element in modern democracy. Without any pressure, without strikes, revolts and political upheavals, Czechoslovakia is openly and honorably trying to prepare herself for this development by making her working people conscious of the great responsibility that falls on their shoulders as a result of these social and economic changes.

It is natural that the socialistic system of the neighboring Soviet Union should exercise an influence on the economic reorganization of Czechoslovakia. In spite of this fact, Czechoslovakia remains and will remain absolutely independent, with her own political democratic régime and her own parliamentary democracy. The Soviet Union does not interfere in any respect in Czechoslovak affairs. Czechslovakia is following her own way, her own methods and traditions. This does not mean isolation from the Soviet Union; it simply represents an endeavor on her part to create her own national policy, one which will satisfy the needs and requirements of her own national and state existence. Czechoslovakia takes whatever can be advantageously adapted to her own needs from the Soviet Union, just as she takes what she needs from America, Great Britain or other countries. In every case and always she acts so as to continue most successfully on *her own Czechoslovak path.*

The present form of organization simply means that three kinds of ownership are developing in Czechoslovakia: private, coöperative and state ownership. The reorganization of Czechoslovak economy is being undertaken very carefully, in full consciousness of the importance of the problems involved for the future of the state and for the adjustment of its relations with its

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neighbors. Czechoslovakia has confidence in the success of her nationalization measures and believes that she will again become as important a factor in the European economic world as she was before the war. She will endeavor to develop and broaden her economic and financial relations with all Allied and friendly countries. She knows that she is facing very important and responsible tasks. She realizes that she will have great difficulties, that she will not be able to accomplish what she has set herself to do overnight. But she has faith that ultimately she will succeed.

I have sketched, now, Czechoslovakia's international problems and those facing her in internal reconstruction. She has begun her postwar tasks with courage and enthusiasm. She is and will remain an independent, democratic and progressive state, with a pacifist policy. She will follow in the tradition of her first President, T. G. Masaryk. I know that during the last six months fantastic rumors have been circulated about her, based on propaganda and a lack of knowledge about actual conditions. I am sure that the year 1946 will prove they were fantastic by giving evidence of her normal development.

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BRITAIN'S DECLINING ROLE IN WORLD TRADE

By Henry Clay

IN ANY attempt to form an opinion of future changes some concept of normality is an intellectual necessity. For men of my generation, men born before 1890, there is an almost irresistible tendency to take as normal the position in the twenty years before 1914. This is especially the case when one considers a subject like that here discussed — the economic position of the United Kingdom. We are apt to think of the First World War as a disturbing influence; of the difficulties of the inter-war period as marking the abnormality of that period; of the late war as another disturbance! After the first war, British economic policy was directed to getting back as quickly as possible to prewar arrangements — as by the return to free trade and the gold standard. I think I discern signs, not only in the United Kingdom but in America as well, that the same undefined but not uninfluential concept of normality is widely held today. I myself now believe any return to pre-1914 conditions to be wildly improbable. I believe that the pre-1914 epoch, far from being normal, was a unique experience in the economic life of the race in historic times, a sort of golden age which no one now living will ever see again. If I am wrong in attributing to others the fallacy of which I used to be guilty, it may still be worth while to glance at the characteristics of this past age, and to examine the effects of two world wars upon it, before attempting to frame a conception of the economic future we have to face.

The economic policy and arrangements of the United Kingdom in the twenty years before 1914 were unique. At no other time and in no other country have these essential characteristics been reproduced together. To take the most obvious: there was almost complete free trade, complete freedom of transfer of funds, an immediately available gold reserve of only 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 pounds sterling; and yet there was a confidence in the stability of the sterling exchanges which we have never enjoyed since 1914. Such unrestricted freedom points to underlying conditions which have since been lost — a fundamental equilibrium in the trade and financial relations between the chief countries of the world; a degree of confidence in the maintenance of that equilib-

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rium which it is hard to realize today; a strength in the United Kingdom's economic relations with other countries which is also now only a memory.

The external relations reflected, and reacted on, the domestic position of British industry. The basis was a high degree of specialization on export industry and the services that are connected with international trade. The predominant industries — those which were growing, which offered the best wages and profits and commanded most political influence — were the industries most engaged in export, namely textiles, coal, engineering and shipbuilding. The typical British manufacturing industry did not merely export a surplus over domestic needs; it produced primarily for export, incidentally satisfying domestic needs, a state of things common enough with the agricultural and mining products of a colonial economy but rare if not unique in a developed industrial country. The concentration on industry for export had two effects. Along with the immense import trade which it made possible, it encouraged the development of ancillary services — shipping, international banking and insurance, long-term overseas lending — which in turn assisted exports. And it compelled industrialists to follow tendencies and developments in the overseas countries which provided them with their markets. Together, these in turn led to the development of a great network of overseas merchandizing and banking houses, agencies, shipping facilities, which provided a material embodiment of the pervasive interest in external trade. It was a system which exploited to the full the natural and historic advantages of the United Kingdom — its insular position at the meeting point of all the world trade routes to Europe; its wealth of harbors; its riches of coal, easily got and accessible to tidewater; the start it had gained in nineteenth century manufacture; the steady stream of its emigrants, temporary and permanent, to every part of the world.

The correlative of this efficient, expanding and closely integrated industrial and financial economy was the other characteristic which made the United Kingdom unique among the great countries of the world — its neglect of agriculture. In the United Kingdom the proportion of the occupied population engaged in agriculture was only 7 percent. In no other great country was agriculture left so destitute of protection and government help and with so little political influence.

So much for the domestic aspect of Britain's international

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position; the aspect it presented to the outside world was of equal importance. In 1914 the United Kingdom was still the greatest trading country in the world. Its industries still retained some of the advantages of the early start in modern industrial methods which its insular position and freedom from war had given it. It was still a cheap producer — the cheapest, in the industries on which its exports depended most. It had normally a favorable balance of payments equivalent to a quarter or a third of its merchandise imports. It had a strong creditor position on long-term which increased yearly. For all those reasons, its financial capital, London, was the repository for a large part of the liquid reserves of a large part of the rest of the world, and the main part of the business of clearing international payments was done in sterling through London. In this way London was the financial capital of a community wider than the United Kingdom and wider than the British Empire. It linked together the credit and clearing arrangements of a large part of the world's international trade, focussed them in a single center and provided them with a uniform currency. British trade was relatively large enough to perform a similar service of coördination and unification. The open United Kingdom market, the largest import market in the world, linked intimately with London and Liverpool most of the specialized agricultural producers of the world and much mineral and industrial production.

Thus the United Kingdom was the nucleus and center of a real international economic community, which enjoyed freedom of movement for goods, funds and men, extending into every corner of the world even if it included only a fraction of many countries. Such a community had not existed since the Roman Empire; a succession of two world wars raises doubt whether it will exist again in our lifetime.

II

It is doubtful whether even now the effect of the First World War on this unique economy is fully understood. The dislocation it caused was both direct and indirect, and was the greater since the war probably concealed and accelerated a fundamental change of trend in economic development which was due to take place. The United Kingdom could not have expected, even if there had been no war, to continue for long to do two-thirds of the world's aggregate export trade in cotton manufactures, four-

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fifths of the world's total export of coal, and more than half of the world's shipbuilding.

The most obvious effect of war is to divert resources from peacetime purposes to war needs and to create a problem of demobilization and settlement when the war is over. This effect, however, need not alter the direction and relations of the country's normal economy; once the readjustment is effected, prewar trends may be resumed. Thus, in the United Kingdom the great diversion of labor into the metal and engineering group of industries during the war was corrected by the end of the twenties. So far as the long-range trends of the British economy were concerned, the chief effect of this primary dislocation was to divert attention from more persistent and fundamental changes to which the country would have to adjust itself. These arose mainly from the interruption war involved in normal relations and processes. It interrupted contact between United Kingdom industry and its overseas market for four years, lengthened to six by the unfortunate postwar boom; and it interrupted the process of continuous adaptation to change, which normally tempers the wind of change to the shorn entrepreneur. The result was that in 1921 British industry was suddenly confronted with the results of six years' cumulative change in its markets, and forced to begin to plan the necessary readjustment in the middle of a trade depression. Its prewar markets had been forced to look elsewhere for supplies for so long that they had made themselves independent of British supplies, and the prosperous and expanding export industries of the country had now a large element of redundant labor and plant.

This was the position already in 1921. For ten years, however, the fundamental change in the country's economic position was overlooked and its effects attributed to cyclical trade depression, credit policy, anything except a permanent shift in comparative advantages. Meanwhile, the change was confirmed and perpetuated by protection of local industries in overseas markets as soon as British industry was able to resume supplies. The full effects were not felt at once, because the business of restocking and reëquipping after the great war sustained demand for British exports for many years; and the world was in an expansionist phase. Yet even in the twenties the so-called "depressed areas" were differentiating themselves — areas specialized to export industries which had lost a substantial part of their

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markets. When the depression came in 1929 it was clear enough that their difficulties until then had not been due to cyclical depression and would not be removed by cyclical recovery. But little was done to adjust industry to the changed conditions.

This failure to perceive and act on the need of permanent and drastic readjustment in the twenties illustrates very well the influence of the concept of prewar normality. So far from trying to adapt the country to a changed situation, the chief aim of economic policy was to get back to the prewar system. The element of wartime protection which might have nursed into existence new industries was swept away; the hard exigencies of the gold standard were restored. This policy was not mere unthinking conservatism. It represented a deliberate election of the prewar world economy as an ideal in preference to a narrower, more self-regarding policy of concentrating on domestic development behind a protective tariff, insulated further by a fluctuating exchange rate. It was a political as much as an economic choice, and offered the best chance of restoring a truly international order such as the world had enjoyed before 1914. But Britain was not strong enough unsupported to reëstablish such an order, and the main political and economic currents in the world were nationalist, not international.

This tendency to look to the past for aims of economic policy, however, was not the only obstacle to effective readjustment to the new conditions. Economic policy offered other obstacles, in the postwar extension of innovations for which the government in office just before the war was responsible. The chance of rapid adaptation to changed conditions depended on effective mobility of labor and ready access to funds to finance new development. Economic policy offered great hindrances to both.

The outlines of a comprehensive scheme of social services, including unemployment insurance, had been drawn before the war. This the postwar Government extended and developed. In theory, a generous system of maintenance in unemployment need have no reaction on the mobility of labor; in practice, it is almost certain to reduce it. Certainly it had this effect in England, and this experience leads one to doubt whether a policy based on free trade and the old type of gold standard is compatible with a generous system of maintenance in unemployment. No popularly elected government can be relied on to enforce by administrative measures the ruthless transfer of labor from one occupa-

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tion or area to another, which is called for if a country is to leave its industries without any protection against foreign competition and defend its currency by productive efficiency alone.

If this change had not been decisive, the fiscal changes caused by war expenditure would have been. British industry depends almost wholly on profits earned and retained in the business to finance expansion, experiment and new development. The contribution made by the London capital market to industry's needs in the way of new long-term capital has always been negligible, that market being concerned mainly with the export of capital and, so far as it took any interest in domestic industry, with the transfer of existing capital assets from family to widely diffused ownership. When, therefore, income tax on all trading profits was increased from 5 or 6 percent before 1914 to 25 and 30 percent, and when, in addition, the trading profits of privately controlled businesses (the vast majority) were subjected to a further surtax ranging up to 17.5 percent, a dangerous inroad was made into the stream of funds available to reorganize, reconstruct and redirect British industry. This taxation of the profits out of which alone the necessary process of change could be financed is a good example of the chief defect of English governmental administration — its departmentalism. The revenue-raising departments performed their task of raising revenue with courage and efficiency, but were not concerned with the incidental result of their action — which was, in short, that they handicapped and delayed the reorientation of industry without which the recovery of the depressed areas was impossible.

Under the strain of the world depression, superimposed on the prolonged difficulties of the depressed areas, English economic policy underwent a revolution. The external and obvious signs of it were, we have seen, the suspension of the gold standard and the final jettisoning of free trade. These, however, symbolized the revolution rather from the point of view of other countries. Until then, it had always been possible to raise good foreign exchange by dumping surpluses into the ever-open United Kingdom market. After 1933 this was no longer possible, an incidental result being that discussions about reducing trade barriers have been much more serious than they were before. In the United Kingdom the real change was much more gradual. It took the form of a steady and continuous shift from production for external markets to production for the domestic market. It can be traced in the

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proportion of industrial production for export in successive years: 33 percent in 1907; probably 40 percent in 1912, though the census was not completed; 27 percent in 1924; 22 percent in 1930; 16 to 18 percent in 1935; and, using such indices as are available in the inter-census years, probably 15 percent in 1938.

This shift, which halved the proportion of industrial activity for export, was accompanied by a similar decline in the proportion of services directed to overseas demands. It was the outcome of a number of converging influences. The chief was the extension of protection in the rest of the world. Before 1914, the spread of protection had not checked the expansion of British exports, because there were always alternative markets. India was kept open by British political control — in the interests of the Indian consumer at least as much as of the European and American exporter; China by unilaterally imposed conventions. The new countries were not yet in a position to meet their own industrial needs. It followed that the exclusion of some British exports from an overseas market would result usually in their diversion (at a cost) to some alternative market. When Europe had been closed to British manufactures, America was open; when America was closed, the Dominions and the east were open. There were so many gaps in the wall of tariffs with which the flood of British exports was faced that a raising or extension of the wall at one point only diverted the flood without diminishing its amplitude. The war had changed all this. By forcing countries to be more self-sufficing, it encouraged them to protect their local industries. The United Kingdom could still endeavor to maintain its total of exports, but only by a continual shift from excluded goods to new goods; the whole burden of adjustment to change was thrown back by the tariffs and subsidies of other countries onto the United Kingdom, which, for the reasons indicated, had lost the adaptability needed for such sudden and extensive change.

Almost everywhere British trade now turned it met tariff barriers. There were no large gaps in an almost continuous wall. Nor was this development surprising, or necessarily uneconomic. The industries which British export dominated before 1914 were very largely the industries which any country with civilized labor could practice; if Lancashire's cotton exports went down, Lancashire's exports of textile machinery have expanded, though not to a compensating extent. The change in Britain is the correlative of the change in the countries with which Britain used to ex-

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change manufactures for agricultural produce; as the agricultural countries industrialized themselves, the United Kingdom was driven to pay attention to its depressed agriculture. British foreign trade was unique in Europe in being predominantly an exchange with agricultural rather than with other industrial countries. It may begin to grow again, once a new equilibrium of industry and agriculture has been established. But that is not yet.

Similarly the change in monetary standard, not adopted voluntarily with any idea of relieving the depression, which it did in fact help to relieve, but forced on the country by the panic withdrawal of foreign funds, was no more than an assimilation of British practice to the almost universal practice of other countries. For a decade, external economic relations had been conducted (except by some smaller European countries) with almost complete disregard of the responsibility which every country shares for the stability of exchanges and the free flow of trade. After America's withdrawal from the business of foreign lending in 1929, the strain concentrated on London proved too much for a country still suffering from fundamental industrial and commercial dislocation caused by war. The feeling of freedom and ease which ensued on the changes of 1931 and 1932 is a serious obstacle to any return to an international standard, much as the more experienced elements in public and private finance desire it.

The gold standard went in the autumn of 1931. Although it reappears as a sort of eschatological appendix in formulations of commercial and monetary policy, no British Government has seriously considered restoring it. Even if the conditions had been propitious, it may be doubted whether Parliament could have been induced to sanction its restoration. Free trade went a little later. The immediate effects of foreign tariffs in restricting British exports have been exaggerated. What, for example, are the exports which the United Kingdom would have sent to America if the Hawley-Smoot tariff had not been enacted? But the domestic effects of the tariffs imposed by other countries in stimulating new enterprise in the protected industries became obvious. In the United States the steel industry showed the most spectacular recovery, because it was organized to take advantage of protection and was on the edge of a new period of capital investment; but a host of smaller industries also benefited and responded to the stimulus. The chief influence of the American tariff on British industry was to make its leaders feel that they had

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been fools not to insist on tariffs long ago. That temper is still almost universal in British industry — even Lancashire is now protectionist. With the reversal of commercial policy went a policy for reviving agriculture. They went together, because the policy of keeping open the United Kingdom market for all the world's surpluses had been the chief obstacle to doing anything for agriculture. Industrialists no longer oppose special measures for assisting agriculture; they cannot deny to agriculture what they enjoy themselves, and they are more concerned with the volume of economic activity than with the nineteenth century aim of cheapness. It is beginning to be understood that the theory that imports create a simultaneous demand for exports and cannot therefore cause local depression and unemployment belongs to the same school of nineteenth century ideas as the theory that saving and inventions do not cause unemployment or that the provision of work by governments in bad times merely diverts a corresponding amount of employment from private enterprise. Perhaps democracies take too short a view of the effects of economic policies; but even statesmen cannot disregard immediate effects, when revolutionary propagandists of the Right and Left are both looking out for opportunities of representing temporary depressions as long-run failures.

The other great influence accounting for the shift from external markets to the home market was the change in consumption habits and in the distribution of income. With the levelling up of incomes there coincided a new demand for transport, light and heat, local services, furnishings and all the other elements in the material equipment of an urban home. The building industry displaced coal as the largest employer among industries; distribution services grew out of all proportion to any increase in production. Entertainment, sports, restaurants and hotels, education and local government, the newer forms of transport, all increased their importance. Thus the home market exerted an attractive influence which would have drawn over to it productive resources even if they had not simultaneously been forced out of the older export industries by the changed overseas environment.

Add to this a steady increase in the volume of expenditure, directly or indirectly financed by government. A small trickle of this reached the export industries; but it is so much easier for the government to spend its money at home, to stimulate activity within its own boundaries, that the growth of government ex-

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penditure incidentally meant a further stimulus to production for the home market.

III

Let us turn from this retrospect to the future. What are likely to be the effects of the second war? Can there be any doubt that they will be similar in kind, though probably greater in degree, than those of the first war? There has been an even greater interruption of normal contacts and processes. Overseas markets have been compelled to supply their own needs, and have been assisted and encouraged by the United Kingdom to do so. India may well be found to have a larger cotton industry than Lancashire, able to undercut Lancashire in the few remaining markets not reserved for domestic producers. Australia already has a steel industry which is cheaper over a wide range than the English industry on which it used to draw, and (this also is true of India) a metallurgical and engineering industry brought into existence by the war. The war has involved a far more extensive dislocation of normal employment; the problem of reabsorbing in regular industry the men and women at present engaged in war industry or the armed forces will be even greater than after the last war. Thus the country will be faced with the double task of reversing the war's effects, and resuming the interrupted task of effecting a long-term readjustment of industry to changed conditions of markets and comparative advantages.

These are the direct and obvious effects of war. They must tend to concentrate the attention of postwar governments on the country's employment problem. It is conceivable that a policy might be adopted of enlarging employment by expanding exports. The obstacles are the loss of mobility due to social security, the loss of adaptability due to high taxation of the funds needed to finance adaptation, and the greater ease of stimulating employment in the home market. It is therefore more probable that government measures will favor the home market. Certain indirect effects of the war will tend in the same direction. There will be an amount of physical reconstruction, of deferred repairs and normal additions, to provide a volume of work for the building industry even greater than the demand for new houses in the years before the war. This war again has given a new importance in the mind of both politicians and people to certain industries which have proved necessary to security. After the last war, pro-

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tection on security grounds was afforded to a handful of small industries, but without conviction and in the face of much ridicule and opposition. Rearmament, when the need arose, was handicapped by an inadequate range of machine tools, by an inadequate optical and instrument industry, and by the contraction between the two wars of the country's shipbuilding capacity. There will be a demand for some form of protection on security grounds for these and other industries. Most of all has the attitude of the country to agriculture changed. While the expansion of arable land has done little more than replace the loss since 1918, and the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture is even smaller than then, government policy has resulted in a great increase in output and in a very great improvement in the condition of the land. Sentimental reasons will reinforce the demands of security in seeking to retain a large part of this increase by one form of government assistance or another.

Behind and pervading all these material changes is the change in social ideas, the substitution of security for enterprise, employment for cheapness, greater equality for increase in aggregate income as the unconscious assumptions of social expediency guiding governments. All converge in an acceleration of the prewar shift from an economy specializing in external trade to an economy based on the expansion of a protected home market. England will remain a great trading country, but I cannot see her main centers of industry ever again concentrating on vast exports, with the home market as a dependent and residual client. Such exports as continue will consist mainly of surpluses over domestic needs. They may in the aggregate be large, but they are not likely to be decisive in the economic fortunes of great populated areas as they were before 1914 and again in the twenties. In other words, the United Kingdom will make a further large move in the direction of the type of economy characteristic of the other great industrial countries of Europe and America.

IV

An objection to this line of argument will have occurred to readers, and it must be faced. Britain's preoccupation with external trade, it will be argued, is not a matter of choice but of necessity; with a population of 47,000,000 the United Kingdom can neither feed herself nor supply her industries with essential materials without a large import, and therefore a large export,

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trade. The objection is well founded. Against any policy which aimed at making the United Kingdom self-sufficing, it would be decisive. But no responsible person has suggested such an aim, and this essay is an attempt to forecast probabilities, not to formulate a policy. We have seen reason to expect that British exports will decline, certainly relatively to total production and probably (apart from a postwar restocking boom) absolutely, until a new distribution of resources has been achieved and the old specialized export industries have been largely replaced by other industries depending primarily on the home market. Must the country's need of imports check this development?

We should note in the first place that the decline in the proportion of industry carried on for export has hitherto been accompanied, not by any lowering in the standard of life of the population, but by a substantial improvement. It is not to be inferred that the decline in exports is a cause of the improvement, but it is evident that the two are compatible. The mass of the population was much better off with the proportion of export industry reduced to a sixth than they were when it was a third, and it is hard to believe that the rich minority were any worse off. Obviously there is a limit to the possible contraction of a country's foreign trade, but it is not obvious that the limit had been reached in 1939. The self-equilibrating power of a free economy is not what it was in the nineteenth century, but it remains considerable.

Next we may note that the war has revealed possibilities of adaptation that were unexpected. Imports of dry cargo were reduced from a prewar average of 55,000,000 tons to 26,400,000 in 1943. The quantum (*i.e.* value corrected for a change in prices) of domestic food production increased by 30 percent. The country's production of health food was maintained, an enormous output of munitions was achieved, and the armed forces supplied. It is easy to underestimate the potentialities of technical science in making economic calculations. Again, it is not to be inferred that the efforts and sacrifices involved would, or should, be tolerated in peace; war experience is cited only as evidence of adaptability under pressure. A shift from imports to domestic sources of supply, effected over a period of years under the pressure of a large adverse balance of payments, is not impossible. It might be small in relation to any one industry but, extending over all industries subject to the direct or indirect competition of imports, important in the aggregate. The retention of part of the increased

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agricultural output of wartime, and of other wartime increases on security grounds, added to the protective measures already employed in 1939, would not cost so much as to excite serious opposition and would be popular in a community which places employment, not cheapness, as the first aim of economic policy.

A long-term tendency for foreign trade to become relatively less important is then not improbable. But it is not possible to envisage Britain's external payments being balanced by curtailment of imports alone. A temporary gap may be bridged by borrowing; but the loss of foreign investments, the accumulation already of an enormous external indebtedness, losses of shipping, and the stimulus given by war to competitive production in so many markets, point to a persistent gap which neither borrowing nor restriction of imports will bridge. If, as is probable, no conscious and deliberate policy of marrying imports and exports is adopted, the necessary balance will be restored by two influences which do not depend on government action — the relative movement of import and export prices, and the self-equilibrating tendency in current payments, which loans only postpone.

In the past, the chief gain that Britain secured from its free trade policy was the cheapness of its imports. So many producers were dependent on the British market that they had to take what Britain could pay or not sell their produce at all. This was shown most clearly when sterling depreciated in 1931; countries like Denmark and New Zealand were so dependent on their sales to Britain that when the value in their own currency of the sterling they received was suddenly reduced, they were forced to depreciate their currency to restore the old return. Actually most of them depreciated their currencies not only to the same extent as sterling had depreciated on gold, but went further and depreciated their currencies on sterling in order to increase the return of their exports to Britain. If, therefore, other countries still seek an outlet for their produce in the British market, when British exports have been curtailed by the spread of protection in former markets, the terms of trade are likely to move in favor of Britain, and the British population obtain the same amount (or an amount not proportionately decreased) for a diminished volume of exports. British policy in this matter is completely passive. There has never, to my knowledge, been any attempt to force a change of the terms of trade to Britain's advantage; on the contrary, the policy has been directed to the opposite aim — the increase of

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British exports and restriction of imports — even at the cost of raising import and depressing export prices.

That is one possibility. If it is realized, it will involve a relative depression in world agricultural prices, similar to the fall from 1929 to 1932 when the world's agricultural surpluses were being dumped into a British market with a diminished capacity to pay for them. The effect might be moderated by bilateral agreement between the importing and exporting countries; but it arises fundamentally from the decline in the United Kingdom's capacity to pay for imports without any corresponding contraction of production for the British market in exporting countries.

The other possibility is that British imports will induce the exports necessary to pay for them, without any deliberate action by the British Government. The free trade policy so long accepted assumed that imports did in this way automatically lead to exports. The policy was discarded when the electorate was forced to perceive that there was not this necessary connection.

Between the two wars imports were maintained, but not exports. Imports were offset in the balance of payments in several ways: by repayment of previous British loans; or by the accumulation of unused sterling balances to the credit of the countries supplying the imports; or by the transfer of the ownership of British assets at home and abroad to other countries; or by the drain of gold and foreign exchange reserves from London. None of these methods of paying for imports provided the employment which exports would have done. In the future, however, capital transfers of all kinds will be controlled in the interests of exchange stability. None of the methods of paying for imports listed above will be permitted (or will be permitted only by special license) except the last, and that only within the limit of the power provided by limited resources, supplemented by the International Monetary Fund. The exporter in another country who supplies British imports will be unable to use the sterling proceeds of his export for any purpose except to buy British exports. He might hold the sterling unused, but he will be discouraged from doing so by the knowledge that it may have its exchange value reduced by 10 percent without notice and by even more with the consent of the International Monetary Fund. The conditions will be established under which imports do automatically lead to exports, and this may operate as a pressure sustaining British exports at prices higher than those of alternative supplies;

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in the long run it may equally lead to the curtailment of British imports by their suppliers.

The nature of this support to British exports is brought out by the British Trade Agreement policy of the years 1933–1938. These agreements were aimed at utilizing overseas dependence on the British market to secure openings for British exports, which they did by tying access to the British market by quotas to access for British exports to overseas markets. They made it possible to direct a certain quantum of overseas demand to the depressed industries, cotton textiles and coal, and similarly, perhaps, to direct British demand to the relief of depressed or threatened agricultural industries in the other countries. Such bilateral quantitative agreements are now frowned on; but the underlying influence of the dependence of the overseas producer on the British market is not removed by the elimination of bilateral agreements. It operates with the same force as before, but to support British exports generally instead of exports by particular depressed industries. Operating in this way, it should hasten the decay of the declining industries, and encourage the development of alternative exports, a desirable adjustment.

The decline in the importance of British overseas trade which I expect to see has limits. It is unlikely also to be sudden or catastrophic. The restocking demand in the world may well sustain the exports even of declining industries for five years. When that demand is exhausted, we are promised the substitute of an expansionist policy in the world as a whole. It is not clear that an expansion in the purchasing power of the overseas world for cottons will make them prefer British goods at higher prices to Japanese or Italian goods at lower prices, or British coal to cheaper Polish coal. It may, however, by expanding world demand as a whole for each important commodity, make things easier for the declining British export industries — and to that extent lead them to defer any attempt to adjust themselves to a contracted market and the emergence of cheaper competition.

V

In connection with the publication of the terms of the Anglo-American financial agreement of December 6, 1945, the question arises whether the agreement will so alter the international position of the United Kingdom that the trends discernible in its development between the wars are likely to be reversed. A defi-

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nite answer is impossible, but one may doubt whether the agreement will make much difference. The agreement recognizes the special difficulties in which the United Kingdom finds itself on the termination of hostilities and makes a generous contribution toward removing them. During the war, in order to save tonnage, the United Kingdom diverted to North America an overwhelming proportion of its demand for imports. This diversion cannot be reversed overnight; and until it is reversed the United Kingdom will find it difficult if not impossible to pay for its imports. Even when this diversion has been corrected, the United Kingdom will still have to meet abnormal expenses of overseas establishments in occupied countries and elsewhere, while its industries will still be handicapped by the wholesale application of manpower and all other productive resources for six years to temporary war needs. The estimate published in the White Paper accompanying the agreement puts the cumulative deficit in the country's balance of payments in the next five years at five billion dollars, so that the American loan, generous as it is, will leave a considerable deficit to be met. This is a transitional problem. It would be even greater if we could not expect a restocking boom throughout the world which will make it easy to sell exports.

The problem to which this article is addressed is the long-term problem which will still face the United Kingdom when the transition from war to peace has been completed — the problem of establishing a balance in external relations. The proposed loan itself is likely to be exhausted before the transition is complete, but the conditions attached to it will continue to have effect. By ruling out any policy of tying exports with imports bilaterally they will deprive British exports of a certain support they enjoyed in the thirties. Taken with Article eight, Section four, of the Bretton Woods Agreement, they subject British monetary policy once more to the requirements of convertibility which will compel a prompter balancing of imports than was necessary when sterling was inconvertible.

On the whole, then, the effect of the agreement is more to postpone than to ease this long-term problem of Britain's. The increase in the volume of exports required to restore a reliable equilibrium is estimated in the statistical White Paper at nearer 75 percent than 50 percent of the prewar level. A 50 percent increase would bring the volume of exports about to their level in

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1913, the point at which we began this examination; a 75 percent increase would bring it to well above that point. Such an increase is not impossible, but it will require a different world as well as a different Britain.

VI

To sum up: the future economic position of the United Kingdom in the world is likely to be less important than before the war. Even if the decline in the volume of its foreign trade is only moderate, the character of that trade will be different. Exports will no longer consist of the output of a few industries specialized to export, but mainly of smaller contributions from a larger range of industries, each contributing a relatively small surplus over domestic needs. The home market will be the main field of enterprise; the spontaneous trend of development will be in that direction, and it will be aided by the policy of government, under the impulse of an almost morbid fear of any unemployment, to maintain employment by government-financed expenditure. London may be larger than ever, and the center of larger transactions; but these will be predominantly domestic transactions. The characteristic functions of the international London — acceptance and bill booking, foreign exchange, the issue and marketing of overseas loans — will have shrunk to a small fraction of its total activities.

In a word, the transition will be completed from the unique economy, based on world trade and world finance with a maximum disregard of political frontiers, to the normal condition of every other mature economy — a condition in which a protected home market is the basis of enterprise, and foreign trade is confined mainly to the export of surpluses and the import of commodities which it is not practicable to produce at home. The change is one that affects the world as a whole at least as much as it does the United Kingdom, since it calls for the creation of new agencies, new institutions, and new foci for international transactions to take the place of those which the United Kingdom provided before 1914 and tried hard to restore in the twenties. The United Kingdom can and will coöperate in the task of building up world trade again; but it can hardly provide again the nucleus and nerve system of a world economy that it did before 1914.

I have discussed this change in relation to the two world wars because these wars have been the decisive influence; but the

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change is deeper and older than a mere readjustment of resources to a changed market situation. The war has involved the loss of the creditor position which provided a foundation for the international banking and clearing functions of London. Shipping, the other great international activity, will suffer a similar decline. The British mercantile marine was subjected to nearly six years of intensive attack; the admirable new tonnage which replaced these losses accrued mainly to the American flag. Even more fundamental are the population changes of the last generation. Before 1914 the United Kingdom population was increasing at over 1 percent per annum after providing a steady stream of emigrants to the new countries; it is faced now with the prospect of a stationary or declining population, and in the decade before this war a substantial part of such increase as occurred was due to a considerable and persistent net immigration.

Outside the United Kingdom, the changes in the world combine to force British industry back on itself. It is significant that in the present century we have substituted the term dominion for colony in popular as well as legal phraseology; the change signifies a transition from economic dependence to independence. Whatever their political future, India and China too have been withdrawn from the colonial sector in the world's economy. All the countries in the world are set on developing their own resources and reserving for themselves their own markets, and there is no longer room for a country which stakes its existence on world trade as the United Kingdom did before the last war.

There is no need to repine over this change. The economic problem with which the present generation is preoccupied is the problem of security. The first need for security is to regularize the flow of income and production, and governments will make that their first aim. Since governments are national, the first steps in any policy of regularization must be directed to domestic markets, and the better individual countries look after their own affairs the more they will contribute to the welfare of other countries. Even before this war, it had become obvious, I think, that the greatest service a country like America or England could render to international trade was to maintain purchasing power in its own market; there was no comparison between the effects on international trade of fluctuations in the domestic activity of American or British industry and changes in tariffs, unfortunate as the latter often were.

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THE BRITISH LOAN

By Judd Polk and Gardner Patterson

PERHAPS it is a curiosity of international relations that collaboration as widespread as that between Britain and the United States should normally be conducted in the atmosphere of unsparing mutual criticism. In December last the two Governments, after three months of negotiations between experts, jointly announced a broad economic and financial agreement — a peacetime accord comparable in breadth, though not in nature, to the wartime lend-lease agreements, and regarded by the executive branches of both Governments as a model for international coöperation. The text of the agreement evoked more than a little hostility. In London various voices pronounced it "cruelly hard," said that it "left us with our agricultural program," or concluded that "we have been forced into a disastrous bargain." In many of the American Congressional comments the agreement was handled in much the same harsh spirit: it was called "not a loan but an outright gift" and "a game of chance," and the criticism was voiced that it would "promote too damned much Socialism at home and too damned much imperialism abroad." A mutual declaration of economic warfare could scarcely have elicited warmer outbursts of distaste on both sides. The British Parliament nevertheless felt forced begrudgingly to confirm the agreement. The United States Congress has yet to act, and what its action will be is at the present time uncertain.

The purpose of this paper is not to show on which side of the Atlantic there has arisen the juster oratory. Rather, an effort is here made to assess from an economic point of view the likely effectiveness of the proposed arrangements for solving the United Kingdom's current economic dilemma, and for contributing to the "multilateral" economy which is the avowed aim of the international economic policy of the United States.

Presumably the first concern of the United States in the negotiations was to expedite Britain s transition to a "normal" self-liquidating trade basis, in contrast to the informal financial arrangements of wartime. The British came to the negotiations with a similar general aim of achieving a multilateral international setup, but also with the need of meeting beforehand an

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urgent problem in their balance of payments. To understand the terms at last agreed upon, consideration must be given to various facets of the British problem, the solution of which represented for the negotiators a condition precedent to effective progress toward the broader aim of the two Governments.

In its simplest form, the British problem is that of finding a way to finance an import balance (that is a balance-of-payments deficit on current account) during the immediate period ahead, when British foreign receipts will be inadequate to sustain imports at a rate necessary for a fast reconversion without lowering the standard of living of the British people to an intolerable degree.

This problem is new to Britain only in its intensity. Her insular economy has always depended on vital imports paid for by British overseas income. Her balance of payments, running in the pattern of a large import balance on merchandise account adjusted by an export balance in invisible transactions, has gotten seriously out of kilter on at least three occasions in the last 15 years alone. On each occasion, the trouble came from the same general cause — the failure of receipts, particularly from service items, to sustain the volume of imports essential for so specialized an economy.

The first occasion was in 1931, when there was a deficit on current account (excluding gold movements) of about $500 million. For the purpose of handling the resulting exchange pressure, the United Kingdom imposed controls which tended to isolate the British Empire from the rest of the trading world. These controls, undertaken in connection with a general devaluation, and meant to stimulate exports and employment, covered a broad field — the Empire system of tariffs and quotas, bilateral clearing and trade agreements, development of the sterling bloc, control of foreign investments, and various forms of assistance to home producers competing with imports. Although these measures were thought by many economists to have contributed to the raising and stabilizing of employment levels, they were only partially effective in eliminating the exchange pressure. During the three years before 1939, proceeds from merchandise exports covered only slightly more than half the cost of merchandise imports, and the debit balance on all current transactions averaged over $170 million a year, excluding gold movements.

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The second of the recent occasions on which the deficit problem became critical arose with the advent of war. Then the necessity for full monopolization of dollar resources, and the need for aid from the United States, again made it necessary for the United Kingdom to alter drastically its system of international trade and financial controls. The sterling area became one unit for exchange control purposes, and exceedingly stringent controls were placed on the movement of funds outside the area. All of the nations remaining in the sterling area (most non-British countries left following the outbreak of war) pooled and monopolized their resources of gold and dollars ("the dollar pool") so as to permit maximum war purchases. As a further step, the United Kingdom required its citizens to surrender their foreign exchange assets. These were spent early in the war: the net gold and dollar reserves of the United Kingdom, estimated at $4.2 billion in August 1938, were drawn down to $12 million by April, 1941.[1]

In addition, over $820 million of investments in the United States were sold or repatriated during the war. It was obvious in the early spring of 1941 that the British deficit on current account vis-à-vis the United States would make other currency arrangements necessary for the further effective conduct of the war. The arrangements took the form of lend-lease agreements, which in themselves amounted to a gigantic bilateral clearing agreement based on an unspecified trade ratio. This was by no means the full extent of Britain's financial and trade adjustments necessitated by the war. Export trade declined drastically, the volume in 1944 being officially reckoned at 30 percent of 1938. Of more immediate importance was the overseas spending during the war of huge sums in maintaining British forces, mostly through the creation of sterling bank accounts. From the outbreak of war to June 30, 1945, this overseas debt of the United Kingdom, commonly referred to as "blocked sterling," increased by $11.6 billion to $13.5 billion. Britain's total repatriation and sale of overseas investments, including those in the United States, totaled $4.5 billion. The net merchant shipping position, always important in bridging the gap between Britain's excess of merchandise imports over exports, declined due to war losses to 75 percent of the prewar capacity.

[1] Largely as a result of spending by the United States forces in the United Kingdom, the British net gold and dollar reserves at the end of the war had increased to $1.8 billion, according to minimum official figures.

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So with the end of lend-lease immediately after the war, the United Kingdom, standing in a greatly impaired economic position, faced for the third time since 1930 the problem of a critical deficit in the balance of payments. The extent of this impairment is to be measured not only by the disadvantageous change in the United Kingdom's external position as shown above, but by parallel changes internally. Industrial disinvestment (accumulated depreciation not even including bomb-damage) is estimated by the British as $3.5 billion. In addition, some of the facilities which might otherwise be reserved for export production will have to be committed to making long-overdue replacements in consumer items, such as houses, clothes, etc. Finally, the United Kingdom faces a drastic reconversion problem — the difficulties of which we also know only too well.

In this grim outlook, several brighter spots may be noted: 1, the increasing centralization of the British economy may well facilitate reconversion, and the attainment of high production levels and increased exports; 2, the war eliminated three of England's chief competitors abroad — Germany, Italy and Japan; 3, during the war, great technological advances were made in British industries, which greatly increased production per man-hour, despite wartime difficulties.

II

Obviously, in these circumstances, the United Kingdom's main interest in financial negotiations with the United States would be to secure such assistance as would permit the necessary balance-of-payments adjustment other than through a drastic paring of imports. The United States was also interested in "regularizing" Britain's position, among other reasons because of her importance as an American customer and because of her potential importance in the creation of a multilateral trading system of the sort hoped for by the American negotiators.

The actual agreements, reflecting both Britain's need for immediate financial aid to adjust her international position and the American desire that any such adjustment be made only within the framework of a multilateral system, are notable for the fact that they deal with the whole range of problems related to that adjustment. Thus, in addition to provisions for a long-term credit line to Britain, the agreements provide for the settlement of lend-lease and surplus war property, and deal with

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mutual trade policy commitments, including a substantial relaxation of the familiar British controls.

Before we proceed to comment on the financial agreements, our main concern in the present paper, brief notice should be taken of the lend-lease settlement, which constitutes a major though relatively little publicized accomplishment of the negotiations. Subject to what will certainly be minor adjustments, the United Kingdom agrees to pay the United States $650 million in full settlement of lend-lease, surplus war property and other financial claims arising out of the conduct of the war. This debt is to be discharged on the same terms as the loan discussed below.

Aid from the United States to the United Kingdom under lend-lease was some $20 billion in excess of reciprocal aid received. This huge debt is now, for all practical purposes, wiped out. The $650 million payment is entirely for goods and services which were not consumed during the war, and which are available for British use or consumption after the war. Although the agreement was made without prejudice to any settlement for lend-lease and reciprocal aid with other nations, it will, no doubt, set a precedent for recognizing (in the words, later retracted, of President Roosevelt) that "victory and a secure peace are the only coin in which we can be repaid" for lend-lease. The great significance of the settlement can be appreciated by recalling the long-drawn-out and largely unsuccessful attempts by the United States to collect from its Allies on World War I debts. The settlement, therefore, removes a threatened renewal of a problem which in the 1920's was one of the major causes of economic and political friction.

III

Under the terms of the financial agreement, the United States negotiators agree to extend a $3.75 billion line of credit to the United Kingdom. This credit can be drawn upon until December 31, 1951, and is to be used "to facilitate purchases by the United Kingdom of goods and services from the United States, to assist the United Kingdom to meet transitional postwar deficits in its current balance of payments, to help the United Kingdom to maintain adequate reserves of gold and dollars, and to assist the United Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade." The loan is to be repaid in 50 annual installments beginning in December 1951, with interest at the rate of 2

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percent per year. Taking account of the interest-free years up to 1951, the rate is actually 1.6 percent. Even at this unprecedentedly low rate, the interest charges will more than cover the cost to the U. S. Treasury unless an unforeseen number of interest-waivers are granted. The maximum annual payment of interest and principal would be $140 million.

The British negotiators, and the British public, had frankly hoped for aid in the form of an outright grant — retroactive lend-lease, as it were, covering the period between the outbreak of war and March 1941. Failing to find a favorable reaction to this idea in the United States, the British felt that the least we could do would be to provide an interest-free loan. Lord Keynes, the chief British negotiator, has stated: ". . . I shall never so long as I live cease to regret that this is not an interest-free loan. The charging of interest is out of tune with the underlying realities." In urging approval in the House of Lords, however, he noted the very potent reality that the United States negotiators deemed it absolutely necessary to charge interest if Congress and the American public were to accept the agreement. The interest charges are, in fact, considerably below those charged by the Export-Import Bank for loans which it is currently making to several of our other Allies, as Lord Keynes also noted.

A further softening of the interest requirement was arranged in the novel automatic waiver provisions. Interest may be waived in any year in which Britain's average income from home-produced exports plus net income from invisible transactions during the five previous years is, after adjusting for price level changes, less than £866 million. In order to prevent the British from drastically reducing or possibly eliminating any net income from invisible transactions, it is further provided that in the handling of releases of blocked sterling, a maximum of £43.75 million is to be included in annual current transactions, and any additional amount is to be considered as capital transactions. Broadly, the effect of this technical arrangement is that Britain could request a waiver of interest whenever her average annual receipts from goods sold abroad plus net service income fall below the prewar volume. It is impossible to forecast whether resort to the waiver of interest will be needed frequently, since so much depends on the level of world — and especially American — economic activity and on political considerations which cannot be assessed.

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The agreement is also unique in that it attaches no strings to Britain's use of the dollars except that they will not be used "to discharge obligations of the United Kingdom to third countries outstanding on the effective date of this agreement." The sterling balances represent the most important obligation of this type. Since nowhere in the agreement does there appear to be any literal intention to earmark dollars from one specific source for transactions of a specific type, the net effect of this provision is to guarantee simply that the United Kingdom will in any year import at least as much as it borrows from the United States. It is inconceivable that the British position could be adjusted on the basis of a volume of imports no larger than the $600 million which could on the average be borrowed annually during the life of the credit. Accordingly, this provision is actually without significance, except as a comforting reaffirmation of the fact that Britain intends to go on importing.

The United Kingdom also agrees not to arrange before 1952 any long-term loans "on terms more favorable to the lender than the terms of this line of credit." The ramifications of this restriction are not clear. Certainly difficult questions could arise as to comparability of terms, inasmuch as the terms of the present agreement go far beyond routine amortization and interest provisions. In any case, the application of this provision is specifically made subject to consultation between the two Governments. It may be that the restriction was intended to discourage further British borrowings, on the narrow assumption that the fewer debts Britain has to service, the more likely she will be to service this one. Whatever the purpose may have been, the proviso will give Britain a weapon against possible pressure to fund the blocked sterling balances on unfavorable terms or undertake other long-term obligations of an unfavorable sort in connection with them. It will also protect the Administration from later charges that the American negotiators were outbargained.

In return for this credit line, the British agree within a year to relax (with minor exceptions) wartime exchange controls so that both countries in the sterling area and other countries will have their current receipts at their free disposal for current transactions anywhere in the world. The fulfillment of this provision will terminate the dollar pool and the further blocking of sterling. As noted above, the difficulties of paying for imports

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from the United States during the war were removed by lend-lease and dollar-pool arrangements, and the difficulties of paying for imports from the sterling area were removed by the "blocked sterling" arrangements. Taken together, these procedures had automatically resolved the problem of Britain's unbalanced external budget. The termination of these controls will, therefore, impose on Britain the necessity of finding hard currencies to pay for the imports, either from the sterling area or from outside the sterling area. In short, with the help of the present credit line and possible other loans, Britain's external budget will have to be balanced within the framework of a multilateral economy.

As an immediate consequence of this concession, the United Kingdom will lose one important current source of dollars, namely, the dollar pool. This loss is an effective reduction of the $3.75 billion credit line. Moreover, to the extent that these provisions initiate a period in which the Empire countries will hold balances in currency other than sterling, they introduce a short-term capital flight, which in turn will aggravate the problem this loan is intended to solve — the United Kingdom's exchange shortage. Faced with such a possibility, the United Kingdom may be forced to cover its short-term debts thereafter with larger exchange reserves. This would immobilize another portion of the credit. In such an eventuality, the United Kingdom might after 1951 become increasingly dependent on the International Monetary Fund for relief from some of the burdens connected with the defense of sterling. These consequences, however, probably should be viewed only as hastened, not caused, by the British agreement to relax the Empire controls. As Lord Keynes pointed out in an answer to bitter criticism of this particular sacrifice of control over the sterling area: "I wonder how much we are giving away there. . . . It will be very satisfactory if we can maintain the voluntary wartime system into 1947. But what hope is there of the countries concerned continuing such an arrangement much longer than that? Indeed, the danger is that these countries which have a dollar or gold surplus, such as India, and South Africa, would prefer to make their own arrangements, leaving us with a dollar pool which is a deficit pool, responsible for the dollar expenditure not only of ourselves but of the other members of the area having a dollar deficit."

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In regard to the existing sterling balances now blocked and not covered by the foregoing provisions, Britain states her intention "to make agreements . . . for an early settlement," on the basis of a partial write-off, with the balance to be liquidated by installments. As has been noted, the wartime sterling accumulations are comparable to the lend-lease accounts and their settlement is subject to political considerations to which the United States is not a party. That a real political difficulty exists is shown by the comment of a New Delhi newspaper that any attempt to write off any part of India's sterling balances would be considered "sheer robbery." However, if the blocked sterling accounts are treated in terms comparable to the settlement of lend-lease, the write-off would be drastic.

Finally, the United Kingdom and the United States mutually undertake not to impose discriminatory quantitative import restrictions. This provision recognizes that if the United Kingdom is to forego its current controls with only the limited help afforded by the present credit line, imports will in all probability have to be rigidly supervised to guarantee that exchange resources will be used in ways most helpful to the reconstruction of the British economy. The time for loosening belts is not at hand. Britain here agrees not to impose import quotas in such a way as to discriminate against United States exports.

Whatever relation "non-discrimination" may have ultimately to a relaxation of "Empire Preference" or to a change in United States tariffs will have to await the fuller formulation of trade policy in the proposed International Trade Organization or in other agreements. In a joint statement accompanying the financial agreements, the United Kingdom and the United States acknowledge their mutual agreement on the general lines of desirable commercial policy, and express their intention to begin at an early date preliminary negotiations between themselves and other countries.

IV

Since the agreements obviously affect far-reaching economic and political problems, they have naturally evoked many questions in both countries. Sometimes these questions have arisen from malice or hostility; more often from sober doubt, occasionally from sheer misunderstanding. It would require many pages to deal with them all. The discussion here will be

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confined to the two questions which on careful consideration seem to have the greatest basic merit. The first question hits at the adequacy of the loan. Will the financial arrangements in fact result in Britain's adjustment to a multilateral world? The second question goes into the urgency of the loan from the standpoint of American international policy. Is there an alternative solution?

Regarding the technical adequacy of the loan, we must recognize that once the idea of an interest-free loan had been discarded, the negotiators must have been concerned to get the size of the loan properly adjusted between two conflicting economic considerations. Too large a loan would produce too heavy a service burden, beginning in 1951, on the British economy; on the other hand, it must be large enough to permit the rapid rate of reconversion essential if the British economy was to stand on its own feet within the allowed five years. The figure actually agreed upon, $3.75 billion, permits an average annual credit of $600 million to the British, or approximately 15 percent of their prewar exchange resources. It is estimated that even in 1946 Britain's own current exchange resources will still be $1.5 billion below the prewar level. Obviously, an annual credit of $600 million would not completely offset the $1.5 billion loss of exchange from these normal sources. At the same time, the maintenance of large British forces overseas and the accumulated capital needs of the economy represent additional exchange requirements. Even though the credit line appears modest when seen in connection with the loss of other exchange resources and the growth in exchange needs, the resulting burden of interest and principal repayments starting in 1951 amounts to some $140 million annually. In addition, the adjustment of the sterling balances and the terms of additional credits may be expected to impose a service burden of similar proportions, resulting in an aggregate burden of some $300 million a year. Consequently, there were cogent reasons for not increasing the credit line above the present figure. The inescapable conclusion is that the adjustment of the British international account on the basis of the present credit can be made only if imports are strictly limited; and that effort will require, as the *New Statesman and Nation* remarked, "every aid which deliberate arrangement and planning can supply."

It is hard to predict how much difficulty will be experienced in attempting an adjustment with only the agreed credit for

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margin. Factors at present unknown, such as possible additional credits from Empire countries (negotiations with Canada are now in progress) and the rapidity of reconversion and reconstruction, will come into play. Most important of all, employment levels and the volume of production outside Britain will influence the volume of her receipts. Favorable conditions for world trade would unquestionably react beneficially on her trade; unfavorable conditions might make adjustment impossible. It is this latter possibility which especially disturbs the British.

In partially forsaking domestic manipulation as a basis for stabilizing trade, and accepting instead the vagaries of unstabilized external production, the British remember sourly the effects on their economy of unemployment in the United States. As an official British publication states: "It is a striking fact that between 1929 and 1930, when the income of the United States fell by 50 percent, British exports *to the whole world* fell by precisely the same figure. . . . It is certain that *under a multilateral trading system*, British exports in the postwar world would tend to follow once again the trend in economic activity of the United States." And the *Economist* commented: "Everything turns on America's foreign trade policy, which depends in its turn on the stability of the American domestic economy. And anyone who believes that America is growing in stability deserves a diploma for optimism."

If the amount of aid and the conditions under which it is offered leave a disturbing possibility that the United Kingdom will not be able to complete the necessary transition within the allowed years, it may be wondered why the British Parliament accepted the agreement. The answer is probably that the British had no real choice. To quote Lord Keynes' observations to the House of Lords: "Do the critics really grasp the nature of the alternative? The alternative is to build up a separate economic *bloc* which excludes Canada and consists of countries to which we already owe more than we can pay, on the basis of their agreeing to lend us money they have not got and buy only from us and one another goods we are unable to supply."

From the standpoint of our foreign policy, the major significance of the agreements appears only when viewed in the context of related international measures. Seen in connection with the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction, and the proposed International Trade Organiza-

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tion, this financial accord may become a crucial part of the general design for an unfettered international commerce. Without these other institutions, it is doubtful if these agreements, except for the credit line, have any significance other than as the record of an interesting bilateral conversation.

In the light of the general international design, it is notable that although the agreements involve commitments which tend to bring the British economy into a larger international economic unit, there are no parallel commitments — particularly from the United States — to provide for sustained production and employment in this larger unit. In fact, it is a remarkable feature not only of the present financial agreement, but also of the related international agreements for monetary institutions (Bretton Woods) and proposals for trade organizations (the State Department's "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment"), that the avowed purpose of attaining high levels of international trade, production and employment is nowhere accompanied by positive provisions for controls commonly regarded in national economies to be necessary for the accomplishment of such a purpose.

While the financial agreement can scarcely be regarded as guaranteeing a full solution of the critical British problem, and much less the creation of a full-fledged multilateral trading sphere, it is important to recognize its significance as a vital step toward both of these objectives. The approach to both might preferably have been multilateral. That alternative is no longer open. If we reject the financial agreement, the British will probably be constrained for political reasons to withdraw their effective participation in the Bretton Woods agreements. With both Britain and Russia outside of the international economic arrangements which we have sought to make, the arrangements themselves would for a long time represent no more than a United States trading sphere of even narrower scope than that which existed before the war.

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AIR POWER AND THE COMING PEACE TREATIES

By John C. Cooper

THE United Nations have as yet made no authoritative statement of their attitude toward the future aviation activity of the former Axis countries. Yet decisions in this field cannot be long delayed.

On December 26, 1945, following the Moscow Conference, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Great Britain and the United States announced the procedure for the preparation of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Such treaties, after being drafted by certain of the Great Powers, are to be submitted to an international peace conference scheduled to be held in May. At some later date, and under some procedure not yet announced, the peace terms to be imposed upon Germany and Japan must be fixed. The treaties with the minor enemy powers and the eventual terms to be imposed on Germany and Japan must each contain definitive air clauses. A clear understanding of the method and degree of control of military and civil aviation which is to be imposed upon the major and minor enemy countries is essential.

Little of our past thinking on this subject is of value today. The distinction between "civil" and "military" aircraft, and the theory that the former cannot be converted to use as bombers or fighters, no longer can provide us with a sense of security. The potentials of aircraft and airborne missiles are changing too rapidly to permit the old distinction to carry much meaning. We are now aware that an atomic bomb can be launched from a "civil" aircraft. The destructive power of the atomic bomb is still unmeasured and our ability to control its development and use is the most pressing problem of civilization.

The process of contraction in time and space, and the accompanying intensification of our danger in the event of war, continue unabated. While this paper was in course of preparation, for example, press dispatches on almost successive days announced: 1, the non-stop flight of a jet-propelled plane, burning cheap commercial kerosene, from Long Beach, California, to New York — a distance of 2,470 miles — in four hours and 13 minutes, at an average speed of 584 miles an hour; 2, the suc-

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cessful use of a commercial-type cargo plane in test jumps by parachute troops; 3, a statement by the retiring Chief of United States Army Ordnance that the Army possesses radio-controlled rockets capable of rising 50 miles above the earth, with the implication that research may produce rockets which can be dispatched to any point in the world.

The same power unit used for the jet-propelled bomber and fighter will also drive the transport in the near future. The controlled rocket is their first cousin. Instruments, parts, techniques for military and civil aircraft are quite interchangeable. Civil transport planes built to carry 80 passengers overnight across the Atlantic will quickly strip down to carry, perhaps, double that number of armed men. A hundred such transports might deliver an equipped military division across a continent or an ocean. If the same 100 transports each carried a few atomic bombs, a war might begin and end in a few hours. These are hard facts. There must be no mistake in the new peace treaties. If air disarmament of an enemy nation is required, then we must ask whether that nation must not be deprived of its entire right to fly.

Air power is the ability of a nation to act through the airspace, in other words, to use controlled flight — such, for instance, as the flight of aircraft. It is part of national power, to be used at home or abroad, in peace or in war. Though its uses are various, both military and civil, it is basically indivisible. The armed air forces represent but one use of the nation's air power. Civil and commercial aviation are supported by and spring from the same basic national elements. If these continue to exist or are uncontrolled, it is utterly futile to expect success from compulsory prohibition of any particular use of air power. Evasion is too practicable.

II

The Treaty of Versailles was supposed to disarm Germany in the air permanently. An army of limited size, and a restricted navy without submarines, were to be permitted, but German military air power was to disappear completely: Germany was not even to possess a token air force with which to threaten Europe. And the victors in the First World War were no less resolved that this disarmament would be immediate. As Foch is reported to have said at one of the conferences preparatory to

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the final adoption of the air clauses of the Treaty: "No delay should occur in depriving the Germans of their military aircraft which had wrought such evil work throughout the war in connection with the unjustifiable bombing of open towns. The conference should, therefore, adopt the principle of the aerial disarmament of Germany."

Disarmament, then, was supported by all the Allied and Associated Powers; but the means by which it was to be accomplished brought months of disagreement. The intent to disarm Germany was plain; the result of the steps taken to give this intent effect was complete and tragic failure. The method used — an attempted separation of the military and civil uses of air power — was artificial and unrealistic. It failed. The German air force reappeared, and Munich and World War II soon followed. The method would fail again.

The discussion at Versailles centered on the problem whether civil aviation must be prohibited in Germany and other states in order to attain effective military air disarmament. As Brigadier-General Groves (of the British Army) pointed out 11 years later in his memorandum to the League of Nations on "The Relations between Civil and Military Aviation," the Supreme Council at Versailles overruled the views of the aeronautical experts as to the practical difficulties of dealing separately with civil and military aviation, and "accordingly the Peace Treaties provided that the late enemy powers should be forbidden to possess any military (including naval) aviation, but should be allowed to develop civil aviation." What General Groves modestly did not say was that he, personally, had taken part in the discussions at Versailles and had warned that "It would, therefore, be very difficult to prevent Germany setting up a large potential military air service under the guise of commercial enterprise." [1]

The original records are quite clear. All of the technical experts on the Aeronautical Commission, except the American representative, insisted upon a long period of prohibition against the manufacture of any type of aircraft in Germany — civil as well as military. The direct question propounded to each technical representative was whether, after the Treaty of Peace and in view of the easy transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of war, it would "be necessary to prohibit civilian avia-

[1] *Cf.* "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919," v. IV, p. 337. Washington: Department of State, 1943.

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tion in Germany and all other enemy states." Each member of the Aeronautical Commission, except the American, answered "yes," disagreeing only as to the length of the period of prohibition. The French representative insisted that this period should last at least 20 or 30 years, due to the impossibility of foreseeing progress in flying in the immediate future.[2]

When the question came before the Supreme Council, President Wilson personally intervened and insisted upon separate treatment of military and civil aviation. Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, in explaining the American attitude as presented at Versailles by President Wilson and Mr. Lansing, has pointed out that the Americans desired Germany to be completely disarmed in a military sense but that "what they wanted to avoid was a long-continued, irritating interference with the economic life of the enemy nations — which they believed would lead speedily to future wars."

The American position having been finally accepted in the Supreme Council and in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the so-called Air Clauses of the Treaty to provide for military air disarmament were included in Part V, the Military, Naval and Air Clauses. The Aerial Navigation Clauses dealing with German civil aviation were separately drafted by the Aeronautical Commission and included in the Treaty as Part XI. The Aeronautical Commission also drafted at the same time the International Air Navigation Convention. The two sets of clauses in the Peace Treaty and certain clauses in this Air Navigation Convention must be considered together if the situation in Germany after World War I is to be understood.

The Air Clauses of the Treaty are Sections 198 to 202, inclusive. They were never abrogated and were theoretically still in force until the outbreak of World War II (except for Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the entire Treaty). They were expected to result in the permanent disarmament of Germany.

Article 198 categorically and without time limit provided that: "The Armed Forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces." The remaining articles required demobilization of the personnel of the German air forces within two months; authorized the aircraft (presumably military) of the Allied and Associated Powers to fly across and land in Germany until the

[2] *Cf.* Ray Stannard Baker, "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement." New York: Doubleday, 1923, v. I, p. 414.

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final evacuation of their troops; forbade for six months after the coming into force of the Treaty the manufacture in Germany or importation of aircraft, aircraft engines and parts; and required delivery within three months by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers of all military and naval aeronautical material, including aircraft, hangars, engines and instruments. The last mentioned clause, covering delivery of aircraft and aeronautical material, was significantly qualified with the proviso that the materials to be delivered will include "all items . . . which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes." The article was amended to include this limitation at President Wilson's specific suggestion, as part of his insistence on minimum interference with German economics. He repeatedly stated that it was impossible to suppress everything that might be used in war.

Clauses 203–210 of the Treaty authorized the creation of Allied Control Commissions to enforce the Military, Naval and Air Clauses.

The Aerial Navigation Clauses of the Treaty are found in Part XI, Articles 313–320. In view of the decision of the Supreme Council not to prohibit German civil aviation, as such, these clauses were drafted to cover the right of civil aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers to fly into and over Germany and to participate in her traffic. They jointly constitute a license for that purpose and thereby tacitly recognize continued German sovereignty over German airspace. This license no more affected such sovereignty than does any other aerial navigation license given by one sovereign state to the civil aircraft of another sovereign state.

Taken together, the Aerial Navigation Clauses, effective for a limited period ending not later than January 1, 1923, gave to the civil aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers rights of transit over and landing in German territory (including the use of airports open for national public traffic), subject to German flight regulations and airport charges, providing that such regulations and charges were applied equally to German aircraft; required recognition by Germany of certificates of aircraft nationality and airworthiness, and of airmen's licenses issued by the Allied and Associated Powers; and required Germany to enforce over her territory as to her aircraft, the rules as to lights, signals and air traffic to be set up under the separate Air Navigation Convention,

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which would be binding upon their own civil air organizations. This Convention was being drafted at the time. When adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers, it was to control international aviation as between themselves and such countries as might later adhere.

The Aerial Navigation Clauses, when first submitted by the Aeronautical Commission to higher authorities of the Allied and Associated Powers, were so drafted as to continue in effect, apparently, until Germany was either admitted into the League of Nations or authorized, by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers, to adhere to the Air Navigation Convention. Mr. Lansing promptly and vigorously objected for various reasons, but particularly because no reciprocal rights were given to future German civil aviation in the territory of the Allied and Associated Powers. The latter objection is again of great interest as indicating the desire of the American delegation to interfere as little as possible with German civil aviation: the American assumption was that German aviation would play a useful part in the reconstruction of German economy. The discussion ended in a compromise. A section was included in Clause 320, providing in substance that the civil air rights in Germany of the Allied and Associated Powers should lapse on January 1, 1923, unless before that date Germany was admitted to the League of Nations or became a party to the Aerial Navigation Convention.

It should be noted here that while Article 200, part of the Air Clauses, gave "the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers" freedom of transit over Germany and the right to land in German territory, this clause was apparently always construed by the parties as applying solely to military aircraft. Otherwise it would have been inconsistent with the limited license privileges in the Aerial Navigation Clauses.

The Air Navigation Convention was drafted by the Aeronautical Commission. Its main purpose was to provide principles and rules for future international air commerce, including uniform regulatory practices. It recognized the fact that each state had sovereignty over its airspace, but provided, as between contracting states, for reciprocal freedom of passage of aircraft except that "the establishment of international airways shall be subject to the consent of the states flown over."

When first drafted, it contained no provision for the ultimate adhesion of enemy states. Lansing again objected, on the ground

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that this limited the development of German civil aviation too harshly, and the Aeronautical Commission was directed to include such a provision. As finally adopted, the Convention authorized adherence of the states which took part in the war but which were not signatory to the Air Navigation Convention (*i.e.* the enemy states) only if they became members of the League of Nations, or — in the period up to January 1, 1923 — if adhesion were approved by the Allied and Associated Powers. After January 1, 1923, adhesion was possible if agreed to by three-fourths of the signatory and other adhering states. The importance of this provision appears from the text of the much-discussed Article V. As adopted, it provided that "no contracting state shall, except by a special and temporary authorization, permit the flight over its territory of an aircraft which does not possess the nationality of a contracting state."

The language of this clause represented one of the few victories of the experts who thought it necessary to limit German civil flight in order to obtain military security. Its intention was clear. Any state which adhered to the Convention could not admit German aircraft to its territory. States which did not adhere to the Convention could not fly into territory of the Allied and Associated Powers. It was hoped, as one of the negotiators frankly admitted,[3] that the Convention would have the effect of placing Germany inside a ring-fence: that is to say, she would not be able to fly outside of her own frontiers.

The situation at the conclusion of the Versailles Conference can, therefore, be summed up as follows: (1) Germany was to be disarmed by the surrender of military and naval aeronautical material; by the demobilization of her armed air forces; by the prohibition for six months of the manufacture of aircraft, engines and parts; and by the permanent prohibition of the inclusion in her armed forces of any military or naval air force. (2) The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers were permitted for a period not beyond January 1, 1923, to have civil aviation rights into and over Germany, and to participate in her air traffic; Germany was not to have reciprocal rights in their territory. (3) Germany could organize and develop her civil aviation within Germany, and internationally to and with such other states as might be able to and would agree. (4) Future international air traffic between the Allied and Associated Powers was to be

[3] Baker, *op. cit.* v. II, p. 458.

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developed under the Air Navigation Convention. Neutral states could participate in this traffic only by adhering to the Convention, in which case they were not to allow the flight into their territories of German aircraft, unless and until Germany was allowed to adhere to the Convention.

The Allied objectives were the permanent military air disarmament of Germany, and possible limitation of German civil aviation within German territory. Except as indicated above, Germany was left in sovereign control of her own airspace, with adequate power to reorganize her civil aviation, and without any control as to the training of pilots and other personnel.

The basis of German air power — its right to fly — still existed.

III

The Allied objectives were never attained. By 1929 German civil aviation was the most important in Europe. By 1934 her armed air force not only was in existence but was far in front of the air forces of other nations.

How this happened is a long story. A summary is sufficient to show the futility of the whole Versailles approach to the control of air power.

The Allied Air Control Commission and the German authorities quickly disagreed as to which aircraft and equipment were military and which were civil. Pending clarification, the Allies prohibited the manufacture of aircraft and engines beyond the original six-months' Treaty period. German aircraft manufacture was resumed in 1922. In the autumn of 1920, the Supreme Council had instructed the Aeronautical Commission to draw up rules to distinguish civil from military aviation. The Commission insisted that this was impossible, but was again directed by the Supreme Council to prepare the rules. After months of discussion the so-called "Nine Rules" were adopted over vigorous German protest, and were put into effect only after the delivery of an actual ultimatum. The Rules were harsh and artificial. Included in "military" aircraft (the manufacture and use of which were prohibited) were all aircraft which could exceed a speed of about 106 miles an hour at a height of about 6,500 feet, or carried fuel for more than four hours' flight at full power, or could transport total cargo in excess of about 1,320 pounds, including pilot, crew, passengers and freight. After continuous quarreling between the Control Commission and German authorities, these Rules were

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modified in 1925 so that a "civil" aircraft could carry a load consisting, approximately, of a pilot, seven or eight passengers, and a few hundred pounds of baggage and express — in other words, a total of approximately 2,000 pounds. In the meantime Allied civil aircraft exceeding these specifications were being used all over Europe in civil operations, giving Germany a sound argument as to the utter artificiality of the Nine Rules. Here was a clear instance of the impracticability of the attempt to differentiate between military and civil aviation. In the meantime, to avoid these prohibitions, German manufacturers had set up branch plants in adjoining countries and were making admittedly military planes, as well as civil aircraft.

The limiting clause of the Air Navigation Convention was also causing trouble. Due to Germany's geographical position, such neighboring neutral nations as Holland, Denmark and Switzerland found it more important to develop international air traffic with Germany than with the former Allies. This was lawfully possible so long as they did not adhere to the Convention as drafted. Article V of the Air Navigation Convention was not building a civil air ring around Germany; on the contrary, special provisions had to be made to modify this article so as to permit contracting states to conclude special conventions for interchange of air traffic with non-contracting states. German air power was still in existence and another loophole was opening for its expansion.

On January 1, 1923, the Aerial Navigation Clauses of the Versailles Treaty ceased to be effective and Allied flying rights into Germany ended. Due to the feeling created by the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany withdrew from pending negotiations for her adherence to the Air Navigation Convention. Germany now had full sovereignty of her own airspace, unencumbered by an Allied license to fly. Promptly taking advantage of this tactical position, Germany forbade the entry into her territory of Allied aircraft, and began to confiscate those that did land. In the meantime her own civil aviation continued to grow. According to figures submitted to the League of Nations in 1930, German aircraft by 1925 were flying more kilometers than were the commercial planes of any other European nation, and her lead continued to grow for the next several years. The effort to control German civil aviation had broken down so completely that it soon became advantageous for the former Allies to try to per-

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suade Germany to adhere to the Air Navigation Convention. Even this was never accomplished.

The strength of Germany's civil aviation forced a revision and the virtual abandonment of attempts to control her military air development. Under the new agreements of May 1926 between Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan on one side and Germany on the other, military aviation theoretically remained forbidden in Germany, but the Allied military air control authorities ceased to exist. Military air training was theoretically prohibited, but German civil aviation was to be "kept within the limits of normal development . . . in regard to commercial aviation, which shall not be subsidized in excess of these requirements." Provision for inspection or control ostensibly passed to the League of Nations. There is no evidence that the League ever acted. It is questionable whether it had any inspection or other organization to warn of German military air rearmament, or enforce the supposedly still existing restrictive covenants of the Versailles Treaty against such rearmament. Germany was apparently left to police herself. Military air rearmament under the Nazis had been made easy. On the conclusion of the May 1926 agreements ending military control, direct arrangements to exchange civil air traffic were made between Germany and several of the former Allied countries.

The attempted division of military and civil aviation had failed. Germany's right to fly, and her "know-how" gained through manufacture of aircraft and training of personnel, ostensibly for civil and commercial purposes, had led to the logical result predicted by the air experts at Versailles.

IV

The dilemma which faced President Wilson and the other Chiefs of State of the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles in 1919 must be faced again, but under infinitely more difficult and complex circumstances. The grave possibilities of the use of air power in the new atomic era pose questions which will make world history.

A basic decision about policy is necessary. If we feel that the past behavior of the enemy Powers requires that in the present world situation we disarm them in the air, it is useless for us to consider again an artificial separation of military and civil air power. Enemy air power must be attacked and controlled at its

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base. Several analyses of air power have been published. None seems to meet the present situation. Air power has one basic element which eclipses all the others — the right of a nation to fly and to exercise sovereignty over its airspace.

Air power, as stated earlier in this paper, is the ability of a nation to act through the airspace, to use controlled flight, at home and abroad, in peace and in war. No matter what the nation's resources may be and what other elements contribute to its air power, it must control the airspace over its territory and have the right to use that airspace for such purposes as it may determine. Otherwise its air power is practically non-existent.

If the future military disarmament of an enemy state is necessary for security purposes, the right of the state to use its airspace must be prohibited or fully controlled. Nothing else will prove satisfactory. This is the lesson of the Versailles failure.

Under international law, each nation normally has sovereignty over its airspace. In the language of the new "Convention on International Civil Aviation" adopted at Chicago in 1944 and now awaiting ratification: "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Language to the same legal effect is in the Air Navigation Convention mentioned earlier and adopted simultaneously with the Treaty of Versailles; in the Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation, adopted at Havana in 1928 (to which the United States is a party); and in the separate statutory provisions of practically every nation. Under this theory of sovereignty, a nation uses its airspace as it may determine and can exclude all others therefrom except as and when general or specific permission may be granted. This is the basis of national air power.

In like manner the government of the homeland may use its sovereignty over its colonial possessions to the exclusion of others and to advance or defend its national aims. Peace terms necessary for future security may well require enemy states to relinquish sovereignty over colonial or other territorial possessions. Such sovereignty will doubtless be vested, temporarily or permanently, in a trusteeship set up under the United Nations Charter.

Exactly the same thing must be done with the airspace over those enemy states which are to be disarmed. Even if some are not to be permanently disarmed, temporary trusteeship of the

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airspace would offer the simplest and soundest method of readjusting world aviation. While the United Nations Charter may not have specifically foreseen this procedure, it can be construed to meet the situation. Certain surface controls should also be vested in the United Nations agency. These include provisions for the international control of airports in enemy territory and for the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft, engines, parts, the training of personnel and the storage of raw material and fuel.

Under such a system, policing would be comparatively simple. No aircraft could use the airspace of the present enemy states until licensed by the United Nations agency. No military air force could be built up under the guise of a commercial organization. The control would also be flexible. Such air transportation as was needed for the rebuilding of the economy of an enemy state could be provided as the United Nations agency might determine. When any enemy state is considered to have so reorganized its government as to warrant its admission into the United Nations Organization, the airspace trusteeship could be relinquished.

In the meantime the problem of Axis air power must be considered as a whole. Treaties being drafted for the minor enemy states, discussions of economic terms for Germany proceeding at Berlin, control directives prepared for Japan in Tokyo — all must face the same problem and face it consistently. Can any of the enemy states at this time be vested with control of the airspace until the rest of the world knows much more than it does now of the future use of air power? The United Nations Organization has been set up to prevent aggression and preserve the peace. It should be trusted and given adequate power and authority to that end in the air as well as at sea and on the ground.

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THE CHOICES IN HUNGARY

By Oscar Jászi

THE information coming out of Hungary is so conflicting and so strongly colored that world opinion is bewildered. Yet it is important that democracies understand events there aright. The author of these pages stands outside the political struggles of present-day Hungary; his only aim is to give an objective picture of what is going on in that tortured country.

Twenty-three years ago, when the White terroristic system of Admiral Horthy was recognized and supported by the western Powers, thus achieving a semblance of legitimacy, the propaganda apparatus of Budapest was successful in the United States in distorting the truth and presenting all Hungarian democratic efforts as a continuation of the unfortunate Bolshevik revolution of Béla Kun. I was glad at that time to have an opportunity of presenting the essential features of the Hungarian tragedy in the pages of this review. My conclusions were that without a complete democratization of Hungary, resulting in a new internal and external policy, a new war in Central Europe was inevitable; and that the only hope that the Danubian and Balkan nations would escape becoming victims of foreign imperialistic schemes lay in their establishment of a free-trade Danubian Confederation.[1] Later on, I tried to show that the nationality struggles in this region had led to the dismemberment of Hungary along the lines of the Trianon Treaty, foreseen by Louis Kossuth as early as 1850.[2] Finally, I emphasized the social and moral bankruptcy of Hungary under the system of the latifundia.[3]

Today, following Hungary's conquest by the Russian Army, the danger of misunderstanding by the west lies in the tendency of both Communists and progressive anti-Communists to present the picture of the new Hungary in terms that are too schematic.[4] The viewpoints of the anti-Communists are roughly analogous to the ideology of the former Second International and of the Men-

[1] Oscar Jászi, "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, December 1923.

[2] Oscar Jászi, "Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1933.

[3] Oscar Jászi, "Feudal Agrarianism in Hungary," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1938.

[4] There is a third type of propaganda which distorts reality, that of the reactionaries of the old régime. This, for the moment, is crushed in Hungary. I shall not refer to it because its bad faith is quite evident.

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sheviks, respectively, and oversimplify the situation — probably because both are still influenced by the original Marxist outlook. For the Communists, of course, the liberation of Hungary is complete, and the Hungarian people stand on the threshold of a rebirth; the period of full democracy lies just ahead. On the other hand, the exponents of western Socialism and the former Mensheviks seem to be unduly pessimistic. They say that what is taking place in Hungary is simply a repetition of what has occurred in the Baltic states, in Bulgaria, Rumania and Jugoslavia. In their eyes, the sovietization of Hungary by means of a Machiavellian policy and a strong dose of terrorism is in full swing.

In my opinion, this picture is false. Though a common pattern is developing slowly in all the "liberated" countries, one can foresee a very different result in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary from that in the countries which are undergoing a process of immediate sovietization. The common pattern results from the fact that Soviet Russia will not tolerate the existence of any doubtful government in this area. The foundations of a Russian bloc are already solidly laid, in spite of the fact that the Communists — deeply pacifistic at heart — deprecate any movement toward a bloc system elsewhere in Europe or in the world. This means that the armies, diplomacies and foreign economic policies of the peoples of this region will be thoroughly *gleichgeschaltet* with those of the "Soviet fatherland," which will extract as much economic advantage from the process as possible. But this is not the whole picture. It can be easily imagined that the inner political, cultural and ideological life of these countries will assume various different patterns, in accordance with the past of each and the moral orientation of each. The new situation, then, will not be radically different from the old one. These small countries have always been satellite countries, in former times mostly under the sway of Berlin, exercised through Vienna. Now the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg imperialism will be supplanted by Soviet imperialism (though it seems outrageous to all true Communists to have the two terms used in conjunction). Whether this new imperialism will be advantageous or detrimental to the peoples involved will depend on the methods of the Soviets, on the influence of liberal, democratic and Socialist energies in the liberated countries, and on the economic and spiritual influence of the western democracies.

I do not have the space here to elaborate this conception,

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however, and to show the very great divergencies between the political and ideological situations of the countries in question. I must restrict myself mainly to Hungarian developments.

II

In order to understand the course of events in Hungary since the Russian conquest, we must recall in headline style certain important antecedents in the country's historical evolution.

Hungary never was in the orbit of the Greek Orthodox Church. Its religious horizon was strictly Roman Catholic, though later with a very decisive admixture of Protestantism, which fought for religious liberty and against the Hapsburgs. At the same time, the cultural and the ideological influence of Hungarian Jewry became an important factor. Hungarian constitutionalism, much as it was vaunted, was a typical feudal growth; it gave neither the masses nor the middle classes much of anything to say. Yet though the analogies often drawn between English and Hungarian parliamentarianism were part of a fallacious propaganda, it cannot be denied that the technical formalities of constitutionalism and the constitutional struggles within the ruling classes, especially between the feudal aristocracy and the middle class gentry, made a strong impression on the growing bourgeoisie and on a part of the peasantry which was anti-Hapsburg and believed ardently in the teachings of Louis Kossuth.

One must also emphasize that the best representatives of Hungarian thought and literature were penetrated by western liberal ideas, and that some of them became important exponents of western democratic values. The revolution of 1848, which became a legend before it had become a reality, consciously followed the great French models; and even earlier, at the end of the eighteenth century, the conspiracy of the Abbot Martinovics was impregnated by Jacobin traditions. And the last flowering of the liberal Hungarian spirit, the October revolution under the leadership of Károlyi, which occurred immediately after the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy, produced the most comprehensive and enlightened program in the history of Hungarian democracy, including the dismemberment of the feudal estates, universal suffrage, and the solution of the nationality problem in the framework of a federal structure. The problems of this democracy were genuinely similar to the efforts of the most advanced groups of the west. For example, the Sociological

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Society, often called the Hungarian Fabians, under the leadership of a first-class philosopher, Julius Pikler, worked hard on the problem of reconciliation between Socialism and freedom. This orientation toward the west was so outspoken that often the better elements of the old feudal society became real Anglomaniacs, introducing, even though superficially, the English concept of the gentleman. This approach was cordially reciprocated by many representatives of the English aristocracy.

Finally must be noted the special character of the Hungarian people: a sober, hard-working, extremely intelligent ethnic group, remarkably free from the mysticism and the extreme racial fanaticism of the Slavs and the Rumanians.

More recent historical events added to the cleavage between Hungary and the Balkan countries. Feudalism, helped by representatives of the western democracies, was soon successful in undermining the democratic republic set up under Károlyi. The ensuing Communistic revolution followed a pure Russian world-revolutionary model, with chaotic experiments in socialization, dreams of the *sovkhozes*, and occasional hysterical outbursts of terrorism. It was short-lived, but it made a deep impression on Hungary's conservative soul. And in spite of the fact that very soon a much bloodier and more inhuman White Terror supplanted the Red (under the secret leadership of Admiral Horthy), the great majority of the people became immune to the Bolshevik virus. Thereafter nobody ever wished to renew the orthodox patterns of Russian Communism. The messianic dream of Bolshevism had lost its strength; and it has not revived.

Indeed, not only has it lost its hold on the minds of the masses, but it has faded even in the minds of the Communist leaders. The many Hungarian Communist exiles in Moscow witnessed quite a strange ideology in operation in the promised land. The Soviet schools no longer trained them in the Leninist religion of hundred percent Communism and immediate world revolution, but in a ruthless *Realpolitik* imbued with the spirit of Stalin. They came to look on the many mistakes of Béla Kun's revolutionary fantasy in a cool, detached and critical temper; and returning to the old country at the close of this war, and to its splendid, gay capital, now completely in ruins and in the grip of acute famine, they saw clearly that the old heroic methods of unmitigated Communism should not be applied again. Only recently the best mind among

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the Hungarian Communist writers, Joseph Révai, emphasized in the official Communist paper the absolute necessity of close coöperation with the peasants and the creative intelligentsia on a strictly non-Communistic basis.

III

Now we are in a position to understand better what happened in Hungary in the critical months after the liberation.

The revolution which followed can be described as one which needed an incubator. It had one — the Russian Army and Russian diplomacy. And the revolution which the Russian incubator helped nurture was a sober, carefully planned revolution with a rigid bureaucratic tinge. In Hungary's state of exhaustion and complete disorganization, revolution had to come that way, or else take the form of a hopeless, chaotic uprising. The radical transformation which is now going on in Hungary could not have been achieved by the purely parliamentarian methods of the western democracies, the less so because the whole diplomacy of the west is impregnated with a counter-revolutionary spirit, the spirit which in Hungary destroyed the strictly constitutional experiment of Károlyi. This is why even great masses who do not sympathize with the Soviets regard the present methods of transformation as necessary and why the best minds of the new Hungary support the incubator revolution.

The main features of the transformation were these:

(1) Two simon-pure Horthy generals were asked to assume military responsibility. They had to choose between becoming *locum tenentes* of the Red Army in the highest positions, or being designated as war criminals.

(2) The Communist leaders in close contact with the Red Army of Occupation made an appeal for a "Popular Front" with the Small Landholders Party — the principal organized political force in the country — and the lower bourgeoisie of the towns. A new element in this coalition was the National Peasant Party which originated in a group sometimes called the "Hungarian Narodniki." This group was limited in numbers but represented considerable moral and intellectual energies; its members called themselves village-researchers, who "went among the people" and studied their sufferings and problems.[5]

(3) The old demagogy of the first Bolshevik revolution was

[5] *Cf.* Oscar Jászi, "Feudal Agrarianism in Hungary," *op. cit.*

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completely absent: Communism had become respectable and gentlemanly. Even the criticism of certain governmental measures by the Roman Catholic hierarchy was listened to with respect, and when Archbishop Mindszenthy attacked the expropriation of the estates as a "product of hatred," the rejoinder was moderate and tactful. Though the large ecclesiastical estates were dismembered like the others, liberal grants-in-aid were provided for the maintenance of the lower clergy, the churches and parochial buildings. Generally speaking, there is not much talk about Communism in Hungary today; the leitmotiv is democracy with intensely patriotic overtones.

(4) The chaotic "people's tribunals," which gave vent to an outburst of popular passion, were soon legalized and according to competent observers their judgments are rather moderate. Only about 100 death sentences seem to have been pronounced and execution in several cases was suspended. After the blood-bath organized by the Nazis and their satellites, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, this popular vengeance was surely not excessive.

(5) There is no capitalistic party or organization. Hungarian capitalism was a kind of a "domestic Jew" of Hungarian feudalism,[6] never an independent political force. None of the parties of the coalition exhibits the smallest desire to conserve capitalistic monopolies or to create new ones.

(6) The Communists display the utmost opportunism in handling political patronage, using anyone who can be regarded as a reliable instrument for their purposes. Even men with reactionary records are accepted in public service if their coöperation seems to serve a useful end; for example, a routine Horthy diplomat was sent to Washington, and the able counter-revolutionary historian, Julius Szekfü, who served the Hapsburgs and the Horthy-Bethlen régimes with equal ardor, was sent to Moscow as ambassador. A great many less notable old-timers are in influential positions.

A number of university professors hastened to become members of the Communist Party. It should be noted, however, that this attitude is not necessarily a servile one. The younger, independent scholars are generally convinced that the old scholarship of the country has become utterly obsolete. The

[6] It was said in the old days that every Count had his domestic Jew, who managed his economic affairs and not seldom his political affairs also.

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foremost scholarly institution, the Hungarian Scientific Academy, a creation of the great Count Széchenyi, served as a bulwark of reaction and an instrument of anti-democratic tendencies. Albert Szent-Györgyi, a Nobel prize winner, expressed a common opinion in his letter renouncing his seat in the Academy: "The Academy is in a large measure responsible for our national catastrophe . . . it has become the nest of servilism and half-science . . . it obstructs the road toward the rebuilding of the country."

(7) Another significant attitude of the new system is its artificial silence concerning the October revolution of 1918. Of course, it was impossible not to give an honorary seat to Károlyi in the National Assembly, but he has not yet reached home and his name is seldom mentioned. Though there is an acknowledged lack of men of higher intellectual capacities, Vambéry and several other leaders of the October revolution still stay away. Some written complaints appear to the effect that many reactionaries and even doubtful characters have been admitted into influential places, whereas leading Octobrists are under suspicion. The greatest figure of modern Hungary, and her foremost lyrical genius of the past 50 years, Andrew Ady, who did more than any other person to propagate the ideas of a democratic revolutionary Hungary, is very seldom mentioned during festivals or commemorations. The explanation is not obscure. The present rulers are not trying to carry out their much-heralded Communist program, but are putting into effect the essential points of the program of the October revolution; but they do not like to have the fact made too evident. A hero of the Hungarian underground and one of the most brilliant political writers of the past quarter of a century, Béla Zsolt, wrote recently: "Why do we not hear 'Andrew Ady' on the streets from every megaphone? Is it perhaps that we are afraid of the mirror of the past; the men of today of the standard of yesterday; the living of the rivalry of the dead? Our irate passions were right to destroy the statues of the past, but who will dare stand on the empty pedestals?"

This silent tension between the October revolution and the present revolution found symbolic expression in the proclamation of the Third Republic under the presidency of Zoltan Tildy, the leader of the Small Landholders Party. Many Hungarians both at home and in the United States felt that the new régime should have been under the honorary leadership of Michael Károlyi,

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who had worked and suffered more than any other person for the liquidation of the latifundia system and the democratization of Hungary. He began the dismemberment of the large estates by dividing his own domain, left the country as a pauper, was hounded by the counter-revolution and declared a traitor, and lived abroad in poverty, but without complaint and without for a minute abandoning his principles. No wonder public imagination saw in him a successor of two other great exiles, Rákóczi and Kossuth. Simple people, though not questioning the merits and qualities of President Tildy, did question such ingratitude toward a great moral leader. However, all is clear in terms of *Realpolitik*. Károlyi's firmness of principle makes him a dangerous person. Moreover, he is hated by many influential conservatives in the west as a traitor to his class. The present government has difficulties enough: why increase them out of sentimental considerations? Besides, the October revolution immediately arouses unpleasant memories of the Béla Kun dictatorship.

Be that as it may, the incubator revolution has the great merit of having carried out, without mercy and without hesitation, the fundamental idea of the new democratic Hungary — the division of all the landed estates among the landless peasantry. Of course, many experiments since the dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy have shown that a purely mechanical distribution of land does not lead automatically to a new and higher standard of popular existence. Only recently Hugh Seton-Watson (son of the noted historian) and a study group of experts concluded that the agrarian reforms in eastern Europe did very little for the rural population.[7] Nevertheless, it remains true that the expropriation of the feudal estates was the necessary first step for opening the gates for the flood of popular energies. If it is used wisely and undogmatically, the Russian conquest may bring about a real economic and moral transformation in Hungary.

IV

In the light of these facts and considerations, there is nothing mysterious about the results of the last elections in Hungary, which have been hotly debated and so differently interpreted. The total number of votes cast was 4,717,256. Of these, the Small

[7] *Cf.* Hugh Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe Between the Wars." New York: Macmillan, 1945. Also Political and Economic Planning, "Economic Development of Southeastern Europe." Oxford University Press, 1945.

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Landholders Party received 2,688,101, the Social Democratic Party 821,566, the Communist Party 800,257, the National Peasant Party 322,988, the Citizens Democratic Party 78,522 and the Radical Party 5,762. The National Assembly comprises 409 members: the Small Landholders have 245, the Communists 70, the Social Democrats 69, the National Peasants 23, the Democrats 2. These returns reflect the present political forces in the country surprisingly accurately.

Of course, one often hears the assertion that the overwhelming victory of the Small Landholders Party was a result of the vote of feudal and capitalist reactionaries who had been dispossessed by the revolution and prohibited from building up a new party. Another explanation given is that the great strength of the Small Landholders Party was that it offered a chance to register a protest vote against the Russian occupation, which is, indeed, an enormous burden, especially for the rural population. However, both explanations are oversimplified. There surely was a considerable counter-revolutionary vote in the "conservative victory," and it cannot be denied that the long Russian occupation is both economically and morally unwelcome. The ghastly situation inside the country could hardly fail to make the latter so in any case. A plea for UNRRA help for Hungary states, for example, that there are 200,000 orphans to be cared for; that 400,000 children are suffering from rickets; that 17,000 of the children suffering from tuberculosis are without hospitalization or convalescent care, without medical supplies, proper nourishment, clothes or bedding; that there is not adequate food for nursing mothers, and no food or clothing for newborn babies; that surgeons are operating without anesthetics; that thousands of persons are dying as a result of the lack of insulin, penicillin, digitalis, sulfa drugs and other medicines; that there are no surgical dressings, iodine, X-ray films, or plaster of Paris; and that there were no warm clothes for the winter, not enough fuel and no supplies to repair the damaged homes. These terrible conditions are reflected in a continuous rise in crime.

Terrible as is this economic and hygienic situation, however, it is only a contributory influence in the political situation. The real cause of the success of the Small Landholders Party is that none of the Marxist parties could offer a real program to the peasants, the small bourgeoisie or considerable numbers of the intelligentsia — in short, to a majority of the country. The rigid

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class doctrine of the Marxist parties is alien to the traditional mentality and widespread religious feeling of the masses. In the election campaign, the Communists said not a word about the issue of private property versus Communism, and made no mention of the collectivization of land. Yet the issue was the village and small-town way of life versus vast bureaucratic organizations. Marxist Socialism's total disregard and misunderstanding of the values of rural life made it, in all its forms, inacceptable to the greater half of the population.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the Small Landholders Party is not reactionary, nor even conservative; it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms. It was the strongest in the country after the advent of Horthy, and though it was demoralized during the Bethlen period, and later became infected with adventurers, it has always remained healthy at the core. In coöperation with the "village researchers," it may perform great deeds in the future.

The elections in Hungary carry a great lesson for the progressives of all parties in all countries. It is often said that people who have once lived under an oligarchic rule or later under a Fascist dictatorship are not ripe for democracy — that after centuries of servitude they are unable to make proper use of the vote. This statement too is a half-truth, and such truth as is in it does not point primarily against the masses but against the corrupted middle and upper classes. The Hungarian people at their first fully free elections proved that their natural intelligence and sense of decency shows them the right political path. If they are not terrorized or cowed — in short, if political freedom lasts — and if they are granted the elementary material conditions of civilized life, which for them implies the growth of new forms of economic and cultural coöperation, I see no reason why they should not march resolutely toward the higher forms of western and Nordic peasant culture.

V

Can the equilibrium created by the recent elections be maintained? Hungary is in the Russian orbit. The military and economic ties binding her to Russia are tight (for example, the issue of banknotes recently became a privilege of the army of occupation). Will it be possible for her to establish a degree of independence — that is to say, freedom of political life, cultural

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self-determination and higher democratic forms of rural life?

This question applies to countries other than Hungary. There are signs that in Czechoslovakia and even more in Austria forces exist which would be persistently opposed to thoroughgoing Sovietization. When the transformation in Hungary was just beginning, some hoped that it might be possible to create a Prague-Vienna-Budapest triangle, which might form an intermediary, twilight zone between the west and the east, between capitalistic democracy and full socialization; that is to say, they thought there might be coöperation among a group of states "neither capitalistic nor Bolshevik."

Such hopes were quite in accordance with all the official declarations of the United Nations. What destroyed them was the new spirit taken over by the conquerors from the Fascist and Nazi dictators, who used conquered peoples simply as pawns and chattels in their imperialistic game. Stalin directed this same policy against the Germans and the Poles. It became very popular, and soon the Czechs and the Slovaks clamored to put it into effect against their German and Hungarian minorities. No wonder it was popular. It solved old difficulties easily; it satisfied the passionate desire for revenge; it gratified personal grievances and enmities; above all, it gave welcome occasion for plunder on a vast scale to hungry masses. Unfortunately, at last even the defeated Hungarians adopted these barbarous methods and expelled 420,000 Germans. The story of this sad episode is not yet clear. Some people speak of Russian pressure; and it must be noted that there was some protest against the measure among Hungarian intellectuals. To my mind, it will in perspective prove to be a greater calamity for Hungary than was the expulsion of the Magyars from Slovakia, for it will deprive the Hungarian Government of much of the moral force of its protest against the Czechoslovak procedures, stated in such dignified terms by Foreign Minister Gyöngyössy.

An important task of the historians of this epoch will be to describe the horrors and insanities of this new age of migration of the peoples. Sad to say, the vague and hypocritical stipulations of paragraph XIII of the Potsdam Agreement gave them a kind of respectability. As an acute observer said, "it applied a humanistic figleaf to the inhumanities of the Polish and Czechoslovak procedures, already in full swing."

Needless to say, the hopes of a Danubian and Balkan federa-

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tion were utterly demolished by this spirit. Instead of a comprehensive democratic federalism we witness only new power-political schemes (often in the form of local pseudo-federations) for building up a system of blocs — which, of course, according to the United Nations ideology, do not and should not exist.

VI

Returning to the particular situation in Hungary, one may say that the idea of a continuation of the "Popular Front" coalition among industrial labor, the peasantry and the intelligentsia seems not to be utopian. There are strong tendencies at work to strengthen it. The new equilibrium appears somewhat precarious, however, due to the fact that it is imposed upon the Communists by the necessities of present-day conditions and is not the outcome of fundamental convictions. There are people who fear that should the Communist forces in Hungary become sufficiently stabilized, with full Russian support, and peasant aspirations be restricted to a use of the ballot which is not translated into terms of real life, a dictatorship may sovietize the country. Some think that a one-party system, composed of several silent and non-active parties under Communist domination, is imaginable.

For the idea of a middle zone between the western democracies and the Soviets to be revived, a number of conditions would have to be fulfilled. First of all, the convinced leaders of democracy in the countries concerned must keep their heads. Secondly, and imperatively, the western democracies must help; they must give energetic coöperation in fighting inflation and creating a healthy international economic structure. If, on the contrary, the reactionary tendencies in western diplomacy prevail, and if Hungary's prostration becomes an excuse for fomenting counter-revolutionary intrigues there, only chaos and final Bolshevization can follow. It was this line of policy which restored feudalism under the dictatorship of Horthy.[8]

The third and most important single factor, of course, is the future attitude of Soviet Russia. Will she sacrifice her real interests in order to satisfy revolutionary dogmatism and to indulge in imperialistic power politics? Hungary already lies in her economic and military sphere. All that is really essential to the Soviets now is that they shall have a government there which

[8] By the way, it is intriguing to speculate why Horthy seems still to enjoy a dignified freedom when many of his accomplices were executed as war criminals.

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is solidly and loyally coöperative with them. They can have such a government easily if they do not impose orthodox Bolshevik forms on the country and do not hurt the traditional sensibilities of the Hungarian spirit — in short, if they avoid oppression and terrorism. Why should they do otherwise? The Hungarian peasantry is intelligent enough to accept higher forms of agrarian coöperation which will prove far more productive than the compulsory drill of the *kolkhozes*. Russia herself has introduced more freedom and a larger degree of individual property, and the process is not yet at an end. As for an ambitious scheme of industrial socialization — why not? The only proviso is that they do it effectively and do not attempt an absurd experiment in paper socialization like that which in 1919 made all production impossible. In Hungary the road is open to really constructive experiments in socialization, since there are very few people there who would shed tears for that hybrid form of capitalism which amassed enormous profits by the ruthless exploitation of monopolistic positions.

The possibility that Russia will permit Hungary to develop in such terms does not seem to rest on empty illusions. Why should she reject this type of transformation? Why should Stalin return in Hungary to the policy of militant Communism or revolutionary mysticism which he has abandoned at home? According to reliable witnesses, we can expect profound transformations within the U.S.S.R. After the terrific sacrifices of this war, the Soviet people may ask that the great promises of the Stalin Constitution of 1936 be put into practice. And every Russian step toward freedom and personal liberty, and every check on the omnipotence of the Russian state, will also encourage and permit a more liberal and democratic spirit in the liberated countries, especially those in the twilight zone.

One must not be too optimistic. On the other hand, I regard it as a disservice to the cause of democracy to assert that there are no alternative possibilities in the twilight zone, to maintain that Russia is bound, in the spirit of a dogmatic materialistic determinism, to use her previous methods unaltered. I think those who fight the battle of liberty should be encouraged in their hope that they have a choice, a really important choice.

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TRANSPORT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

By Paul Wohl

THE state of Russia's transport and communications has always been a test of her strength. In 1856 France and England would never have considered attacking the Crimea had Russia been able to reinforce armies on the Black Sea coast by rail from Moscow or St. Petersburg. According to General Kuropatkin, who commanded the Tsar's army in Manchuria in 1904–05, the Japanese would have been defeated had the Russians been able to speed up the arrival of reinforcements and supplies. While logistics certainly were not the only reason for Japan's victory, the fact remains that the Russians would have fought under much more favorable conditions if the single-track Trans-Siberian railroad had had a more solid roadbed, a few more looplines providing for greater train frequency and, last but not least, if communications had not depended upon ice conditions in Lake Baikal, which had to be crossed by ferry when the ice was not thick enough to support the rails and could not be crossed at all until enough ice had melted to make it navigable.[1]

The German archives and the testimony of imprisoned Nazis have given evidence that Hitler's initial war plan against Russia was based less on strategic considerations than on the expectation that the Soviet administration would be technically unable to prevent the country's disintegration under the impact of German military might and propaganda. The poor condition of the Soviet railroads, Berlin then thought, would make it impossible for the Red Army to manœuvre and to receive reinforcements and supplies.[2] There is no other explanation for the German action in attacking in equal strength along a front extending from Finland to the Black Sea — an operation unprecedented in the annals of military strategy.[3]

Insufficient communications and transportation between the

[1] *cf.* Squadron Leader Murray Harris, "Lifelines of Victory." New York: Putnam, 1942, p. 42.

[2] Regarding the importance which the German General Staff attached to its railroad superiority, *cf.* Ernst Marquart, "Eisenbahnen im Dienst der Strategie," Archiv fuer Eisenbahnwesen, 1939, p. 915. On the weakness of Russian transportation, *cf.* Colonel Oskar von Niedermayer, "Wehrgeographische Betrachtung der Sowjet Union," Berlin, 1933, and Colonel Oskar von Niedermayer and Yu, "Sowjet Russland," Berlin, 1934; also Semenoff, "Wehrgeographische Studien," with a preface by Karl Haushofer.

[3] *cf.* Major Erwin Lessner, "Blitzkrieg and Bluff." New York: Putnam, 1943, p. 198.

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capital and the provinces account also for much of the former weakness of the Russian state's internal structure. The Tsarist Government's constant fear of revolutionary peasant movements or national uprisings in regions with non-Russian population were due largely to the inability of the central government in St. Petersburg to assert itself swiftly and effectively throughout the country and to keep check on what was going on in the villages of the interior and on the periphery.

The Soviet Government originally had similar difficulties. Development of radio, telephone circuits, aviation and long distance inland transportation were given an important place on its agenda. Significantly, nationalization of the railroads (most of which had already been owned and operated by the state under the Tsar), of inland shipping and of the merchant marine were among the first sweeping measures taken by the Soviet régime. From 1917 to 1919, individual industries were nationalized piecemeal, enterprise by enterprise. Only in banking and transportation did the Soviets immediately establish state monopolies.[4] In the long-drawn-out party discussions about how Russian economy should be placed on a Socialist basis, all Bolshevik theoreticians agreed that government control of transportation was one of the fundamental means of socialization. Lenin stressed this point at the first Congress of Economic Soviets in Kharkov in June 1918. Nikolai Bukharin during the great party debate on the eve of the collectivization called the government monopoly of transportation one of the "commanding heights" from which the Soviets were able to direct the country toward Socialism. Under the first two Five Year Plans, A. A. Andreyev and L. M. Kaganovich, who successively took a hand in the reorganization of the railroads, expressed this view with even greater emphasis. In 1935, Stalin, addressing a conference of railway Stakhanovites, declared: "The U.S.S.R. would be inconceivable as a state without first-class railway transport linking its many regions and areas into one whole."

Without a swift restoration of long-distance transportation the Communist Party might have lost its monopoly of political power. The collectivization of the villages in 1930–32, which the Bolsheviks themselves have called the second Soviet revolution, would have been far more difficult had there not been the

[4] Paul Wohl: "Nationalization of Russian Banks," with a survey of the first nationalization decrees, *Pennsylvania Law Review*, 1927, nos. 5, 6 and 7.

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means of long-distance communication; against it the traditional lethargy and evasiveness of the old-time mujiks were of no avail.

Transportation occupied a prominent place in the three prewar Five Year Plans. From the Second Five Year Plan on, the total investment in transportation was greater than that in agriculture. The amount increased steadily from plan to plan:

	1st Five Year Plan		2nd Five Year Plan		3rd Five Year Plan	
	Actual Investments		*Actual Investments*		*Planned Investments*	
	in billion rubles	*percent of total*	*in billion rubles*	*percent of total*	*in billion rubles*	*percent of total*
Industry	25.0	49.50	58.7	51.49	111.9	58.28
Agriculture	9.7	19.20	15.2[1]	13.33	11.0	5.73
Transportation	8.9	17.62	20.7	18.16	37.3	19.43
Total	50.5	100	114.7	100	192	100

[1] Planned investment.

In landlocked Soviet Russia, the railways are of greater importance than in any other country in the world and rank first among the various means of transportation. Their share in the total traffic burden increased much faster than that of inland navigation. From 1928 to 1937, the traffic volume of railways in terms of ton-miles rose from 63.8 billion to 243 billion; while inland shipping in the same period increased only from 15.62 to 20.2 billion ton-miles.

Rail transportation reached its prewar standards before industrial production was restored. In 1928, steel production regained its prewar level. In that year, rail traffic had risen from the 1913 figure of 48.3 billion ton-miles to 63.8 billion ton-miles, an increase of about 40 percent, while tonnage increased from 132.4 million tons in 1913 to 156.2 million tons. The slower tonnage increase indicated that the amount of commodities carried was only about 18 percent greater than before the war. The reason for the greater increase in terms of ton-miles was a longer average haul. This in turn was due mainly to the poor condition of shipping, which in 1913 had carried a much larger share of the country's long-distance transportation, and to new directions of traffic currents.

Political and psychological reasons also may have induced the Soviets to concentrate their attention on the railroads rather than on water transportation. No other means of transportation, and no other industry with the exception of power production

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and forestry, calls for such continuous long-range planning and is technologically and operationally so well suited for the administrative technique of a Socialist government.

The Five Year Plans added to the traffic load of the railroads. In his electoral address of February 9, 1946, Stalin stated that in 1940 the output of pig iron was four times as great as in 1913, of steel four and one-half times as great, of coal five and one-half times as great, of oil three and one-half times as great, while the amount of marketed grain increased by around 75 percent. In 1928 and 1935, these five commodities together accounted for more than half the tonnage carried by the railroads; in 1937, coal shipments alone amounted to 116.6 million tons or 86 percent of the total tonnage carried before the First World War.

At the same time distances increased as a result of the development of new heavy industries in west Siberia. Russia's main production centers always have been unfavorably located. Coal from the Don basin had to be shipped to Leningrad and to the Urals. Oil had to be distributed from Transcaucasia all over European and Asiatic Russia. Due to differences in climate and geological conditions, agricultural production and even such materials as wood and stone are unevenly distributed. Stone for construction purposes and for railway ballasting had to be shipped from the Caucasus and from the north to the black soil areas of the Ukraine. The north is dependent upon the south and Siberia for grain; while the south is practically without wood.

The efforts of the Government to open up new coal fields in the north and in Kazakhstan, to drill new oil wells closer to the Urals and to the Moscow area, to produce new and hardier types of seed-grain adapted to the northern climate, to replace crushed rock and wood by cement, and in other ways to change the transport geography of the vast and sprawling Soviet realm were only beginning to become effective before the war.

Transport facilities could not keep pace with this development. As a result, the railroads of the U.S.S.R. were heavily overburdened. Their traffic load per mile of track in 1937 was almost three times as great as in the United States (4,814,042 against 14,237,290 ton-miles in America). The average active haul per freight car was 86.8 miles against only 40.6 miles in the United States. At the same time, the Soviet railroads had a longer average haul (426.2 miles against 337 miles) and slower average

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speed per freight train (12.2 miles against 16.1 miles).[5] This extraordinary performance was achieved at terrific cost: accidents galore and a larger number of railway men per track mile than in any other country.

The Soviet railroads were the only major network belonging to the International Union of Railroads which never gave out accident and personnel statistics. Only relatively few accidents were reported in the press, but enough seeped out to indicate that conditions were disastrous.

II

No wonder that the Germans who kept a rather close record of Soviet transport developments were convinced that the Russian rail system would not be able to stand the additional strain of a major war. Their experts pointed to the fact that the Second Five Year Plan had not been fulfilled, that 6,835 miles of new track had been planned and only 1,871 miles actually built, that the plan had called for double-tracking of 5,903 miles and that only 3,106 miles had received a second track, that the automatic block system was to be introduced for 5,157 miles and that it had been installed only for 2,982 miles, that only 71.5 percent of the locomotives planned had been built, that only 17.4 percent of all cars were equipped with automatic coupling instead of 50 percent, and so forth.[6]

The reasons for these shortcomings were two: 1, The first Soviet plans established tentative goals; they contained an element of propaganda, and even if they were not fulfilled they generally marked considerable progress; 2, in the particular case of the railroad section of the Second Five Year Plan, Soviet policy was changed in 1935 after Moscow's crack organizer L. M. Kaganovich, in the midst of a terrific crisis, had taken over the direction of the railroads: instead of working toward all-round extension and improvement, as originally planned, only a few new lines were built, while existing facilities on certain lines were strengthened and adapted to the use of heavy rolling stock.

These specially selected trunk lines became the backbone of the whole transportation system. The poor condition of the remaining lines was of secondary importance. The purpose of this

[5] Methods of assessing American and Soviet railroad statistics are not the same. Comparisons therefore are only approximate.

[6] *Planovoye Khoziaistvo* (*Planned Economy*), No. 6. Moscow, 1938.

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new railroad policy was to connect the principal production centers, separated by vast expanses of thinly populated land, steppes, forests and deserts, at the expense of the transport facilities within the various regions. This change of plan saved the country from chaos.

Seen from the outside, the result was confusing. While the majority of the lines retained their light roadbed and were operated with old and inadequate rolling stock, the trunk lines handled a vast traffic with the heaviest and most modern equipment. Among these were the lines connecting Moscow with the Urals and with the Don and Donetz, and even more so the railroads between the Urals and the new industrial region of Kuznetsk, between the upper Irtish and the Yenisei in west Siberia, and between the Urals and the coal fields of Karaganda in Kazakhstan. In 1940 this development had gone so far that less than 40 percent of the total track mileage accounted for more than 75 percent of the total traffic. The heaviest traffic was located in the Don and Donetz area, in the Urals, in west Siberia and in the confines of Central Asia.

When the war broke out, most of these inter-regional trunk lines were in operation. In addition the entire Trans-Siberian had been double-tracked, and its northern parallel, which follows the Amur River and the Manchurian frontier at a distance of 200 to 300 miles, was under construction. In the last two years before the war, the Third Five Year Plan added a new feature, with the purpose of bringing new raw material bases closer to the main industrial centers so as to shorten the haul of such essential commodities as coal and oil, and to establish reserve routes in case the existing trunk lines should be cut.

Outstanding examples were: 1, the rail line from Kotlas on the Northern Dvina to the Pechora river (between the Urals and Archangel) whence coal produced from open seams was to be shipped to Leningrad, Moscow and Murmansk, which then depended for their coal upon the Don basin and Spitsbergen; 2, two new lines in Kazakhstan to facilitate shipment of coal and alloys from the Karaganda region to the Urals and to points in west Siberia, which hitherto had been supplied over much longer distances from the Ukraine and the Kuznetsk basin; 3, a new connection between the Murmansk and the Archangel railroads diverting traffic from Murmansk to a safer line several hundred miles east of the Finnish border; 4, a rail link between

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Baku and Astrakhan, enabling the Soviets to continue oil shipments from Transcaucasia to central Russia even after the Germans had severed the main line which swings westward along the northern foothills of the Caucasus in the direction of the Don.

None of these four railroads was ready in 1941; but construction work had been advanced sufficiently to complete them in record time during the war. Without them Russia might have lost the battle of transportation. It was won thanks to three improvisations:

In the first place, inland shipping, which the first two Five Year Plans had relegated to a secondary rôle, emerged in the summer of 1944 by the sheer willpower and resourcefulness of its personnel as a major factor in Soviet transportation. On July 15, 1944, a Moscow communiqué announced triumphantly that seamen of the Dnieper flotilla had conquered Pinsk, the Polish town in the center of the Pripet marshes. Over the Tsar's neglected east-west waterways, which had been practically closed during the inter-war period, large numbers of shallow-going transports and gunboats swarmed through the wood and swamp lands of Polesie, Nowogródek and Bialystok, the three northeastern provinces of Poland, in the direction of the Vistula, Niemen and Dvina. Instead of the grain and timber of prerevolutionary Russia, these waterways now carried soldiers and supplies.

Secondly, more than 300,000 motor trucks arrived from America and Britain. These, together with several hundred thousand Soviet-built motor vehicles, enabled the Red Army to roll from the Vistula to the Oder, long before its rail arm had managed to repair the thoroughly destroyed railroads of western Poland and to convert them to Russian broad-gauge.

Thirdly, the capture of more than 100,000 standard-gauge freight cars and locomotives in Bessarabia and Rumania made it possible for Russia's southern armies to move across the Carpathians and through the Danube valley into Hungary.

Little of this material is available for reconstruction. American and British trucks are worn out, and captured standard-gauge rolling stock cannot be converted economically to broad gauge.

Great damage was created by the war. The Commissariat of Transportation has announced that 40 percent of the total rail network was under enemy occupation. On many lines the re-

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treating Germans used special engines to cut the rails and to break up the roadbed. It is reported that 32,560 miles of main lines and 11,500 miles of secondary lines were destroyed. Since the total mileage (including new construction during the war) was 66,000, the 40 percent figure released in Moscow must include sidings and tracks on marshaling yards. Also reported as destroyed are 2,323 large and medium bridges, 317 depots and 2,455 railway stations. Most of the rolling stock, however, was evacuated to the rear.

Much of the damage has been repaired with the same speed which characterized the restoration of railroads in areas under aerial bombardment. By August 1945 more than 30,000 miles of track were reported to have been restored, as were more than 1,900 large and medium bridges and 192 depots. However, these figures are so large that one must question whether the repairs are more than temporary.

The Soviet transportation system as it emerges from the war does not present a bright picture. Thousands of miles of track and innumerable permanent installations have been battered by four years of war and worn out by the demands of an enormous traffic load. There is a network of 65,000 miles of inland waterways, but only about 3,000 miles of canals actually in operation, many of them equipped with wooden locks and accessible only to small barges with a three-foot draught. The only important new waterway is the modern one between Moscow and the Volga. Before the war waterways carried altogether about 70 million tons of traffic, representing 20.2 billion ton-miles (1937) — only 6.3 percent of the ton-mileage of the railroads. There are approximately 37,000 miles of surfaced highways, mostly second rate (against 1.4 million miles in the United States), some 130,000 miles of macadamized highway of inferior quality, and about one million motor vehicles of which, according to the latest official registration (1943) 890,000 units were trucks (against 4.7 million trucks in the United States). The prewar maritime tonnage totalled 1,300,000 gross tons (Lloyd's Register, June 1939), including a relatively large number of sturdy small and medium-sized freighters of fairly modern construction.

The main assets of Soviet transportation are: 1, the industrial trunk lines east of the Urals and between the Urals and the Volga — the former handling a traffic as heavy as that in our principal industrial areas, with freight trains carrying 3,000

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tons or more;[7] the new rail line to the Pechora coal fields; joint use of the excellent Manchurian railroads; mass production facilities for rolling stock in the Urals and locomotive factories turning out large numbers of units of the heaviest type;[8] 2, freedom of maritime and coastwise shipping; improved conditions of navigation along the Northern Seaway around Siberia, especially between the Yenisei and the North Atlantic, over which route, before the war, large quantities of wood were brought to Britain; and, 3, last but not least, several large automobile and tractor factories in the Urals and in the central area around Moscow, which in 1938 produced 210,000 vehicles a year, mostly trucks, and which have been extended considerably during the war.

III

Against this background the Soviets have drawn up their new Five Year Plan, covering the period from 1946 to the end of 1950. Although at this writing full details have not yet been released, the main features of the transportation section of the plan have been published in three authoritative and comprehensive studies in the official organ of the Planning Commission.[9] The fact that the studies on the future of the railroads and of inland shipping bear the signature of the People's Commissars for Railroads and Inland Navigation gives them an importance which goes far beyond that of ordinary articles. Both studies

[7] Soviet railway traffic east of the Urals was described by a reliable and competent eyewitness, J. H. Potts, President of the British Union of Railwaymen 1939–41 in a report on his observations in Russia in 1942, published by the International Federation of Transport Workers, London. "There are huge marshalling yards everywhere — all automatically controlled and many of them capable of handling 10,000 cars a day," wrote Mr. Potts. "In these yards the engines are controlled by wireless, with direct communication between the driver and the control cabin. The latest Russian locomotive — the F. D. types — can draw loads up to 3,000 tons at speeds over 30 miles an hour. They are fitted with condensers for travelling through waterless country . . ." An even larger type of locomotive, the AA type (Alexander Andreyev), hauling 1,400 tons at an average speed of 24¾ miles an hour and used for the transportation of coal from the Don basin, is described in the *Railway Gazette*, London, of November 10, 1944, p. 464.

[8] According to the Soviet press, the rolling stock works at Nijni-Tagil in the Urals can turn out more than 100,000 cars a year. Production is reported to be on the assembly line. No other country has gone in for mass production of rolling stock. Between 1936 and 1944, the United States produced between 40,000 and 80,000 units a year. The Soviet figures probably are much too high. There seems to be evidence, however, that the output of the Ural works is very substantial, and the possibility of freight car production on the assembly line cannot be discarded.

[9] I. Kovalov, People's Commissar of Transport and Communications, "Perspectives of Railroad Transportation," in *Planovoye Khoziaistvo*, 1945, No. 5; A. Galitzky and I. Libin, "Perspectives of Railroad Electrification" in *Planovoye Khoziaistvo*, 1945, No. 3; Z. Shashkov, People's Commissar of the River Fleet, "Basic Problems of the Development of River Transportation" in *Planovoye Khoziaistvo*, 1945, No. 4.

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have been referred to repeatedly by the Soviet press in connection with the new Five Year Plan. These surveys, plus data culled from various technical publications, give a picture of transport policies in the coming years and suggest their general political and economic implications.

The transportation section of Soviet Five Year Plans is in many respects more revealing than any other single section. Since the U.S.S.R. imports relatively little transport equipment from abroad, the route and vehicle production projects of the plan are a touchstone of the industrial capacity of rolling mills, machine building, electrotechnical and aluminum production — to name only the most essential industries. Since most projects are broken down into regional sections, they also make it possible to indicate which regions are slated for the most intensive development: the surveys propose new rail connections or double-tracking of existing lines between two points, hard-surfacing of certain highways, building or extension of certain maritime or river ports, improvement of certain waterways, etc. Since the natural resources of most of these regions are known, the transport plan implicitly provides a key to the development of various branches of primary production.

At the same time, the traffic program in terms of tons and ton-miles, the choice of rolling stock and engines, the capacity and type of river barges and the power of tugs, and even so general a feature as the distribution of the total traffic volume among the various means of transportation, permit a fairly reliable forecast of the rôle allocated to the major raw materials and of the technological pattern of Soviet economy. To some extent the general transportation plan also anticipates future population shifts and population increases in various parts of the country. Other more specific indications of such shifts can be seen in urban and suburban transport programs, and in the relationship between truck and passenger car production.

According to the responsible heads of the Soviet Railway and Inland Shipping Commissariats the main features of the 1946–50 plan are as follows:

(1) The principal new railroad developments will be in European and not in Asiatic Russia. The greater part of the European network is to receive a heavier roadbed and stronger rails (on 37,000 miles of track). Existing lines to Soviet Baltic ports are to be connected and improved. Russian broad-gauge will

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not be extended beyond the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. — an indication that the Soviets do not expect to coördinate their industries too closely with those of Poland and Central Europe. It is interesting to note in this connection that last August the Polish Government informed the European Central Inland Transport Organization that Poland would retain the standard gauge of four feet eight-and-one-half inches and that those tracks which temporarily had been converted to Russian broad gauge (five feet), such as the Warsaw-Berlin-Potsdam line, would be restored to standard.[10]

Improvements and extensions are provided especially for the central area between Moscow-Leningrad and the Don-Dnieper region in the west, and the Urals in the east, which is likely to be the mainspring of Russian strength. Rail connections between the capital and Jaroslavl, Gorki, Riazan, Volovo and Kharkov are to be strengthened. A more intensive traffic is foreseen on the Donbas (coal) — Krivoi Rog (iron ore) lines, and between the Donbas and Stalingrad (manufacturing). The plan calls also for additional tracks between the Donbas and the Urals, and between the Donbas, Krivoi Rog and the Caucasus. The Molotov province, formerly Perm, on the western slopes of the Urals, is slated for considerable development.[11] Here, trunk lines are to be built to Solikamsk on the upper Kama River (a tributary of the Volga), reported to have a potash plant, the largest of its kind in the world, and a number of other chemical factories. A trunk line is also planned to the metallurgical centers of Nadezhinsk and Bogoslovo in the northern Urals, about 100 miles north of Nijni Tagil; this in turn will be connected by additional tracks with the new coal center of Kizel and, by way of Kizel, with the center of heavy industries between Chelyabinsk and Sverdlov in the central Urals at the crossing of the main lines into Siberia. Several new marshaling yards are projected in this area.

Next in importance are the rail connections between the central region and west Siberia, Kazakhstan and central Asia. Emphasis is placed on the strengthening and partial double-tracking of the lines between the coal fields of Karaganda and the non-ferrous metal centers (nickel, copper) near there, and the Urals, west Siberia and Central Asia. The principal new lines to

[10] *The Railway Gazette*, London, October 19, 1945, p. 385.

[11] On the development and industrial potential of the Molotov (Perm) province, *cf.* L. M. Herman, "Next Phase in the Urals: New Plans and Potentials," *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, February 9, 1946, p. 5.

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be completed in this region are a railroad connecting Karaganda with Lake Aral (new chemical factories) east of the Caspian Sea, and with the old trunk line from Moscow to Tashkent; a line from the coal town of Akmolinsk, northwest of Karaganda, extending between 200 and 400 miles south of the Trans-Siberian into the heart of the Kuznetsk basin, and beyond to the junction of Taishet, some 500 miles west of Lake Baikal where the projected northern Trans-Siberian branches off in the direction of the Lena River; and a line from Mointy, south of Karaganda and close to Lake Balkhash, to the city of Chu, on the Tashkent-Alma Ata railroad, where the Turksib swings northeastward into Siberia. The Mointy-Chu line will open a third direct connection between central Asia and central Russia and the Urals. Chu is the ancient terminal of the caravan route into northwest China.

These three new lines were under construction before and during the war and are to be completed during the period of the new plan. The principal development, however, will be between the central region (Moscow, Leningrad, the Don and Dnieper) and the western and northern Urals. The lines east and southeast of the Urals are likely to have a smaller share in the projected improvements, because they already have been strengthened substantially as the result of the eastward movement of industry.

(2) A vast railway electrification program extending over 15 years — the largest project of this kind ever undertaken — is the most significant and original feature of the new plan. While there are several schools of thought among engineers regarding the economies which can be achieved through electrification, it is generally held that if sufficient power is available, electrified railroads are advantageous wherever there is a regular traffic of high frequency. Electrification also is recommended for technical reasons in terrain with steep gradients.

The Russians as usual have made short shrift of the economic considerations which prevail under capitalist conditions, where every network has to balance its budget and generally cannot engage in long-range projects depending upon uncertain traffic developments. The principal motive of the Soviet electrification program is not operational economy for a particular network, but national efficiency, and increase of the country's industrial potential. Electrification permits more rational use of local power and fuel resources (peat, lignite, low-grade coal), avoids the use of high-grade coal from the Don and Karaganda basins for trans-

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portation purposes and offsets, partly at least, the unfavorable location of fuel reserves.

The lines chosen for electrification are those for which the Planning Commission expects high frequency traffic, mountain railroads and lines extending through regions in which the water supply is inadequate for steam locomotives. The latter point is of particular interest to the Soviet Union, for lack of water in desert regions and in the Arctic territories has made it necessary to equip locomotives with costly condenser installations; electrification also overcomes the disadvantage inherent in the chemical composition of water in the Caspian plains and in Kazakhstan, where the water has a high salt and sodium content which calls for special conditioning.

Electrification will first be introduced on single-track lines where high train frequency would otherwise require the laying of a second track. Only double-track lines with the heaviest traffic will be electrified. Altogether 18,600 to 21,700 miles of track are slated for electrification within the next 15 years, representing a total investment of approximately seven billion rubles, not including the cost of new power plants.

The trunk lines between the Urals and the Kuznetsk region, and the new lines from the northwestern slopes of the Urals to Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk, are the first to be electrified. Electrification is also planned for the railroad connecting Karaganda with Magnitogorsk. The trunk line extending from the Urals to the central region around Moscow by way of Kazan will be electrified as soon as the new great power stations on the Oka River are completed — that is, in later Five Year plans.

Electrification of the Moscow-Leningrad line may be started toward the end of the present plan. Its purpose is to reduce the train time between the two capital cities. Energy is to be supplied by power stations using local coal, peat and water. The fact that the Leningrad-Moscow trunk line has been included in the electrification plan for the current five-year period shows that the Soviet Government expects the further growth of Leningrad as an industrial center and a port. The Donbas-Krivoi Rog lines, which carry heavy industrial traffic, are also slated for electrification during the current period. Later, electrification is to be extended to Kharkov and Rostov and to the line from Stalingrad by way of Dniepropetrovsk to Krivoi Rog, with connections to the metallurgical and machine building center of Zaporozhe.

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A special electrification program based on local water resources is provided for the Caucasus. It will include the oil trunk lines extending into European Russia, the principal railroads of Transcaucasia, and the strategic line from Tiflis in Georgia to Leninakan and Erivan — the capital of Soviet Armenia — whence railroads extend into Turkey (Erzerum) and Iranian Azerbaijan (Tabriz).

Electrification of the Murmansk-Leningrad line is part of the long-range project, and will have to wait until the Soviets are ready to harness the great waterpower resources of the Finno-Karelian Republic. At the end of the 15-year period, electrification is to be extended to the mountain lines of east Siberia, to the Far Eastern end of the Trans-Siberian railroad, to the projected extension of the Far Eastern network to the mouth of the Amur River and to Okhotsk on the Okhotsk Sea. Eventually all the above projects are to be coördinated into a single system. This, however, is part of a larger plan which goes back to the great electrification program of Lenin.

An important feature of the present Five Year development is the electrification of the commutation systems of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, Riga, Vilunis (Vilna), Rostov, Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk. Electrified railroads for suburban traffic indicate expectations of swift growth of the city populations. It is significant that only one of these cities is located east of the Urals.

(3) Inland shipping will be improved considerably. Here again the main development is scheduled to take place in the central area. The Marie-Canal system between the Baltic and the Volga is to be turned into a large waterway. The Volga which, it is revealed, carried only 9,000,000 tons of traffic before the war (about one-tenth of the traffic of the Rhine and slightly more than one-fourth of that of the Mississippi), is to be transformed into one of the world's major inland waterways, navigated by barges with a carrying capacity of between 4,000 and 6,000 tons and tankers up to 12,000 tons. The Kama River which extends from the Volga basin to the western foothills of the Urals is included in this plan.

Less stress is placed on the waterways between the Dnieper and the Vistula; these are to be modernized, but will be made accessible only to ships up to 1,500 tons. This seems to suggest that the Soviets, for the next five years at least, are not planning to coördinate the ore-rich Ukraine and the coal-based heavy

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industries of Upper Silesia-Moravia into another giant combine comparable to the Kuznetsk-Ural group.

(4) Increased inland water transport is to absorb a large share of the liquid fuel traffic of the railroads. Before the war, Moscow and Leningrad received, respectively, only 13 and 9 percent of their petroleum by water; now they are to be supplied extensively by tanker barges and to be equipped with additional storing facilities for the winter months when the canals are frozen. Coal, wood, salt, fertilizers and building material, which before the war accounted for more than half of the total railroad tonnage, also are to be carried largely by water. The total traffic volume of inland shipping which was around 70 billion ton-miles before the war is to be doubled. This would bring it up to the present American traffic volume on rivers, canals and the Great Lakes. The projected increase in the volume of inland water transportation is relatively greater than that of the railroads.[12]

(5) The waterway program also includes development of the Siberian rivers. This seems intended to boost the export of timber, processed wood and agricultural commodities, the latter two by way of Leningrad, and suggests that the Soviets intend to step up their rôle in international trade to take advantage of the world's rising demand for pulp and wood fiber as raw materials for the paper, plastics and synthetic textile industry.

(6) Maritime shipbuilding is to be increased on a relatively modest scale. By the end of the new Five Year Plan the Soviet merchant marine is supposed to be twice as large as before the war, or close to 3,000,000 gross tons (less than the prewar tonnage of France or Italy). The Baltic and the Northern Sea Route figure prominently in the maritime program, although shipping by way of the Black Sea with its well-developed harbors and rich hinterland may continue to be more important. The data on the maritime plan were released shortly after the conclusion of the treaty with China of August 14, 1945. The final plan may include special provisions for maritime shipping in the Pacific, now that ice-free ports are available to the U.S.S.R.

[12] Professor V. N. Obratzov of the Academy of Science, according to *Meshdunarodni Transport* (*International Transport*), Moscow, November 1, 1945, estimates that the traffic volume of the Soviet railroads will increase from its present level of approximately 250 billion ton-miles to 734 billion ton-miles in 1960, which would be slightly below our traffic volume in 1944; for the same period he foresees an increase in the volume of inland water traffic to 178 billion tons. In the first of three five-year periods between today and 1960, inland water traffic, however, is to increase faster than railroad traffic.

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(7) Increased automobile production and highway improvement will promote regional traffic, which was neglected in the past at the expense of inter-regional communications. According to the new transport plan, the Soviet automobile industry in 1950 will turn out more than four times as many vehicles as in 1940, *i.e.* around 1,200,000 units, not including tractors and trailers for agricultural purposes. Capital investments in the automobile industry for the next five years will reach nearly 4 billion rubles.[13] In the past, passenger cars represented only about one-seventh of the total automobile production. Under the new plan the output of passenger cars is to become proportionally much greater. Definite figures have not yet been published, but according to a British press dispatch referring to the Soviet magazine *Automobile Transport*, one-third of the future automobile output is to consist of passenger cars. Four new passenger car models are ready for the assembly line.

On January 1, 1941, Russia had 890,000 trucks and buses but only 170,000 passenger cars. (In the United States there were almost six times as many passenger cars as trucks.) Automobile production is one of the youngest industries in the U.S.S.R. In 1930 Soviet factories turned out only 4,200 trucks. By 1937, production of trucks and buses had risen to 183,800, plus some 103,000 vehicles for agricultural purposes. Mass production methods were introduced in the early thirties under the direction of American engineers; Soviet trucks as well as passenger cars are even today very similar to American models. In the current year the output of automobiles is to be double that of 1945. Since last year's output is reported to have been 30 percent above that of 1939, the total for 1946 should be in the neighborhood of 500,000 units.

The plan calls for relatively small investments in highway construction. Yet more than 100,000 miles of highway are to be paved and several hundred thousand miles of dirt roads are to be made accessible to automobiles. Voluntary highway construction work of the *kolkhozniks* or members of collective farms, will supplement the program, as in the past. The highways which are to be paved are those connecting the principal cities of European Russia. Up to the war, the Moscow-Leningrad and the Moscow-Minsk routes were the model highways of the U.S.S.R.

[13] G. Osipov, "Postwar Development of the Soviet Automobile Industry," *Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.*, Washington, D. C., February 14, 1946, p. 140.

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The highways from the capital to Kharkov and Kiev, and to Stalingrad, are now to be modernized, and hard-surfaced roads are to be extended into the new territories in the west to connect Moscow with Bucharest, Lvov, Warsaw, Kaunas, Koenigsberg, Riga and Talinn. For some of these projects the Soviets will be able to use the foundations of three highways which the Germans extended from Galicia and Rumania to Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk and to the foot of the Crimea.

The plan also provides for extensive highway construction in the Urals, especially in the Molotov province. Highway development projects in the Asiatic frontier area, near Frunze in Kazakhstan at the Soviet terminal of the caravan route into China, in the vicinity of the mountain city of Osh (where a caravan route crosses into Chinese Turkestan), along the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea, and around Stalinabad (north of the Afghan border), seem to indicate that Moscow foresees trade developments in the interior of Asia, especially in western China, Iran and Afghanistan. Here military interests may also be at stake.

(8) Aviation is to be developed on a large scale. Data are less specific than for other means of transportation and, judging by previous plans, the complete program may not be published for reasons of national security. Premier Stalin's statement in his speech of February 9, that the Soviet aircraft industry has been able to turn out 40,000 planes a year during the last three years of the war, shows that there is a substantial industrial basis for further expansion. Before the war, in 1938, there were more than 70,000 miles of airline routes, very nearly as many as in the United States.

Air freight services in European Russia and west Siberia are likely to be confined to emergency shipments of spare parts and will be far less important than in other industrial countries. The U.S.S.R. has little need for swift transportation of high-priced perishable consumer goods. The main development of air transport will be for the purpose of opening up new or otherwise inaccessible areas in the thinly populated regions of Siberia and central Asia. Pilot services on the Northern Sea Route will also be expanded. In the Far East and in Arctic Siberia precious alloys, gold and furs are most likely to be moved by air. Except for the Asiatic territories, few provisions are made for large-scale regular passenger air services. The latter probably will be limited to

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passenger movements for administrative or scientific purposes, and special lines for foreign tourists and official visitors.

IV

The U.S.S.R.'s transportation program for the next five years seems, on the whole, fairly realistic. Its technical aspects are bold and far-reaching. It assumes swift reconstruction of the invaded areas and further expansion of heavy industrial capacity.

From a political point of view, the transportation section of the new plan suggests that, for the next five-year period at least, the U.S.S.R. expects to steer a peaceful course. It apparently neither intends to withdraw into Asia nor to expand into central Europe. The transportation plan makes it clear that there will be no further large-scale industrial migration into Asia and that the nerve center of the Soviet realm is going to remain where it was before the war. There are no projects of maritime or overseas expansion, no provisions for new strategic railroads either in Asia or in Europe; some of the highway projects in central Asia may be motivated by military reasons, but no other aspect of the plan seems to be.

While many details have not been made public for reasons of security, the plan as a whole gives remarkable publicity to projects which in free-enterprise countries are neither conceived as broadly nor discussed publicly. The very fact that the Soviet Union, for reasons inherent in the managerial methods required by its centralized state economy, is compelled to draw up so complex a chart to guide its executives and engineers during the next five or ten years, is a promise of stability. Once the essential features of such a plan have been adopted, it is difficult to change them.

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SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM IN ITALY

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

IT IS the fashion in Italy to abuse the political parties — those genuinely anti-Fascist groupings which, in spite of their widely differing aims, combined in 1943 to form the national and regional Committees of National Liberation (in Italian, *Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale*, always referred to as CLNs). These Committees made a great contribution to the defeat of Nazi-Fascism; but its magnitude was not appreciated outside Italy at the time and is now being forgotten at home. For reasons peculiar to Italy, the disillusionment which followed the end of the fighting has been even more devastating in that country than elsewhere, and Italians have found it easy to throw the blame for present conditions upon the CLN parties which are governing the nation until a Constituent Assembly can be elected. This irritation with politics and parties is exceedingly dangerous, for it is pregnant with a totalitarian mentality.

In Italy today the most urgent economic questions must be politically determined. Poverty is so great that social peace is impossible without a radical redistribution of the little wealth that, more than ever, is concentrated in the hands of a few; and this necessitates action by the state. One may be Socialist or anti-Socialist in theory in Italy today, but it is difficult not to be temporarily Socialistic in practice. This is the basis on which CLN plans for the future were worked out. The Action Party, in some ways the most interesting of the CLN groups, has evolved a program synthesizing guaranteed liberty for the individual with socialism in industry and, to some extent, in agriculture. The program is close to the line of British Labor, though more particularly to the conceptions of Beveridge. The Action Party is, however, a small one, born out of the anti-Fascist *Giustizia e Libertà* group; it appeals to intellectuals and has many distinguished sympathizers of the caliber of Count Sforza.

The CLN parties which have hitherto represented large masses of the population are the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists. Of these the Christian Democrats tend to be passive because, while their rank and file is probably Socialistic, their leaders — with the notable exception of Don Sturzo — are

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predominantly conservative. The Socialists and Communists have similar aims and represent a certain homogeneous body of opinion, but in Italy as in so many other countries their rivalry makes coöperation difficult.

Some of the worst enemies of Communism will agree that the Italian Communists played a magnificent part in the resistance offered to the Germans and neo-Fascists; the record of the Fiat workers in Turin — mainly Communists — is, for example, a particularly fine one, at least since the strike in March 1943. The Communists suffered heavy casualties in the Resistance and emerged with high prestige. The success of Russian armies added to their popularity. They were, as usual, the best organized party; and naturally they advocated a Socialist-Communist fusion, which was likely to work out to their own advantage.

There was no little logic in the policy. Italian large-scale industry is young and half its existence has been spent under the shadow of Fascism. Yet the factory hands of Milan and Turin and the dockers of Genoa are politically conscious to a relatively high degree. They have long suffered from a low standard of living and from the effects of the overpopulation of Italy. (Overpopulation in Italy is a painful actuality, not a matter of specious propaganda as it was in Germany.) They believe, not without considerable justification, that most of their employers subsidized Fascism in order to enjoy monopolistic privileges, and they therefore desire not only a redistribution of the huge fortunes but also a reorganization of industry which gives them some degree of control. But they desire no less to be free to say and read what they like. To these north Italians, this spells the expulsion, not only of the Fascists, but also of the monarchy which countenanced Mussolini, and which, both before and after the Fascist period, is felt to have shown extreme distrust of its people and a lack of understanding of their needs. In other words, the Italian working people favor a democratic republic. Most Italian workmen are probably Marxist only in so far as their leaders may insist upon using Marxist terminology: Mazzini still competes with Marx for their allegiance. The older generation habitually regards itself as Socialist, though this may mean nothing more than a gentle reformism in the Bissolati tradition. The younger people are likely to call themselves Communist, precisely because they are young and have known only conditions conducive to extremism. All of the above groups get on well

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enough together in the *Confederazione Generale Italiano Lavoro* (CGIL), which corresponds to the British TUC.

The Socialist leader, Pietro Nenni, favored the fusion which the Communists suggested: it seemed to him deplorable that this great body of common political opinion should be divided in so critical a period. As far back as 1934, a pact of unity had been made between the two working-class parties in exile. Yet, in the interval between the Italian armistice and the final liberation, the party leaders were estranged by the question of monarchy versus republic. One of the strongest impulses in the CLN (quite independently of social class) was that of revolt against the monarchy. The Risorgimento of Mazzini and Garibaldi had been hostile to the church as the enemy of national unity and friendly to the House of Savoy, which was the instrument for unity. This second and more national uprising of the Italian people — more national because more general — reversed the old allegiance. It was more hostile to the monarchy than to the church, for it looked upon the monarchy as the ally of Fascism, against which the Vatican had reacted slowly but with a rising determination. The growth of this spirit also helps explain why the Christian Democrat Party was integrated with the CLN.

In September 1943, the King and his son fled and the question seemed to have settled itself. Great irritation was felt, therefore, especially by the Socialist and Action Parties, when the Communists, presumably obeying orders from Moscow, accepted the monarchist Badoglio Government without protest. Then at the time of the Sforza crisis, December 1944, the Communist Party broke a pledge to Socialists and Actionists overnight and entered the second Bonomi Cabinet; irritation developed into a bitter resentment, which has never been completely effaced. The members of Bonomi's first Government had sworn allegiance to the nation alone. Henceforward ministers swore allegiance to the Prince of Piedmont, who had been nominated by his father as provisional Regent with the title of *Luogotenente del Regno*. All republican ministers felt humiliated by the action of the Allies in thus forcing them to violate their convictions, and republicans tended to describe the Communist share in the compromise in phrases suggestive of the Russo-German Treaty of 1939.

Liberation came at last, and the political solidarity of the north made itself felt. A government was formed from all six CLN parties under an Action Party republican, Professor

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Ferruccio Parri, as Premier. All six had shared the Partisan mystique and were determined that their sacrifices were not to be vain. The second Risorgimento seemed to have been achieved and the majority of the nation looked forward to the early election of a Constituent Assembly which should establish the republic and provide the legislative machinery for social reform.

Unfortunately, the CLN leaders displayed political immaturity. To the consternation of some of his Socialist colleagues, Pietro Nenni, at a National Council of the Party in July 1945, rushed through a motion in favor of fusion with the Communist Party. The Socialist Party has never ceased to regret the move. The Communists in Italy, as elsewhere, are rigidly disciplined, but the Italian Socialists allow their leading personalities to jostle one another in anarchistic fashion. They do so partly because they have a wealth of leaders and partly because they believe in the value of discussion and controversy, but it results in so many definitions of policy that the party program is never clear, even on points of cardinal importance.

Nenni himself appears to be without tact or tactics; it would be foolish to question his honesty, but he seems unreliable in the sense that he often seems to make statements and propose motions without pausing to reflect. Under Parri, he undertook to be high commissioner for the purge of Fascists and minister responsible for preparing the election of the Constituent Assembly — all this in addition to his party activities. The tasks were too great for a man whose political experience consisted of little more than journalism in exile, and the slow execution of them brought him much unpopularity — more, indeed, than he deserved. A new anti-Red scare came at this time and the CLN was said to be nothing but the tool of the Communist Party, which was charged with distorting the alliance into a Communist National Front. The high-handed action of Russia in eastern Europe added fuel to the flames and the Jugoslav menace to Trieste and Istria shook the Italian Communists themselves.

Toward the end of October 1945 the Socialist Central Committee met in Rome. Urged on by its right-wing leaders, notably the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Giuseppe Saragat, and his friend the writer Ignazio Silone, it took measures to rectify the situation. Fusionism was renounced, and though the Committee said that it intended to reinforce the pact with the Communists calling for unity of action, it also declared that the Socialist

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Party sought agreement with the other mass parties. At the same time the Party said that it intended to strengthen its own unity and independence. Various public statements were made by Socialist leaders (including Nenni) to the effect that the Socialist Party was a champion of individual liberty and had long ceased to be anticlerical. These advances to the Christian Democrat Party prefaced a curious reorganization of the Cabinet. The campaign organized from the Right by those who feared the spirit of the CLN drove Parri from office at the end of November, and after long-drawn-out negotiations, Parri's Christian Democrat Foreign Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, succeeded him. Nenni was made sole Vice Premier. A right-wing Socialist, Giuseppe Romita, took the key position of Minister of the Interior. The CLN six-party alliance was somehow preserved on paper; but before taking office de Gasperi had expressed sympathy with those who attacked the CLN regional committees and had accepted the advice of the provisional Regent, Prince Humbert.

The Socialist Party was demoralized by the compromise with de Gasperi. During this period, toward the close of 1945, the Socialists were, moreover, faced with big Communist successes in various trade-union elections: for example, in the tram and busman's union in Rome, 2,256 voted Communist, 1,251 Socialist, 858 Christian Democrat and 500 voted for candidates of other parties. It was evident that a superior party organization gave the Communists a great advantage in elections.

Both local elections and elections for the Constituent Assembly were imminent. The resignation at Christmas of the party Secretary, Sandro Pertini, made it plain that the Socialists were faced with a crisis. Pertini's place among the most influential leaders of the Italian Socialist Party is unchallenged. It has never been said of him, as of most of his colleagues, that he is motivated by personal ambition; and his splendid Resistance record had endeared him especially to the Socialist Youth Groups. Led by men like Matteotti's son, Matteo, these groups were in a state of revolt; they disliked the new government and they regretted the Saragat-Silone attitude as destructive of their party's revolutionary working-class character; at the same time, they wished the Party to emphasize its independence of Communism.

The sympathetic outsider who attempts to analyse the situation in which the Italian Socialist Party found itself cannot but conclude that the attitude of Pertini and young Matteotti, and

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the October declarations of the Socialist Central Committee, created an almost hopeless dilemma for the rank and file of the Socialists. The situation jeopardizes the political future of Italy. It seems clear that the Italian Socialists should either act as Marxists, and in that case fuse with the Communists in order to work for the dictatorship of the proletariat, or they should abandon the notion that they are "proletarians" striving for "dictatorship." They might then at last make room for the politically neglected middle classes and become a non-Marxist party like British Labor, which aims at social justice without the sacrifice of individual liberty and the constitutional procedure which protects it. To insist, as the Italian Socialists are trying to do, upon revolutionary Marxism and also on love of constitutional liberty is a contradiction in terms, and it divides rather than reconciles opposing wings of the Party. On the one hand it is dismissed as a mere imitation-Communist opportunism, while on the other it risks losing the working people *en bloc* to the Communist Party, whose objectives are easier to comprehend.

The Italian Socialist Party has never been so foolish as to think only in terms of the industrial working class in a country where the peasantry is at least twice as numerous. There is a Socialist tradition which cannot be ignored among the peasants of Emilia, Romagna and southern Lombardy. There are, of course, many other influences in the countryside. That of the Catholic clergy is strong, especially in the Veneto. And in southern Italy and Sicily the influence of the big landowners, on whose estates the laborers work under shocking conditions, is considerable. But the unsolved problem, *par excellence*, is that of the political orientation of the middle class.

The middle class in Italy is very numerous, probably almost as large as the industrial working class. It includes large "black-coated" worker and professional groups — office clerks and shopkeepers, doctors and lawyers — and it contains a veritable army of major and minor state officials, including university and school teachers. This Italian middle class need not be dismissed as pot-bellied and docilely Fascist, that is to say, as "German," for it descends directly from Mazzini and the other idealists of the nineteenth-century Risorgimento, and it has provided nearly all the Socialist and even Communist leaders, from Turati to Togliatti. It has given birth to an academic tradition which survived 23 years of Fascist oppression with credit. The *Giustizia*

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e Libertà group, from the Rosselli brothers to the founders of the Action Party, is middle-class in origin: this class supplied many true martyrs of the Resistance, like young Gasparotto or Beltrami. The middle class Action Party worked enthusiastically with Socialists and Communists during the Resistance, and it published its own clandestine papers for workmen and peasants; in so doing it expressed the aspirations of Carlo Rosselli and the enlightened middle class of which Parri is typical.

The Christian Democrat Party is predominantly peasant, but its middle-class element is not inconsiderable. The CLN spirit, which ruled the times, drew the Christian Democrat Party to the Left, toward the Action Party, which was abandoning its traditional anticlericalism. The growth of republicanism among Christian Democrats, especially in the north, helped strengthen the affinity. Both parties also advocated government decentralization.

Two small parties were coöperating with these larger groups. The first was the old Republican Party, a small intransigent group gathered from all classes of society, and led by the eloquent Randolfo Pacciardi, who believes that the Allies excluded him from a share in the liberation because of his hatred of the monarchy. Although, unlike other twentieth century politicians, Republicans have kept their politics innocent of economic content, they are Socialists and internationalists in Mazzinian fashion. Though they dislike Marxism, they feel real sympathy for the practical aims of the Socialist Party and are intimately associated with the Action Party. Another small party is Democratic Labor. This group is essentially middle-class, corresponding to the French Radicals before 1940; its main support comes from southern Italy and it is closely associated with the former Socialist, Ivanoe Bonomi. One of its leading members is the staunch democrat, Meuccio Ruini, a founder of the CLN in Rome in 1943 and Minister of Reconstruction under Parri; significantly, he followed Parri out of office when de Gasperi came in.

All these middle-class elements might have been united with the working class by a non-Marxist Italian Socialist Party in 1945; the long series of disasters which has reduced most of the middle class to proletarian poverty might have been used to emphasize a community of interest. Instead, almost the opposite result seems to have been brought about. The catastrophic disappointment which followed liberation, plus the inflationary

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rise in prices, created fear which degenerated into panic and swept the rank and file of the middle class off its feet. A reaction against the idealism of the Resistance period was inevitable, and it was nourished by the indifference of the Allies (who had also been idealized) toward social questions and by their inability to understand the case against the monarchy. But the reaction was far more violent than it need have been. Marxist members of the CLN, especially in the north, contributed to it by talking as if they intended to use these committees as soviets. The Action Party also was responsible for costly follies, such as allowing its more exuberant members to indulge in childish Jacobinism.

A number of persons, groups and even institutions were waiting eagerly to reap the harvest of disillusionment. A fantastic number of "Liberty Fronts" sprang up, each making use of the name of some known anti-Fascist or military man, each exhorting the Italians to forget all disputes and rally around its particular leader. A Socialist, Zeniboni, made confusion worse confounded by forming a separate "Social-Democratic Union" without, however, resigning from the Socialist Party. Following the insidious example of the Nazis and Fascists, these Fronts (or whatever else they chose to call themselves) began to buy supporters by organizing social relief for the starving population. The most skilful and therefore most dangerous of these affairs is the *Fronte del'Uomo Qualunque*, organized by a former Fascist, Guglielmo Giannini, who brought out a popular weekly paper, *L'Uomo Qualunque* (*The Ordinary Man*), and is now also publishing a daily, *Il Buonsenso* (*Common Sense*). His slogan is, "The Fascists deprived the Italians of their liberty but no one has yet restored it to them." With this he entices all sorts of well-meaning people into his ranks. Giannini's papers pour out torrents of abuse against all kinds of people and against "politics" and "parties" — as if a Front of this kind were not itself a bastard political party. His most extreme tirades are directed toward everything related to the CLNs, which are equated with Communism. These papers say nothing against Fascists of any kind nor against the monarchy; they frequently speak favorably of the marines and the repatriated prisoners-of-war who habitually raid Socialist and Communist centers in much the same way their fathers did when Mussolini was coming to power. The prisoners-of-war, indeed, present a most difficult problem. They returned to find their country in ruins, and it is not surprising that their

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Fascist education asserts itself. There is no lack of secret neo-Fascist organizations — usually with a monarchist orientation — angling for them, and the general feeling that the Allies have trifled with CLN governments makes it difficult for the Socialists to compete with their propaganda. The unpopularity of the Socialist head of the British Foreign Office does not help the Italian Socialists in this regard.

The problems of the parties on the Left cannot be adequately stated without a brief examination of that anomaly, the Italian Liberal Party. This party is ultra-conservative; it would like to turn the clock back at least twenty-five years. Many of its members — men like Luigi Einaudi, Governor of the Bank of Italy, and Benedetto Croce, whose philosophy had developed a liberalism of its own — were consistent opponents of Fascism, but they believe in liberty in terms of Adam Smith or Jeremy Bentham. Thus from the first the position of this sixth party in the CLN was an uneasy one. Many Liberals, especially in the north, became republican, most of them fearing the redistribution of wealth which was generally felt necessary. Some were motivated by a genuine devotion to the idea of liberty: they did not understand that no starving man is free. But the most powerful members of the Party were northern industrialists, or owners of the big landed estates in the south where reform was long overdue — people who had bought Fascist protection when it was useful to them between 1922 and 1943. In the name of liberty, the Liberals constantly accused the CLNs (on which they did not cease to be represented) of high-handed action, and their right wing drove Parri out of office. Yet they tended to champion only the liberty of Fascists and those who sympathized with them, and the effect of their action was to impede the punishment of Fascist criminals and to delay the election of the Constituent Assembly which alone could provide a legal basis for the government of liberated Italy. They maintained that legal government could be found only in the discredited monarchy, advancing the questionable theory that the Constitution of Charles Albert had never been abrogated. It would be inaccurate to label all monarchist Liberals as Fascist, but they persistently advocated a return to pre-Fascist conditions — for instance, backing the octogenarian Orlando, or Francesco Nitti, as Prime Minister instead of Parri. They likewise pressed for the restoration of prefects appointed by the Crown in the place of those provisionally

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chosen by the CLNs. It is true, however, that there were dissidents among them; some republican Liberals who disliked the manœuvres which forced Parri out of office seemed prepared to join forces with the Action Party or the Socialists.

But now it is almost certainly too late for the Socialists to create the big anti-Fascist bloc which once seemed possible. The Communist Congress held in Rome at the turn of the year skilfully stole what should have been the Socialist thunder. This Congress made a greater impression upon both its friends and its enemies than either had expected. In the first place, Palmiro Togliatti, whose discourses were masterly, was able to announce that his party at the end of 1945 had around two million registered members, a tremendous figure for Italy. Secondly, he and Luigi Longo now offered federation to the Socialists on a basis of equal representation, although the Socialist Party was obviously the weaker. Thirdly, Longo made an able appeal to all true democrats to continue CLN coöperation, and to work closely with non-party organizations such as the CGIL or the UDI (Union of Italian Women). In other words he suggested a democratic republican bloc of exactly the kind which the Socialists might have created on a non-Marxist basis. Longo, naturally, wishes to harness this bloc to the Communist Party. In reply to the "minions-of-Moscow" reproach which is often made by Saragat and his friends, Longo replies that the Communists are as independent of Molotov as the Socialists are of Bevin.

The upshot is that the divisions in the Socialist Party seem more likely to deepen than to heal. The opponents of the proposed anti-Fascist union will label it "Communist" more ardently than ever. Indeed, if such a union is formed, and if it endures at least until the Constituent Assembly has been elected, thanks will be due the Communist Congress. Leadership in the union is bound to be mainly supplied by the Communists.

Out of this whole situation three general conclusions emerge. The first is that the Fascist mentality has by no means disappeared in Italy and that neo-Fascism is plainly in evidence. The second is that the Communist Party has shown marked political ability and has taken the leadership of the anti-Fascist forces. The third is that Britain and the United States analyzed the Italian situation crudely when they failed to perceive that republicanism represents the dynamic "middle-class" force in Italy.

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DEPENDENT AREAS OF THE PACIFIC

An Australian View

By K. H. Bailey

WHAT has happened since Japan's surrender amply vindicates those who declared, so far back as 1942, that there could be no return to the colonial status quo in the Pacific area. World War II has injected powerful new factors into colonial history all over the world. Through its Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, the Government of Australia has gone on record, at home and abroad, with definite and constructive proposals for the future of dependent territories. The purpose of this article is to discuss these Australian proposals, and to sketch their background and development.

The Australian Government's views are applicable to dependent territories generally. They have been formed, however, with an eye specifically to the situation in the Pacific. As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Australia is indirectly concerned with the future of the colonial areas of the west too. Her political outlook has been compared to the Australian penny — with the King's head on one side, the Kangaroo on the other. The King's head symbolizes Australia's loyalty to the British connection, and all that that implies. The Kangaroo symbolizes her distinct national interest and consciousness, as she looks out north and east, toward Asia and the Pacific. Indeed, she may truly be regarded as a quasi-peninsula, terminating the long island chain that juts out from the southeastern corner of Asia. Giving the term Southeast Asia a rather extended meaning, to embrace not only Indonesia and Australia but the South Sea Islands and New Zealand, one may say that Australia's whole future is bound up with the security, the stability and the prosperity of Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia, as thus conceived, has certain characteristics that are common to its many and multifarious communities. With the exception of China, the two British Dominions in the southwest Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), and Thailand, it has hitherto been an area of political dependence upon one or other of the western nations. It is an area of almost chronic poverty, found often in the midst of immense natural resources. It is an

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area of great strategical importance. In this region, Australia's interests are not different in kind from those of the United States, of Britain, of China, of France, of Holland and of others directly concerned there. The long-term common interest of all is in the conversion of Southeast Asia from discord, backwardness, strategic weakness and international rivalry to economic strength, to prosperity and welfare, and to political stability. For Australia and New Zealand, however, if only because of their geographical situation, this common interest possesses a vital and imperative character that is scarcely the case with most of the other countries concerned.

The proposals put forward by Dr. Evatt on behalf of the Australian Government, from 1942 on, are based on the ideas for the postwar world which found expression in the Atlantic Charter. They are aimed at securing, for "all the men in all the lands," freedom from fear and freedom from want. More concretely, Australia has contended: 1, that it is the duty of all states responsible for the administration of dependent territories to regard themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of the territories, and as such to take active steps to raise their standard of living and generally to promote their economic and social welfare and political development; 2, that states administering dependent territories should hold themselves accountable for the due performance of their trust to an expert international authority with advisory and supervisory powers; 3, that the economic and social welfare of the inhabitants can best be promoted by the coöperation, through regional agencies, of neighboring administrations; 4, that dependent territories must be effectively included within any system of collective security that is established for the area as a whole.

The fact is that the dependent communities of the Pacific area fall into two broadly distinct classes. On the one hand are relatively rich, populous and well-established communities such as Indo-China, Malaya and Indonesia, often with highly organized indigenous cultures; on the other hand are the small, sparsely populated and isolated islands of the South Seas. It is with territories of the latter class that Australia has had most to deal. She tends to look at the problem of dependent territories in terms of her colony of Papua and her Mandated Territory of New Guinea. For such territories as hers, the problem is not how to adjust the requirements of security and of economic development to the

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demands of colonial nationalism but how to find appropriate means for associating with the administration the more advanced members of really primitive communities. To state the objectives of trusteeship in terms of independence, or even of self-government, would be to use language without any present reality for such peoples. Australia's own immediate territorial problems have thus conditioned the terms in which her general policies have been expressed. It is just as natural for Australia to think of dependent territories in terms of New Guinea rather than of the Philippines as it is for Americans to think of dependent territories in terms of the Philippines rather than of Puerto Rico. Implicitly or explicitly, however, political development, in whatever form may be appropriate to the particular community concerned, always is in fact part of the objective of the colonial trust, as Australians understand it. In the light of these general observations, let us elaborate the four points listed above.

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

The principle that states responsible for the administration of dependent territories should render to an international authority an account of their stewardship implies that there is a legitimate international interest in the welfare and good government of dependencies. But what is the real nature of this "international interest?" At the unofficial conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942, and at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, such an interest was vigorously expressed, most clearly by representatives of liberal opinion in the United States. Delegates from the United Kingdom and from the other imperial Powers in the Pacific area were told bluntly that American opinion would not be interested in a post-war international organization which had for one of its main purposes the reëstablishment and preservation of the colonial system. A settled attitude on the part of any powerful state cannot, of course, just be ignored. If the coöperation of that state is desired, the policy of others must to some extent accommodate itself, no matter whether the attitude in question is well or ill-founded. American readers will all the same realize (as certainly the American delegates did at Mont Tremblant) that in the long run the international interest must be identified with more objective and fundamental considerations than merely satisfying the demands of public opinion in any one country.

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Analyzed, the international interest in the welfare and good government of dependent territories is seen to be well grounded in at least three considerations. The first is to be found in recent international history. The principle of trusteeship or mandate, expressed a generation ago in the Treaty of Versailles, cannot rationally or even decently be confined to the 14 ex-German and ex-Turkish dependencies to which alone Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant applied. The principle is that a system of accountability to an expert international body is needed for the adequate protection of peoples not able to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world. Of its nature, this principle applies wherever such peoples are to be found. Speaking of dependent territories which before the war were under the rule of members of the United Nations, Dr. Evatt said at San Francisco: "I see no reason why the progress of these peoples shall be any less a matter of international concern than the progress and welfare of peoples of territories taken from our enemies."

A second consideration pointing in the same direction is to be found in the conditions of international economic welfare. All agree that the world's best hope, perhaps the world's only hope, of those advancing standards of living and that condition of full employment to which the United Nations are committed by the Charter is through the general adoption of policies leading to an expansionist international economy. The world's dependent territories — and those of Southeast Asia not least among them — have been called the world's depressed areas. Unless adequate help is provided by the advanced nations for the proper development of these areas, the hope of general economic expansion becomes more remote. Hence the United Nations as a whole are vitally interested in the adoption everywhere of policies directed to raising the standards of living in the dependent territories.

Yet a third consideration pointing in the same direction is to be found in the realm of defense. Under the Charter, the defense against aggression of territories dependent on members of the United Nations becomes the joint and several responsibility of all. Experience under the League of Nations Covenant suggests that this responsibility is not likely to be discharged effectively unless other states are broadly satisfied that the state concerned has administered its dependent territories with reasonable regard for justice and humanity. This is the hard core of reality which justifies the reminder that liberal American opinion is not inter-

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ested in the preservation of the colonial system as it was. Collective security implies, therefore, the effective association of the international community with the development of the dependent territories.

For all these reasons, the welfare and progress of dependent territories is a matter of legitimate international concern. The next question is how that concern can best be expressed. In conference at Wellington in November 1944, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand agreed upon an answer to this question in a form which they subsequently advocated both in London (at a pre-San Francisco exchange of views among the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations) and at the San Francisco Conference itself. The Wellington resolution ran as follows:

> Powers responsible for dependent territories should accept the principle of trusteeship, already applicable in the case of mandated territories. In such dependent territories the purpose of the trust is the welfare and advancement of the native peoples. Colonial Powers should undertake to make regular reports to an international body analogous to the Permanent Mandates Commission, set up within the framework of the General Organization. This body should be empowered to publish reports of its deliberations and to inspect dependent territories.

This proposal for a general international body, exercising supervisory functions backed by the sanction of publicity, and enjoying the right (denied to the Permanent Mandates Commission) of visiting the dependent territories themselves, was fully in line with the liberal suggestions that had been discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference in Quebec in 1942. Long before San Francisco, however, there were indications that some at least of the imperial Powers would not welcome proposals on those lines. In January 1945, for example, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies (Colonel Oliver Stanley) followed earlier declarations of policy by an address in New York from which many people inferred that, so far from making general the system of accountability established under the League Covenant, the British Government intended to propose its total abolition. For the mandate system, the suggestion seemed to be, there should be substituted regional Councils on the analogy of the Caribbean Commission, representing the governments administering neighboring dependent territories, with the possible addition of other states interested in the region.

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A case for such a solution can be put, on both positive and negative grounds. The Permanent Mandates Commission had proved itself effective in the negative task of checking abuses. But it had generally been too aloof, too far removed from the day-to-day problems of colonial administration, to advocate positive means of improvement. What was wanted, it was said, was affirmative continuous collaboration between governments directly interested in the welfare and progress of a particular region. The inclusion of states not themselves administering dependencies would provide something at any rate of "third party interest."

The need for regional councils of collaboration is great. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be doubted that the abandonment of an institution which for twenty years had translated into practical terms the principle that the administration of dependent territories is "a sacred trust of civilization" would have produced a distinctly bad impression in the democratic world. The Permanent Mandates Commission, moreover, had done important work. Perhaps the best of all tributes to the efficacy of the Commission was the anxiety with which representatives of mandatory Powers always approached the discussion of their annual reports by the Commission. A fair judgment on the mandate system is that it did something at least to improve the standards of administration, the welfare of the populations concerned, and the progress of some of the territories toward self-government. On the other hand, even conceding the strength of the case for retaining and extending the mandate system, there would be grave difficulties in subjecting, as the Wellington resolution proposed, the administration of every territory not fully self-governing to the supervisory jurisdiction of a general international authority. Such a proposal is appropriate enough for primitive or undeveloped territories, but it would be certain to cause resentment in communities such as Malta or Ceylon, for instance, with already a substantial degree of political autonomy. This the Australian and New Zealand Governments readily perceived. So much was impliedly conceded in the initial proposals put forward at San Francisco by the Australian delegation, which carried the general support of the New Zealand delegation also.

To try to follow the complex discussions at San Francisco out of which emerged the three chapters of the United Nations Charter that deal with dependent territories would for present pur-

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poses be unprofitable. The main outlines will be sufficient, and are reasonably clear. The Dumbarton Oaks text, it will be remembered, did not contain any provisions at all on the subject. At San Francisco, one of the 12 technical committees, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Peter Fraser, was specifically assigned the task of producing a draft for inclusion in the Charter. Commander Harold Stassen, delegate of the United States, tabled a "working paper," to serve as a basis for discussion in this committee. The working paper was drawn from the drafts filed by the delegations of Australia, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The first part of the working paper contained a draft declaration of principles of general policy, intended to apply to all non-self-governing territories. This eventually became Chapter XI of the Charter. The second part provided for the establishment of an international trusteeship system which would be applicable only to certain classes of non-self-governing territories. This second part is now embodied in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter. Nobody can hope to assess properly the significance of the Charter, or to gauge accurately its impact on the future of dependent territories, without keeping clearly apart in his mind the general declaration of policy on the one hand and the international trusteeship system, strictly so-called, on the other.

It is a good thing in itself to declare the principle that it is a sacred trust of civilization to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of all non-self-governing territories. This is a universalization of the principle which was enunciated, in Article 22 of the League Covenant, with regard to ex-enemy territories only. But declarations of noble intentions too often become purely vapid under the hard test of practical execution. Strenuous and successful efforts were put forth at San Francisco to make a more effective instrument of this general declaration of the principle of trusteeship.

On the one hand, the obligations to be recognized became more specific and detailed; the declaration was made, as lawyers say, to condescend a great deal more upon particulars. The protection of the inhabitants against abuses was mentioned. So was the duty to promote constructive measures of development, and to encourage research. So was the development of self-government and of free political institutions. Every line added to the declaration in

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this way supplies an added criterion by which the performance of the general obligation can be measured.

On the other hand, provision was made for acquainting the United Nations with the conditions prevailing in all the territories to which the general declaration applies, *i.e.* all non-self-governing territories everywhere (unless they are included within the international trusteeship system, to which an even more specific obligation attaches). This provision now forms paragraph (e) of Article 73. Members accept the obligation

> to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

The initiative in both these directions came primarily from the Australian delegation at San Francisco. Australia and New Zealand did not achieve the full objective they had stated in the Wellington resolutions. There is no expert international supervisory agency here, clothed with the right to inspect any dependent territory. Statistics may be used for concealment as well as for disclosure. But the important thing, surely, is that the Charter as it now stands brings within the ambit of the powers of the General Assembly — to discuss and make recommendations — the extent to which every member nation is fulfilling its obligations under the Charter toward the inhabitants of its dependent territories. The General Assembly, if it so chooses, can fashion this Chapter XI into something very like a world-wide "mandate system." To be sure, the public discussion of colonial administration will sometimes need delicate handling. Effectively used, however, Chapter XI of the Charter should keep the government of every parent state on its toes.

A week after signing the United Nations Charter, the Australian Government introduced into the House of Representatives at Canberra a bill for the reëstablishment of a provisional civil administration in the greater part of the island territories of Papua-New Guinea. In drafting the bill, the Government naturally had an eye to the obligations it was assuming under the Charter. The provisions for native welfare suggest that the Government is taking seriously its new responsibilities. In the past, the colony of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New

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Guinea had both been reasonably administered, in a deliberate endeavor to maintain the best traditions of modern British colonial government. They had been kept pretty free of abuses. Australian and American soldiers in these territories had reason to be thankful for the assistance and friendliness they received from the "fuzzy-wuzzies," as the native inhabitants were affectionately called. This in itself is something of a tribute to the success of the former administration. Where it fell short, as indeed colonial administrations did all the world over, was in the positive promotion of native welfare and advancement by the expenditure of public funds from the parent state and by the control of the economic life of the territory in the native interest.

The promise of the Papua-New Guinea Administration Act of 1945 is perhaps not as ambitious as that of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts passed by the United Kingdom in 1940 and 1945. But the Government has given an undertaking which will have a far-reaching effect upon the economic and social development of the territories. It has pledged itself to bring to an end within five years at most the system of indentured labor on which the island economy has hitherto rested. This system was really the only substantial matter which the Permanent Mandates Commission criticized in relation to the territory of New Guinea. The whole Act suggests that the Australian Government is already on its toes, in regard to these territories.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

In the proposals of Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter for the establishment of an international trusteeship system, the principle of accountability to an international authority is carried further than in the general declaration in Chapter XI. Further, but not so very much further. The objectives of the system are broadly the same: in particular, the advancement of the inhabitants. The administering state, however, undertakes to make an annual report on the basis of a questionnaire, formulated by a Trusteeship Council, on the political, economic, social and educational development of the trust territories for which it is responsible. The Trusteeship Council is to consist of persons appointed as representative not only of the states which administer trust territories but of an equal number of states which do not. This Council is to be authorized to do something more than merely consider the reports submitted; it will be competent to

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accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority, and to provide for periodical visits to the trust territories. The Trusteeship Council will thus have all the powers that the Permanent Mandates Commission possessed, and some that it did not.

Potentially unlimited in its application, this excellent system does not operate automatically, or by virtue merely of the Charter, in respect of any territories at all. It *may* apply first to territories now held under mandate; secondly, to territories that may be detached from enemy states as a result of World War II; thirdly, to other territories voluntarily placed under it by the administering state. But it does not apply to a single territory in any one of these categories unless an agreement has been made for the purpose. And until such an agreement has been made, all existing rights are expressly preserved. Looked at with the dispassionate eye of political analysis, the new international trusteeship system is, as it were, simply an empty page, which may or may not be written on. These considerations explain why the Australian effort at San Francisco was spent rather in defining and giving greater practical content to the obligations under Chapter XI, which attach universally.

Two features at least of the proposed international trusteeship system are, however, markedly different from those of the mandate system. The first is in the sphere of defense and security, the second in that of trade. In both cases, on a realistic view, the new features may encourage mandatory Powers to bring under the new system the territories they now hold under mandate.

The mandate system rested on the implied assumption that the mandated territories should forever be excluded from the sphere of strategy. The mandatory was forbidden to fortify them or to train the inhabitants militarily except for the defense of the territory. The international trusteeship system rests on exactly the opposite assumption: that each trust territory must be made to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. The administering authority is expressly permitted to make use of volunteer forces, facilities (*e.g.* bases) and other assistance from the territory, not only for local purposes but also as part of the general system of collective security. The military prohibitions in the mandates proved onerous — in some cases disastrous — to the mandatory Powers which (unlike Japan) honored their obligations under the Covenant. The terms upon

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which a mandated territory is brought under the international trusteeship system would naturally include the abandonment of these restrictions. There will thus be one positive inducement toward bringing existing mandated territories under the new system.

The same result may flow from commercial considerations. The mandate system rested on an attempt to eliminate colonial rivalries and promote equal access to raw materials by imposing on the mandatories an obligation to maintain what is generally called the "Open Door." This obligation was clearly imposed in the "B" class mandates. Whether or not it applied in the "C" class mandates has been the subject of an unsettled difference of opinion between the United States and the "C" class mandatories. But the League accepted the contention that a mandatory which was permitted to administer a territory as an integral portion of its own territory was under no such obligation.

Among the objectives of the new international trusteeship system, the Open Door does indeed figure prominently. But it is made subject to two qualifications. One is that "equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals" is to be sought "without prejudice to" the other objectives of the system — in particular, the maintenance of security and the advancement of the inhabitants of the territories. Secondly, "equal treatment" is made subject to individual trusteeship agreements, and pending those agreements existing rights are maintained. Each parent state, in defining the terms upon which it is willing to place any dependent territory under the trusteeship system, will be able to determine the extent to which it will maintain the Open Door. If its terms are not satisfactory to the Organization, then no agreement will be made, and the territory will not be brought under the system. In the case of a "B" class mandate, however, the mandatory may well wish to bring the territory within the more flexible requirements of the Charter, because unless it does so the terms of the existing instrument will remain.

This flexibility of the Charter in connection with the maintenance of the Open Door does not mean abandonment of the principle that equal access to materials is in itself an important element in friendly international relations, and even in the maintenance of peace. What it does abandon is the idea that it is practicable to isolate dependent territories from the problem of

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commercial policy in general. What it asserts is to be found in Article 74, as part of the general declarations of Chapter XI:

> Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the [non-self-governing] territories . . . no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

The sound reasons of national advantage for bringing under the international trusteeship system the territories now held under mandate are reinforced by the moral and political objections to any course which would in effect abolish the mandate system when once the League had been wound up. In the case of the other two categories of territories to which the system may be applied, the position is not so clear. Whether or not, therefore, the new system will come to anything more than a continuation (and relaxation) of the existing mandate system will depend on the attitude of the major Powers administering dependent territories. In the Pacific, the conquest of the Japanese islands has plainly brought the United States into this group of Powers.

The discussions at the inaugural meetings of the United Nations have altogether altered the outlook for the international trusteeship system. At the Preparatory Commission in London in November–December 1945, a number of eastern European and Middle Eastern states, following the lead of the Soviet Union, took the initiative in urging a direct and immediate invitation to the mandatory states to bring the trusteeship system into being by placing their territories under it. The mandatory states showed themselves by no means unwilling, in principle, to concur in this proposal. To be sure, the debates in the Preparatory Commission found them often on the defensive. This was partly because, in their view, the case for calling on them to inaugurate the trusteeship system was often put on grounds that were inconsistent with the essentially voluntary character of the system envisaged by the Charter for bringing territories under trusteeship. The plan originally put forward, moreover, involved a rapid timetable for the negotiation and approval of trusteeship agreements which they thought ignored important practical difficulties. They did not want to commit themselves to a plan which they might be unable to carry out. Though they concurred in the substance of the proposal, they therefore felt bound to criticize some of its features and some of the reasons given in support of it.

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In the event, the Preparatory Commission unanimously accepted a resolution calling on the mandatory states to undertake practical steps, in concert with the other states directly concerned, for the conclusion of agreements on the terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system. These agreements would then be submitted for approval, preferably not later than during the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly.

Without waiting for the General Assembly to consider this resolution, the mandatory states all made declarations, in the opening debates in January, as to the future of the territories they hold under mandate. The Australian declaration ran as follows:

> The Australian Government, mindful of the obligations which the Charter imposes on all members of the United Nations administering non-self-governing territories, and conscious of its responsibilities as a trustee for the peoples of the mandated territories administered by it under the Covenant of the League of Nations, announces its intention of negotiating an appropriate trusteeship agreement with a view to bringing the mandated territory of New Guinea under the international trusteeship system contemplated by Chapters XII and XIII of the United Nations Charter. At the same time, it announces a similar intention in regard to the territory of Nauru. Both the United Kingdom and the New Zealand Governments, with whom Australia shares this mandate, concur in this course of action.

The process of negotiating satisfactory trusteeship agreements may take some little time, particularly where strategic areas have to be designated. In any case, the General Assembly will not be able to consider and approve any draft agreements until its next meetings in September. But the point is that the proceedings at the Preparatory Commission and the General Assembly have transformed the inauguration of the trusteeship system from a possibility into a promise. The necessary practical steps, in some cases at least, are already being taken.

IV. REGIONAL COÖPERATION AND THE PROMOTION OF WELFARE

At the first Australian-New Zealand conference at Canberra in January 1944, the two Governments put forward constructive common proposals for the full promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories in the South Seas. The adoption of positive and liberal policies by each parent state is of course indispensable. But some of the most important administrative problems of contiguous, and even of neighboring, territories overlap governmental boundaries and cannot be solved merely by

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action in a number of entirely separate units. Problems of health, of communications, of production, of markets, of labor supply, can often be solved only by coöperation across frontiers. The two Dominion Governments therefore proposed the creation of a South Seas Regional Commission, with advisory powers. This Commission would be closely analogous to the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, already in practical operation, but the Australian-New Zealand proposal seems to have been collateral rather than derivative, and to have sprung from close study of the needs of the territories in question.

A regional Council of this kind is plainly adapted for collaboration, not for supervision. Its members would meet as representatives of governments directly interested in the territories concerned. Its function would be to interchange information, promote the pooling of resources, and generally to assist in the formulation and execution of common policies. But it would operate as an auxiliary of the governments concerned; it would be accountable to them, not they to it. One of the by-products of its successful operation would obviously be to raise the standards of the more backward administrations in the group. Indeed, this is one of the main objectives of any such proposal. But it will operate most effectively if it is confined strictly to governments actually responsible for colonial administration in the region concerned.

For similar reasons, a regional Commission such as this would be most effective where the territories concerned are not only neighboring but at roughly comparable stages of social development. They would under such circumstances be likely to provide the maximum range of practical problems in common. The delimitation of the appropriate regions in each case is therefore a matter of some nicety. The governments suggested in the Canberra agreement as members of the South Seas Regional Commission were those of the two proposers (Australia and New Zealand) together with the United States, the United Kingdom and France. (Some misunderstanding was apparently caused in the United States because the agreement said that in addition to Australia and New Zealand there "might be" representatives of the three Great Powers. The subjunctive was clearly intended to express not the mere possibility that they would be invited but the hope that they would accept membership.) The territories in mind were such, for example, as those of the Australian islands, the

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British colonies of the Solomons, the condominium of the New Hebrides, the French colony of New Caledonia, and Samoa.

Australian ideas would probably run to the establishment of another regional commission in the southwestern Pacific or southeastern Asia area, the scope of which would include at least Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia and Timor. Territories such as Dutch New Guinea on the west of the proposed South Seas Commission's zone, and the Japanese mandated islands to the east of it, are clearly borderline cases. But membership questions belong to the category of matters of detail rather than principle.

The great practical difficulties confronting every parent state in the Pacific area in the rehabilitation period lying immediately ahead strengthen the case for the early establishment of such regional bodies as the South Seas Commission. The common tasks of the moment would give the Commission an opportunity to establish itself, as the Caribbean Commission has done, by making immediate practical contributions to the rehabilitation of the territories concerned, and to demonstrate the value of international coöperation along these lines in this area. It is to be hoped that early support will come from the United Kingdom and the United States for the establishment of this Commission.

From the Australian emphasis on regional coöperation in administrative matters, it would be altogether wrong to infer any leaning on the part of the Government or the people toward joint or collective administration of dependent territories. Quite the contrary is the case. Australians would not be concerned to deny the possibility, in principle, of joint international administration. But they have had practical experience in the New Hebrides of a condominium with France. The results have not inspired confidence. Effective joint government is not hard to envisage in a purely "police state," in which the functions of government are reduced to the bare minimum for maintaining order. Where, however, the active promotion of welfare and development is required, the necessary authority is hard to achieve except through a national administration. It is true that more effective modes of international government can probably be found than those represented by a condominium, as usually understood. The reported proposal to place the former Italian colonies under the temporary collective administration of the United Nations may have broken new ground in this connection. But the emphasis in Australian discussions of the subject is

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usually upon the solid advantages of single and undivided national responsibility.

V. PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY

The vital importance, for the defense and security of Australia, of the island chain that links her to Asia and the scattered island groups which dot the sea and airways between her and the United States, scarcely needs exposition. Through the islands comes her danger, in the islands lies her defense. One difficulty that the layman feels in discussing Australian views on the future of the dependent territories from the defense angle is that this is the sphere primarily of the strategist, in which the public is not fully informed, and about which, with a kind of unconscious comprehension, it does not insist on being fully informed. The result is that often even official views lie unexpressed at the root of decisions taken. Another difficulty is peculiar to the present juncture in world affairs. The discovery of the atomic bomb has probably rendered obsolete most of the previously existing plans for security. The proposals for an island defense zone north of Australia and New Zealand put forward so recently as January 1944 in the Australian-New Zealand agreement clearly stand in need of revision, at the least. The agreement envisaged a regional arrangement, to which not only Australia and New Zealand would be parties but also the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Portugal and the Netherlands, for the defense of the island arc stretching from Timor to Samoa. But the strategic frontiers of Australia and New Zealand are further away today. Perhaps, indeed, such things as strategic frontiers no longer exist. Subject to those uncertainties, however, three points may be made.

First, Australia recognizes, without qualification, that security for her must be collective security, in a system in which, at the barest minimum, she acts in concert with the United Kingdom and the United States. That is one of the plainest lessons of World War II. Australia will not forget what the United States did in 1942 in saving her from invasion.

Second, Australia accepts without qualification the thesis explicit in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, that the dependent territories of the Pacific must be brought within the security arrangements made under the Charter. She recognizes that the provision made in the Charter in relation to areas designated as

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"strategic" was devised — so far as concerns the Pacific — to enable the Navy of the United States, in particular, to work out a plan which would reconcile the promotion of native welfare on the one hand with the requirements of defense on the other.

Third, Australia feels the anxieties natural to a community numerically small, brought into close proximity with the gigantic military and naval expansion of the United States in the Pacific. It is not that she fears aggression. It is simply that she desires to be dealt with as a free and self-governing country, with a voice in the shaping of her affairs.

This anxiety found expression in some of the rather controversial paragraphs in the "Anzac" agreement of January 1944, *e.g.* in the assertion of the principle that the construction and use in time of war of military installations in the territory of another Power does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the cessation of hostilities; in the claim also of a right to a voice in the disposition of any enemy territories in the Pacific, and in any changes in the sovereignty or system of control of the Pacific islands. The same anxiety has been felt from time to time in the face of reported assertions by United States political or military leaders of an intention on the part of the United States to retain bases in the territory of Allied countries after the war. One such reference was made recently to the harbor of Manus in the Admiralty islands, which are part of the Australian mandated territory of New Guinea. The reference was accompanied by the expression of a contemptuous expectation that the Australians would "put up a squawk" about trusteeship.

From the fact that the reputed intentions of the United States Navy have caused misgivings in Australia, it must not for a moment be inferred that Australia would be unwilling to enter into a voluntary agreement for the provision of naval or other facilities for the United States forces in Australian territory. An answer given by the Acting Minister for External Affairs in the House of Representatives to a question about Manus fairly states the Australian view:

> The trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter specifically preserve all existing rights and interests in the Territories concerned, including Mandated Territories. In those rights, there can be no change to which the responsible power (in this case Australia) does not consent. The security provisions of the United Nations Charter impose the obligation to make available

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to the Security Council forces and facilities. The precise extent of this obligation is to be defined by the terms of an agreement with the Security Council (Article 43). In reaching decisions on these matters and in any negotiations which may take place concerning bases, the Government will be guided by its experience during the war.

The views discussed in these pages have been chiefly those put forward by the Australian Government, and in particular by the present Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt. It may fairly be asked what is the background of these views, and how much backing they have in the country.

In part, the policies currently advocated on behalf of Australia in relation to dependent territories undoubtedly stem from the fact that Australia has had a Labor Government since October 1941. Labor thought has not hitherto been deeply affected by the teaching of Marx and Lenin. It has been subject to Fabian influences, no doubt, and its platform, not radically revised now for over a generation, is certainly both egalitarian and critical of imperialism. But an ideological basis is not Labor's strongest characteristic. It is moved more by sentiment than by doctrine, and desire for the improvement of the lot of the underdog is in truth its strongest motive.

Though the views put forward by the Government are of a piece with Labor's general outlook, it would be wrong to infer that they are merely a product of the Labor movement. A government of a more conservative political complexion might have been less positive in several directions. In Parliament and in the press, there was some opposition to and criticism of the stand taken by the Australian delegation at San Francisco on the question of dependent territories. But there was little objection on this head when later the position had been fully explained and the bill for approving the Charter came before Parliament. The fact is that, in large part, the present Government's views are the product not so much of Labor policy as of the times themselves.

The war has given Australia a pretty thorough shake-up. The conquest by the Japanese of the colonial empires in Southeast Asia of Britain, France and the Netherlands, and the apparent complaisance of the Asiatic inhabitants under the invader, not only underlined the part played by the near north in Australian security but threw a searchlight on colonial administration in the Pacific generally. Realization has spread that positive programs of a new kind will be required if economic and political stability —

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the essential for security — is to be maintained in the Pacific area. The New Guinea campaigns spread a new knowledge of, and an utterly new and vivid interest in, Australia's own island empire. Perhaps Australians are developing an uneasy conscience, too, about the aboriginal population on the mainland, and about some of the awkward angles of their immigration policy. There is certainly a fresh realization of the importance of coöperation within the British Commonwealth on matters that previously Australia had tended to think of as being exclusively Britain's concern. In all these ways, the war has created both the need and the readiness for a more vital national concern in the problems of security, welfare and good government raised by the dependent territories of the Pacific area. From this point of view, the Government may be thought of as rather expressing than creating a new public opinion.

Probably the truth is that, while the basis of an altogether new and effective public interest is there, the Labor Government is a long way in the lead in this matter of dependent territories. There are personal factors too. Much of the present Government's policy is the creation of a single Minister — Dr. Evatt himself. How much one man of powerful mind and intense energy can do, with effective backing, even in a few years, to modify a people's outlook on policy is very well understood in the United States. Under Dr. Evatt's stimulus, Australia as a nation, in this matter of dependent territories as in other international matters too, has been helping to give a lead, not merely following a lead given by others. The lead given is in some respects controversial, and has aroused some dissent at home. But probably a large majority of the Australian people would endorse the policies for which the Government stood at San Francisco. An important task now is so to build on the foundation of aroused public concern, already laid by the events of the war, that what is permanent in the policies of the present Australian Government may find permanent expression also in the political thought of the whole Australian people.

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FINLAND TAKES STOCK

By Eric Dancy

FINLAND may be described as a corner of Europe insulated through much of the year by ice. Historically, she was a prize and a battlefield for Sweden and Russia — until the Germans replaced the Swedes as the principal enemies of the Russians, when she became a flank for the new battlefield. The Finns never had much political instinct. They looked to brave or astute leaders to defend them in their unfortunate geographical position.

The Finns migrated into Finland — it is now supposed from the northern Caspian country — late in the first millennium, driving the Lapps into the Arctic. Swedes colonized Finland in the twelfth century, and established themselves as an ascendancy. They kept to themselves, calling themselves Swedish Finns. There has been a certain amount of intermarriage, and some Finns "turned Swedish" and vice versa, changing even their names. Culturally and in language the Swedish Finns remain a race apart, like the Anglo-Irish in Ireland, with whom they share psychological characteristics. Finland is their "fatherland," and like the Anglo-Irish they are sometimes sharp in their criticism of the country of their origin. Like the Anglo-Irish they have produced many of the great national leaders of the country. They are not universally popular among Finnish Finns, although their position is now better than it was during the "Second Campaign" (1941–44), as it is called. For reasons partly of language, they were better informed at that time than Finnish Finns. They could read the Swedish press, and they could understand broadcasts from London in Swedish and Norwegian, and generally also in Danish and in English.[1] The Swedish Finns never supported the Second Campaign wholeheartedly and, with the left-wing of the Social Democrats, advocated peace. They form about 10 percent of the population. Now that Finland is moving somewhat toward Russia, while retaining her independence, they are more important than ever as a link with Scandinavia and the west.

For about 800 years before 1918, Finland was under foreign tutelage — first that of Sweden and then, after Napoleon, that of Russia. Under the Tsars she enjoyed a high degree of auton-

[1] The Finnish language is non-Indo-Germanic; there are not even genders in Finnish. Language difficulties have had much to do with the political ignorance of the Finns.

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omy, including management of fiscal affairs, but Russia controlled her foreign policy and brought her into the First World War.

The Finns on the whole were not Germanophil in 1914–18, but they considered Russia's defeat a means to liberation. Civil war in Russia precipitated civil war in Finland, but in this the



Left was defeated. The Right in Finland did not triumph without foreign help, however — and that help came from Germany. The new Finnish Army, commanded by Baron Mannerheim, who had previously been one of the Russian generals on the Galician front, had the support of a German division commanded by General von der Goltz. Mannerheim himself was against using the Germans, but in view of threatened starvation he agreed to their help in order to shorten the campaign.

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Finland declared her independence on December 6, 1917, and Mannerheim and von der Goltz next turned the war outward against Russia. The Finnish Left had been just as ready as the Right to avail itself of a revolutionary situation in Russia to strike for national liberation, but it took no part in this campaign, and indeed, most Leftists were by now in prison camps. The Finnish Right had disposed of the Left in advance, as it had different ideas about the government of liberated Finland. Mannerheim's aim (repeated in his Order of the Day of July 15, 1941, when Finnish troops crossed the Russian frontier) was to conquer eastern Karelia for Finland. Von der Goltz opposed this objective, however, since Germany had concluded a secret agreement with Russia at Brest-Litovsk which precluded support for the Finnish claim. The Finns withdrew from eastern Karelia, and Mannerheim resigned command of the Finnish army because of differences with von der Goltz.

The Right intended to make Finland a kingdom, and in gratitude to the Germans the Diet offered the crown to Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse. Since Mannerheim looked forward to a democratic evolution in Finland, he opposed this project, as did the Liberals. With the German defeat in the west, the scheme fell through; and Finland became a republic democratic in form, which is not quite the same thing as a democratic republic.

Independent Finland was never completely sure of her democracy. The mass of the people wanted democracy on the western pattern, partly because their sympathies were with the west. But the groups of the Right remained very powerful, especially in the Army, and they were strong enough both during the interwar years and during the recent campaigns to interfere with the functioning of democracy.

Mannerheim was never thought of as a politician, and he retired from public life for many years. His moderation nevertheless placed him in a special position, and it was to him, later on, that the nation turned when there was need of a non-party leader who could hold it together. He never lost the special advantage of his generation, which he shares with J. K. Paasikivi — he could speak Russian; and although he was anti-Communist, he was by no means anti-Russian. He preferred Russians to Germans. His wisdom and his knowledge of Russia enabled him to curb the imaginations of Finns during the war and to prevent a dictatorship of the Right, just as the influence of ex-President Ståhlberg

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had helped to save Finland from civil war in 1932 when the Fascist "Lappua" forces threatened to march on Helsinki.

The Left slowly softened toward the aging marshal, who was becoming more and more of a grand seigneur. The memory of the prison camps of the civil war of 1918 died hard: many of the some hundred thousand Communists and Social Democrats who had been thrown into them — mainly members of the Red Guard — had perished, and many others had been subjected to severe and arbitrary punishments. But it was remembered that Mannerheim himself had sought to humanize the treatment of these prisoners and to mitigate their sentences.

During the interregnum between the World Wars the people of the self-conscious young nation lived in fear of Russia. The frontier was sealed almost hermetically, and Finland and Russia were neighbors in the geographical sense alone. The country "went western" rapidly, developing a large trade and leaning politically more and more toward Scandinavia. For Finns of a certain generation, very nearly the only Russian contact was that with Russian émigrés, who saw Russia in terms of their own plight: they knew the past but not the present. Throughout the world, Helsinki became a dateline for sensations. (I was told in Helsinki, on my first arrival there in 1927, that the British fleet was at the moment sailing up the Baltic to bombard Leningrad.) The Russian language disappeared from the schools.

Educational standards were raised to the highest western level except, notably, in the faculties of economics and social sciences. The universities became breeding grounds of reaction. A consequence of this was that it was easy, and tempting, for Finnish youths of all classes to embrace the career of army officers. But it was practically a condition of promotion in the Officers' Reserve that a man should have belonged as a student to the Academic Karelian Association. This irredentist organization was as anti-Swedish as it was anti-Russian It sympathized strongly with Nazism during the rise of Hitler, and it dominated student politics: no fewer than 80 percent of Helsinki students voted for its candidates. In the universities of Scandinavia, by contrast, about the same proportion of students were Social Democrats, and Nazism made almost no headway.

It was natural enough that the highest posts in the army should be filled by officers with field experience, but this meant that the top positions tended to go to former members of the Finnish

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Jägerkorps — the group which, preparatory to the expected struggle for the liberation of Finland, had fought in the German Army against Russia up to 1917. Other technical reasons, apart from considerations of sympathy, made the German influence very strong in the Finnish Army. Germany, for example, produced the most important body of military literature, hence German became a second language for a Finnish officer. Finally, the rise of Hitler, and with it the resurrection of German military power, raised hopes for powerful help in translating to reality irredentist dreams which, in some minds, also included expansion into northern Sweden and northern Norway. The more moderate Right and the Left, and Mannerheim himself in his retirement, were by no means at ease about these tendencies.

It was apparent that a new European war, and possibly a world war, was brewing. The Finnish instinct was to support the west. One could have said that the secret wish of nearly every Finn was that one day the sun would rise in the west and set in the east. The strength of Russia was grossly underestimated, thanks largely to the stories of émigrés. It was hoped that, if war must come, it would take the same course as in 1914–18.

In 1937, when the Liberal Rudolf Holsti was at the Finnish Foreign Office, prospects for the development of good relations between Russia and Finnish democracy were quite hopeful. Finland was then governed by a coalition, in which the Social Democrats participated; but the groups of the Right manœuvred to get rid of Holsti. In the early summer of 1939 Russia particularly objected to the fortification of the Aaland Islands by the Finns; their opposition stemmed from the belief that the Finnish Army was pro-German in its sympathies, and from fear that these islands might become a German base of operations against the Soviets in the Baltic. Finland's refusal to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany which Hitler demanded was interpreted by the Russians as a reassuring factor, however. Sweden and Norway also refused to sign such a pact with Hitler. Denmark, where the small party of radical pacifists controlled the Foreign Office, signed, as did Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The *Völkischer Beobachter* called these pacts the "answer to the American President Roosevelt" — who in April had asked Hitler for assurances that he had no aggressive designs on 31 specific nations. The Russo-German pact of August 23 was the climax of these eleventh-hour diplomatic moves.

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II

The climax for Finland came in October, when J. K. Paasikivi and Väinö Tanner went to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin concerning the Russian demands for territorial concessions near Leningrad. Väinö Tanner, leader of the Social Democratic Party — the largest in Finland — dry, energetic, astute and with a gift for oratory, was a great personality. He spoke Swedish and English rather well, and was considered well informed in international matters too deep for Finnish-speaking members of the *Eduskunta*. He was a blunt Finn, disliking anything mystic, or anything foreign, and only theoretically fond of Swedish Finns — as suspicious of God as he was of the Devil. He had surrounded himself with men whom he had pulled out of the prison camps after the Civil War, who were profoundly grateful to him. But Stalin thought him an unhappy choice as negotiator, since he was an avowed anti-Communist.

The situation by now had crystallized in Poland. Tanner reminded Stalin that Russia and Germany had signed a non-aggression pact. "Against whom are you on guard," he asked, "that you should want territorial concessions for the defense of Leningrad?" Stalin replied, "A situation can always change." The fact that some high German officers had been invited to inspect Finnish frontier defenses had also caused some anxiety in Moscow. Paasikivi and Tanner took the line that neutral Russia had the right to consider her own defenses, and so had neutral Finland. If the situation was so precarious, they said, Finland's neutral position would be legally weakened if she made territorial concessions to one side. But the European situation at that given hour was not being determined by legalities.

Three and a half months later Finland was no longer at war; she had lost 27,000 men. The losses with which Russia had purchased her defenses for Leningrad must have been considerably greater. Swedish Finns in particular thought that the peace terms were not unrealistic, and there is no doubt that, with three weeks more of campaigning, the Russians could have occupied Finland. In retrospect, it is clear that the U.S.S.R. was playing a gambit: among the captured Russian material exhibited in Helsinki at the close of the campaign was none of the first-class equipment that the Germans subsequently came up against on the Russian front, with the possible exception of some antiaircraft guns.

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Newspaper correspondents returning to Helsinki a fortnight after the peace was signed in March received the impression that the Finns did not expect the peace to last very long. There was open boasting in the Hotel Kämp, where journalists made their headquarters, of sabotage to factories in industrial territories ceded to Russia. The Army remained partly mobilized, still under the command of Mannerheim, though during peacetime it should be under the President of the Republic. This was explained by talk of "Communist activities," and officials of the Russian Legation were accused of fomenting riots by groups of the newly formed Fenno-Soviet Society. The larger buildings remained protected (by ice encased in wood) against air raids; this was natural enough, if another aggression was feared. But it was said widely that Finland was simply taking a pause for breath.

From then on decisions regarding Finland's foreign relations passed into the hands of a few men around the new Premier, Herra Risto Ryti, former president of the Bank of Finland. The consequences were disastrous to the nation. Ryti and his Government steered Finland by stages into a military alliance with Germany, resulting in the Second Campaign and humiliating defeat. Throughout that period the form of democratic government was outwardly preserved, but constitutional law, which requires that the Government should keep the *Eduskunta* informed in all matters affecting the issue of peace and war, was not observed. This disregard for the constitution subsequently provided the legal basis for the prosecution of Ryti and the other ex-Ministers — a condition of the second armistice.

III

According to evidence at the trial, Mannerheim, on Ryti's personal authority, agreed in principle in August 1940 to allow German sick and leave troops to pass through Finland between Germany and northern Norway. The proposal had been brought to Mannerheim by a messenger from Goering. At the end of August two Finnish officers were sent to Germany to discuss it. In September a secret transit agreement was made in Berlin, and on September 21 the first German troops and material were landed at Vaasa. German service dépôts were established at Vaasa, Oulu and Rovaniemi.

Telegrams produced at the trial show that the Finns were anxious to preserve the appearance of neutrality while this con-

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cession was being planned. Finland had made a concession to Russia after the armistice, allowing the transit — with certain exceptions — of unarmed troops, to the treaty base at Hangö. The telegrams showed that both Kivimäki, the Finnish Minister in Berlin, and the Finnish Foreign Office realized that to make a greater concession to Germany than to Russia would compromise Finland's neutrality. They prepared, therefore, to excuse the German concession on the ground that by its nature it was the less important of the two; and they thought also that it could be defended on the ground that it was granted for a shorter period than the Russian concession.

The German transit agreement provided for the transport of 5,000 troops with their equipment, and the establishment of the three dépôts named above. But in practice it continued until Germany attacked Russia. Bases were established all over Finland, and between June 7 and June 21 of that year, 74 German transports unloaded in Finnish ports. It also came out at the trial that, even when the first unloading took place at Vaasa, most members of the Government were apparently ignorant that the agreement existed.

Sweden granted transit concessions to Germany in July 1940, but no observer who was in Stockholm or in Helsinki at the time is in serious doubt that the Swedish Government yielded to superior force. Finland's case was different, however. By the Treaty of March 1940 she had conceded to the Soviet Union areas which the latter had required for the defense of its right flank. The Finnish Army was protected from the Germans in that quarter. It was better trained and equipped than the Swedish Army. (Sweden had given Finland more military help during the Winter Campaign than she could actually afford, thereby weakening her own defense.) Finally, the defense of Finland against German attack would have been incomparably less difficult than the defense of Sweden.

Documents found in Germany and produced at the Helsinki trial make it fairly evident that the Finnish concessions to Germany did not represent simply submission to German power. It appears that Fenno-German military conversations took place in Germany on the highest level as early as December 1940, when the Finnish Chief of Staff, General Heinrichs, was initiated into the Barbarossa plan for the attack on Russia. In February 1941 the German General Buschenhagen, who had been present at

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these conversations, was taken on an inspection tour of the whole Finnish front. Ryti had meanwhile become President through the death of Kallio. On May 30, 1941, he instructed Kivimäki to find out the views of the German Government on the subject of a rectification of the Finnish frontier which would give Finland eastern Karelia. Propaganda for the acquisition of this territory became official as soon as the attack on Russia was launched.

The Finnish claim to eastern Karelia on racial grounds was not so strong as some other irredentist claims in Europe. Finns who fought in eastern Karelia during the campaign found that the inhabitants were, on the whole, not as eager to join Finland as had been expected. Views differ as to whether the desire to unite with the Finns was stronger in one age group than in another. The Karelians, darker than the southern and western Finns, are of a livelier temperament, more akin to the Russian. Intermarriage between Karelians and Russians is common. The Russians encourage the Finnish language in Karelia, and most people there are bilingual.

The trial of ex-President Ryti and the former Ministers ended in a verdict of guilty. Ryti was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment; Tanner and ex-Premier Linkomies received five and a half years, the others less. There is a widespread feeling that Finnish democracy itself has been on trial, since it was impossible completely to separate the responsibility of the former Government and that of its supporters, inside or outside the *Eduskunta*. The nation had to search its conscience under the very terms of the indictment brought against the Government. The charges were well defined. First, the Government was accused of breaking foreign agreements, mainly the agreement with Russia not to enter into an alliance against her. The second heading was constitutional: that the Finnish President had declared war without consulting the *Eduskunta*. Events consequent upon Finland's being led illegally into war with Russia, such as the British declaration of war upon Finland, were also examined under legal headings. The Government was accused of keeping the *Eduskunta* in the dark about foreign relations — in particular, about the various moves for peace by other nations. In regard to this, as in regard to the infiltration of German troops, it is impossible to determine how far members of the *Eduskunta*, and Finnish people generally, did actually know the circumstances. Yet that only intensifies the need for searching self-analysis by the Finns, for a

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people cannot be content with ignorance in political matters and at the same time assert that they are governing themselves.

This effort of stock-taking centers particularly on the events of the period after March 1943. In that month there was a change of government, Professor Linkomies becoming Premier and Hr. Henrik Ramsay becoming Foreign Minister. The Linkomies Government was expected to investigate the possibilities of peace, although the Allied offensive in the west had not yet started. The Russians had already made various peace offers.[2] There is no doubt that the Linkomies Government wavered, and probably it got flustered. When the United States Government informed it that Russia would be prepared to conclude peace with Finland, Ramsay went straight to Ribbentrop and told him. Yet Ramsay was pro-western! He was of Scots origin, known to be a "good fellow," and had been president of the Anglo-Finnish Society in Helsinki. But his course between the hare and the hounds caused the United States to sever diplomatic relations with Finland and eventually cost Finland the Porkkala peninsula. Finland's losses during the Second Campaign included about 100,000 killed or permanently disabled.

One year later Finland entered into negotiations with the Russians. But although it seems impossible that the Finns did not perceive that the fortunes of war had definitely turned, and that Allied victory was only a matter of time, the *Eduskunta*, during a secret session, unanimously rejected the peace terms and chose to face the massive offensive the Russians were then mounting.

In the debate, the leader of the powerful Agrarian Party said that his party trusted the Government implicitly in matters of foreign policy. Such, too, was the feeling of most of the Finnish bourgeoisie. Most of the Social Democrats followed their leader, Tanner, as a matter of course. Tanner had not been a member of the Government in June 1941; he joined it later. But in the trial it has been shown that he supported the Campaign enthusiastically and used his great power within the Social Democratic Party to prevent it from supporting the peace movement.

It is impossible to know to what degree the *Eduskunta* was moved by fear of what might happen if the Government were

[2] The fact that the first one, made a few weeks after the Campaign had started, proposed a return to the pre-Winter Campaign frontiers, must be ascribed either to a Russian feeling of military weakness at the time — of which no evidence is known — or to her desire to admit that in 1939 she had had to subordinate legality to the exigency of self-defense.

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overturned. Finns who wanted peace feared that the Government might be succeeded by another coalition, even more war-minded. They were also aware of what seemed a greater danger. The *Skyddskar* (Volunteer Defense Corps), a spearhead of reaction dating from the Civil War of 1918, was about 60,000 strong. Mannerheim so far had kept it in order. But a change of government, at that critical time, might have precipitated a realignment which would lead to a repetition of the situation of 1918, with the officers and many others making common cause with the *Skyddskar* and seeking German support in the domestic controversy. Since the Germans were becoming increasingly unpopular, the internal dissension would have been even more bitter than in 1918. The Left would have turned to Russia for help — and every village in Finland would have been a battleground in a civil war. There would have been no Finnish Government to negotiate with the Russians and Russian occupation would have followed. Some of the bitterest opponents of the accused Ministers argue that the more it became evident that the Government had acted illegally the less possible it was for the nation to force it to resign.

Such, at any rate, was the background for the Finnish rejection of Russian terms for peace. The Russians took the offensive and broke through the Isthmus defenses. Ryti, without consulting the *Eduskunta*, signed an agreement with Ribbentrop, who had flown to Helsinki, pledging that Finland would not make a separate peace with the U.S.S.R. He received in return assurances of continued German help. Ryti's undertaking was a personal one, and at the trial it was said in his defense that he left a loophole through which Finland could escape — that is to say, the agreement would be cancelled if he resigned from the Presidency. He did resign, on August 1.

IV

A crisis of despondency, aggravated by economic want, swept the country after the defeat. Lacking coal, Finland had to burn the wood which she would normally have exported, to keep her railways and her industries going at about half capacity. More than 10 percent of her population was displaced by the ravages of war and the migration from western Karelia. Thousands in Helsinki are still without homes, and the streets are none too safe at night. Almost everyone has money — except intellectuals, government officials and certain categories of workers — but there is

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nothing to buy legally; the results are widespread alcoholism and a thriving black market.

The Finns do not easily see beyond their frontiers; the trials have focussed their thoughts on their own political shortcomings. The very fact that, once things had reached a certain stage, there seemed nothing that the *Eduskunta* or the people could do save go on supporting the government, forces the Finns to ask themselves how it happened that democratic government got so badly out of hand. Few Finns were completely opposed to the trials except the right-wing Social Democrats, and their opposition was centered around the personality of Väinö Tanner. "He is a man, and a Finn, and a democrat," I heard one of them say during the trial. But for the left-wing Social Democrats he was Finland's *éminence grise*. In the eyes of the nation — as well as from the legal point of view — Tanner was less culpable than Ryti and certain others of the Right.

The congress of the Social Democratic Party will decide the question of the elimination of "Tannerites." Economic factors tend to make the party the largest in Finland, and both Finland's international orientation and the course of her domestic development will to some extent be determined by the decision taken at the party meeting. Some Social Democrats now sit on the same benches with the Communists because they place whole-hearted collaboration with Russia before every other political consideration — even though they do not interpret that position as excluding friendship and trade with the western democracies. Perhaps about half of the population is politically disposed toward collaboration with Russia.

The Russian indemnity commissioners have proved exacting, but clear. Russia, on account of Finnish exactness in meeting her commitments, offered Finland in October 1945 a two years' extension of time in which to discharge her reparations obligations. Stalin chose to break this important news to the members of a Finnish cultural delegation which was visiting him. He told them, moreover, that when the indemnity period ended in 1951, Russia would want to continue to receive as imports from Finland the types of goods she is now receiving as reparations — and in two or three times the volume. If this comes to pass, Finland will possess important trade outlets with the east.

At the moment, Finland is faced with grave economic difficulties, although her position is not the worst in Europe. She is short

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of coal and of the raw materials needed for the conversion of her industries to indemnity requirements. She has sterling and now dollar credits, and would like to buy more goods than can be supplied. She has lost two-thirds of her own shipping. Clothes, vegetables — especially greens — and sugar are very scarce. There is practically no fruit. (The severe winter of 1939–40, when the temperature fell sometimes to 57 degrees centigrade below zero, destroyed nearly all the fruit trees.) There is a little tobacco; coffee, the most prized luxury in Finland, is expected soon.

Finland's experiment with a Scandinavian orientation is over — except culturally, and cultural relations mainly concern the Swedish Finns. Norway is not at all pleased with Finland's war policy. The Danes, with their gift for analytical psychology, "try to understand" and send sugar; and Sweden is continuing the economic help she gave to Finland during the war. But a northern union or bloc has passed outside the sphere of practical politics.

The Russians are doing their best to avoid interference with Finland's internal affairs; their attitude is comparable with the British attitude toward the Irish. One observes how careful they are to avoid "incidents." Russian soldiers and sailors are to be seen in the streets, in the shops and in cinemas, but never in restaurants. The U.S.S.R. may be expected to seek to exercise a certain control over Finnish foreign policy, however, and it has been made plain that if influences hitherto anti-Russian are allowed to stir up feeling against Russia, the relations between the two countries will change. During the trials, a Tass correspondent expressed the view that whether Finland is to be included among the United Nations will depend upon whether the Tanner-Ryti influence is removed.

Britain, too, is still technically at war with Finland, and hence there are Britons as well as Russians on the Allied Control Commission. The Finns have a background of friendly relations with Britain. As a result of the British declaration of war, a large part of the population, including many of the moderate Right, came to understand that it is possible for a country which is well disposed toward Finland to break with her, if Finland's own democracy fails. This was a useful lesson.

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THE PAKISTAN DOCTRINE: ITS ORIGINS AND POWER

By Sir Frederick Puckle

MR. JINNAH, the President of the Moslem League, claims that the Moslems in India are not just another kind of Indian, are not merely a minority, but are a nation. On this claim rests the demand for Pakistan, a separate Moslem state, independent in the world and in particular independent of Hindustan, the India of the Hindus. Hindus find difficulty in accepting this claim and its implication that there can be no union of India. The dispute is not just a petty squabble among politicians, of no particular importance to the rest of the world. The outcome of it will be the creation either of a Union of India — the most populous state in the world, with the possible exception of China — or of Pakistan, the largest of all the Moslem states and the last of a belt of independent Moslem countries stretching from Constantinople to Delhi, from the Hindu Kush to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb.

II

The political and religious eruption of Islam out of Arabia in the seventh century soon spilt over into India; and Sind and parts of the Punjab were included, by about 700, in the domain of the Caliph of Baghdad. But not for another three hundred years was the influence of Islam to penetrate further into India, and then it did so under the banner of the Turks, not of the Arabs. About the year 1000, Mahmud, the ruler of a state based on Ghazni in southern Afghanistan, began a series of raids deep into India and added most of the modern Punjab and Sind to his possessions. From then onward for 500 years the story is a confused and rather grim one of conquest and rebellion and intervals of settled government. The Turkish invaders found themselves surrounded by a society and a civilization with which they had very little in common. In other parts of the world Moslem expansion was at the expense of Christians, who as "people of the Book," acknowledging, that is to say, the authority of the Old Testament, were exempt from the rule of "Islam or death" and could be allowed to live in peace, if they accepted their sub-

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ordinate position and paid the special tax, the *jizya*, levied on unbelievers. But the Hindus were not only unbelievers, they were idolators as well, and though a more tolerant attitude was very soon adopted by the conquerors, death or Islam was the choice which many a Hindu had to make in the early incursions. No doubt the invaders were realists. There were not many of them (it is a mistake to think of mass irruptions); they came to conquer and rule and enjoy the fruits of conquest, not to trade or plough; to kill off peasants and traders was false economy. So the Hindus were left very much to themselves and encouraged to produce the country's wealth. From what they produced, the Turks as the ruling class skimmed the cream.

The conquerors and the conquered seem to have kept to themselves. Life in India in the Middle Ages "must be thought of as two distinct currents flowing side by side, mingling to a varying extent along the line of contact, but not uniting to form a single stream." There were reasons for this apart from the harsh reality of conquest. There was the Turkish practice of secluding women. Turks, it is true, married with the women of the country, as conquerors will, but there is little evidence that they gave their women in marriage to Hindus. There was caste. The Turk was a convivial fellow and also a beefeater, and Hindu caste rules fostered a very different kind of social life. Moreover, in the eyes of the orthodox Hindu, the conquering Turk was an outcast, an untouchable, and the very idea of "caste" was opposed to that equality of man before God which is one of the fundamentals of Islam. There can have been very little social intercourse. There was the difference of language, of script, of literary traditions, though the lingua franca, now known as Hindustani, began to develop in this period. It seems, in fact, that it was only in Bengal where some progress was made toward an effective synthesis of conflicting cultures. The Turks must have occupied in an exaggerated degree the position that, for two centuries after the Conquest, the Normans occupied in Anglo-Saxon England.

There was of course considerable conversion of Hindus to Islam. Mr. Jinnah is right in not trying to support his "two nation" thesis with the claim that modern Indian Moslems are racially different from their fellow Indians. The invaders did not arrive in hordes, though it is important to remember that for centuries there was constant coming and going between India and the Moslem lands to the west, a traffic which certainly pro-

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vided steady reinforcements of new blood for the Moslem invaders. Probably as many as 90 percent of India's 90,000,000 Moslems are descended from Hindu converts to Islam. The curious traveller in the central Punjab will often find Moslems and Sikhs living in the same village. His inquiries will show that both claim descent from the original founder of the village, who will have a Hindu name. At different periods long ago the descendants of Lal, the Hindu, accepted Islam or Sikhism, and Lal Mahomed and Lal Singh live side by side in the village still. Some conversions were certainly forced — there are records of persecutions — and some were doubtless sincere. But probably the great majority was due to social or economic causes, the material advantage of adopting the creed of the ruling class. But when there was no conversion — and there was probably very little among the higher castes of Hinduism and the educated — the difference in religion was a tremendous barrier. Nor was this all: Hinduism and Islam are both more than religions; each is a way of life, a civilization, as well. Whether as civilizations or religions, they are as unlike as they can be.

By the end of the fifteenth century the picture of India is something like this: Several centuries of Turkish rule have produced a pattern of which the details shift but the general shape remains. Turkish authority based in Delhi is accepted over northern India from Peshawar to Bengal. It extends southward into the Peninsula, but southern India is still Hindu and unconquered. In the Moslem sphere Hindu princes and chiefs still often remain at the head of their people, but as vassals or clients of Delhi. The Moslems are the ruling race and generally a class apart. They officer the armies and staff such civil administration as there is; they have acquired estates which they hold as fiefs from the king. Their numbers have grown by conversion and many of the peasantry, especially in the north, are Moslems. Below the ruling class the immemorial life of Hindu India goes on unchanged. The Hindus are not usually oppressed, but they are kept in their place and may have to pay *jizya*. But most of the commerce, industry and agriculture of the country is in their hands. Rebellions against the authority of Delhi are common, both by Hindu vassal princes and by ambitious Turkish or Afghan nobles, and the death of a king is often the signal for a ruthless little war of succession. The country is ruled but not governed; there is little administration and much lawlessness.

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Upon this scene, about 1500, came the Mogul Conquest. Babur, the conqueror, ruler of Kabul, was of mixed Turkish and Mongol blood. His descent was distinguished, from Tamerlane on his father's side and from Jenghiz Khan on his mother's. The Mogul dynasty which he founded produced a succession of able rulers, Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb, and though the subjugation of the extreme south was never more than temporary, the Mogul Empire during the seventeenth century did impose upon India a degree of unity which it had never known before and was not to know again for nearly two hundred years. Not that there was complete and easy submission; the Rajput princes and the Hindu kingdoms of the south fought hard to keep their independence and were ever alert to try to regain it. There was no lack of dynastic warfare or of rebellion by Moslem adventurers. But in general for much of the country the period was one of unprecedented internal peace. Trade flourished, agriculture expanded, roads were made and fine buildings appeared. The Courts of Akbar and his two successors were centers of culture. Even more important to the ordinary man, the Moguls governed as well as ruled; administration was strengthened and extended. The famous inscription in the Red Palace at Delhi, "If there is a paradise on earth, it is here, it is here," certainly did not apply to the country as a whole, but it does seem that in the great middle period of the Mogul Empire, round about 1650, the ordinary man, peasant or trader, could go about his business with a new freedom and safety.

The Moslems were still the ruling class, more so than ever perhaps, for they now wore the imperial purple. But Hindus were winning their way into important offices of state and, as the principal commercial and mercantile class, must have benefited much from the more settled conditions. Akbar at any rate made conscious attempts to encourage a synthesis of both religion and culture between Hinduism and Islam. *Jizya* was no longer imposed; the cow was protected; the tax on Hindu pilgrimages was abolished. One gets the impression of a short period of halcyon weather in the relations between Hindus and Moslems. The political power of the ruling class up above was too strong to make revolt worth thinking about. Down below, prosperity, comparatively efficient government and the increasing number of Moslems among the ordinary folk were making for contentment and tolerance and a blurring of the lines of religious differ-

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ence. The tradition of a golden age of Akbar still lingers faintly in the villages of India.

If this somewhat rosy vision of mid-seventeenth century India is true to life, it was soon to fade away. Akbar's position had rested on two foundations: a clear realization of what was practicable in the way of control of outlying parts of the empire and a deliberate policy of tolerance toward his Hindu subjects. His two successors deviated little from this policy, but Aurangzeb, the last of the great emperors, lacked statesmanship and was a bigot into the bargain. He dissipated the strength of the empire in attempting to bring the south into complete as well as nominal submission and, worse still, he antagonized his Hindu subjects. The customs taxes were differentiated in favor of Moslems, the *jizya* was reimposed, temples were destroyed deliberately, *suttee* was forbidden, official protection was withdrawn from the cow. In every way Hindus were made to feel that they were a subject people and infidels as well. For the first time in the long history of Moslem rule, there was aroused what we should call today a Hindu "Resistance." Before Aurangzeb died the whole fabric of the empire was threatened. A capable successor might have restored the position in the north. But there was no capable successor, and in the 50 years between Aurangzeb's death and the British victory at Plassey in 1757, the Mogul Empire crumbled away in a twilight of bigotry, internal rebellion and external invasion. The eighteenth century was grim for India and the story is one of internecine wars between the succession states of the empire and the struggle of the survivors of these wars with the growing British power.

III

When the dust of conflict finally cleared away after the Indian Mutiny in 1857, and India settled down to nearly a century of internal peace, the picture that appeared was a new one. Much of India had known foreign rule for 800 years, but now for the first time the foreign rulers exercised effective sovereignty, directly or indirectly, over the whole of the country. It is interesting to speculate on what the picture would have been had the British taken no hand in the game. Perhaps we may get a glimpse of this from looking at what remained in 1860 of the old structure — the Indian states which were not under direct British rule. These were, and still are, 90 percent Hindu. In Hyderabad a Mos-

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lem aristocracy ruled a Hindu population; in Kashmir the position was reversed, but the general pattern was that of a Hindu prince ruling Hindu subjects. There was no state of importance in which a Moslem ruled over Moslems. It seems possible at any rate that without British intervention India might have resumed the shape of pre-Moslem days, a collection of Hindu kingdoms and principalities (with perhaps Moslem states in Bengal, Sind and the Northwest and a Sikh kingdom in the Punjab) cohering or falling apart with the rise and fall of rulers of unusual ability or ambition. One thing seems certain — though Moslems are apt to forget it — Moslem imperial pretensions had ceased to be valid before the British appeared. The Mogul Empire fell not by foreign invasion but by internal disintegration, helped on by Hindu rebellion and made irretrievable by the degeneration of its rulers.

The Hindus lost their chance of throwing off foreign masters, it is true, but otherwise they gained rather than lost by the change. Under the Moguls they had been the bankers, merchants and traders of the country. They must have suffered more than any other class from the anarchy of the eighteenth century, and they gained correspondingly from the enforcement of order, the rule of law, the improvement in communications and the stability in public finance which the British brought in. Trade and commerce, both external and internal, were expanding rapidly and there was plenty for Hindu businessmen after the British merchants had taken their share. The education, science and industrial methods of the west were spreading rapidly and the Hindus were wise enough to take every advantage of them. In Moslem times Hindus had been used freely in posts in the civil administration, even sometimes the highest. If they now lost some opportunities of high employment, their British rulers were only too thankful to make use of Hindu experience and literacy in all administrative posts which they did not think necessary to reserve for themselves. The new courts called for lawyers, the new schools and colleges for professors; western medicine and western journalism were becoming popular. Presently Hindus had almost a monopoly of the liberal professions. Modern India is predominantly the expression of a new Hindu urban civilization and the foundations of this were laid in the security and improved conditions of the nineteenth century. Outside the towns the peasants lived as they had always lived, but

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in a security which was new to them and with the confidence that their taxes would be neither arbitrarily imposed nor capriciously collected. The result was an extension of agriculture and a slow rise in the standards of rural life.

Moslem peasants of course shared in the general improvement in conditions. But the Moslem upper and middle classes, in town or country, were in very different circumstances. For centuries they had been a ruling class — courtiers, soldiers, judges, administrators. The fortunate ones had commanded armies and ruled provinces and stood at the right hand of kings and emperors. All had enjoyed in some measure the prerogatives and perquisites of rulers. All these material advantages of political ascendancy were now enjoyed by the British, and if there were Moslems who had the inclination to turn to other fields of activity and the qualifications required to make good in them, they found, as we have noted, Hindus already in full possession of trade, commerce and the professions. In addition to the decline in their material fortunes, Moslems had the mortification of playing second fiddle to the despised Hindus in political importance and in influence with the British rulers of India. This rankled perhaps more than anything else. The reversal of fortune was so crushing that the members of the Moslem community seemed stunned by it. Wrapping themselves in the fatalism of their creed, they sulked in the corner, watching apathetically and with impartial distaste their new rulers and their former subjects, infidels both and supplanters as well.

This apathy in a quarter of the inhabitants of the country could not last forever. But it was not until almost the last quarter of the nineteenth century that there were signs of a Moslem renaissance. For this revival the chief credit must go to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, a man of vision and a leader who, in spite of the opposition of the old school of conservatives, captured the imagination of the rising generation of Moslems. He had a threefold program: social reform within the framework of Islam, acceptance of western education, and friendship with the British. The second item of the program was urgent. Moslems had turned their backs on the new learning which the west was offering to India. They had clung to their old ways; small boys went on attending the school attached to the mosque where they learned the Koran by rote and little else, and their elders sat at the feet of Moslem divines hearing much talk "about it and about" and

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generally coming out at the same door as in they went. But the connection between education and power was becoming too obvious to be ignored. "When Hindu clerks were being promoted to posts in which they could give orders, when even policemen were chosen because they were good at their books, it was clearly wise for Moslems to reconsider their attitude to the new education." The foundation of the Moslem university at Aligarh in 1877 served notice to both British and Hindus that Moslems had done with sulking in their tents and were in the field again.

The moment for a friendly approach to the British was opportune. In Europe England was playing the rôle of friend to the Sick Man in Constantinople, and the Sultan of Turkey was, in the eyes of Indian Moslems at any rate, the Caliph of Islam. In Asia the policy of meddling in Afghanistan had been dropped and common apprehension of the intentions of Russia was improving relations between British India and her nearest Moslem neighbor. Nearer home Indian nationalism was being born, with the British Raj as a complaisant midwife. The Indian National Congress held its first session in 1885. The stirrings of political consciousness were watched with doubtful eyes by Moslems who saw in the proclaimed goal — the establishment of representative institutions — not so much a promise of self-government for India as a threat of the perpetual rule of a Hindu majority. Moslems seemed in need of safeguards. These must be sought from the British Government and it was only common sense therefore to make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness. The new policy justified itself from the Moslem point of view in 1909, when Indian legislatures became representative bodies and Moslems obtained the safeguards they sought — separate electorates and "weightage," that is to say, a measure of representation commensurate not merely with their numbers but with their political importance and the value of their contribution to the defense of the country. The Moslem League had already been founded in 1906.

To sum up, we can trace three phases in the history of the Moslems in India from 1500 to the First World War. First came the period of dominance, which ended with the crumbling of the Mogul Empire about 1700. This was followed by a century of conflict, during which the question whether Hindu or Moslem was to rule India was reopened. The issue was never decided owing to the intervention of the British, who were stronger than

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either contestant for power. The third phase might be described as an armistice, and covers roughly the nineteenth century. There was nothing for the rivals to fight for. Political power was out of the reach of either, securely held in the British grasp.

We may put the beginning of a fourth phase in the year 1917, when the British Government announced that its policy was "the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The importance of this announcement for Hindu-Moslem relations has been too little understood outside India. It said clearly that the destiny of Indians was to govern themselves by democratic process. It gave notice that presently — perhaps in as little as a generation — political power would pass from British to Indian hands. To which Indian hands? Moslem or Hindu? The armistice was over. The interrupted conflict of the eighteenth century was on again.

IV

The present phase is still working itself out. The complexity of the political history of India over the last 25 years defies compression; the events are recent and heavily charged with emotion. The curious may be referred to Professor Coupland's report to Nuffield College, Oxford,[1] for something as near to a dispassionate survey as is possible for a contemporary Englishman. From among the many landmarks of the period we may pick out three as of peculiar relevance to the history of the Moslems in India. We may note two frustrated attempts by Britain to devise a constitution under which India might progress in unity to full self-government and the final decision to leave it to Indians themselves to decide the sort of government under which they wish to live. We may single out next the fact that Moslems, in a large part of India, for the first time had a short experience of living under Hindu government. Lastly, there is the emergence of the doctrine of Pakistan. The connection between these three facts of history cannot be missed. Mr. Mahomed Ali, no friend to British rule in India, once said, "Make no mistake about the quarrels between Hindu and Mussulman; they are founded only on the fear of domination."

Pakistan has, as one at any rate of its parents, Moslem fear of domination. It is the political reaction to Moslem apprehension

[1] Reginald Coupland, "The Indian Problem." London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

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that Union of India, equipped with democratic institutions, whether the government be unitary or federal, can mean nothing but perpetual Hindu domination and virtual Moslem economic serfdom. The basis of Pakistan is the "two-nation theory," expressed by Mr. Jinnah in these words: "Moslems and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions. In short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life." If the Moslems are a separate nation, then they are entitled to self-determination in the parts of India where they are in the majority and which constitute their "homelands." These are Punjab, North West Frontier, Kashmir, Sind, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam. In these homelands they propose to set up a sovereign Moslem state, independent internationally and specifically independent of the India of the Hindus, Hindustan.

This is the doctrine of Pakistan, as it is expounded by the Moslem League. One may call it a crime against India or the Moslem Magna Carta, a counsel of despair or the only logical solution; one may demand a cutting of the Gordian knot or a judgment of Solomon. But whatever one's views on Pakistan as a solution for India, it cannot be brushed aside, it has got to be taken into account. The fourth phase will not end until Moslems either get Pakistan or are satisfied that they can have security without it. The sooner public opinion, whether inside or outside India, recognizes this inescapable fact, the better.

The fifth phase, when it comes, will be the end of a long journey. Will the 90,000,000 successors of the little band of Moslem invaders at last settle down in India as Indians, and identify themselves with its future? Or will they turn their faces from India and reënter as a nation the political orbit of Islam, of which they have always remained a part in religion and culture? If Pakistan is to be the answer, the wheel will have turned full circle. The early Moslem invaders undoubtedly thought of themselves as a camp in a foreign land. The word *Urdu* means "the language of the camp." Their modern descendants, the adherents of Pakistan, take a similar view of themselves. Have the Moslems in truth been a people apart all through the varied course of their history in India, the years of slow conquest, the

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peak of empire, the almost Miltonic fall from glory, the long century of despondency, the gradual renaissance? It seems sometimes as if it must be so, as if the two streams are still, after 900 years, flowing side by side. Such a thing has happened elsewhere, notably in Canada. But if it is so, it means that Pakistan is not merely the child of fear of domination. That fear can be removed, as it has been removed for other minorities in other countries. But, immediately, these political and economic fears are important.

Moslems in India are, speaking broadly, the "have-nots," Hindus the "haves." As the traveller, riding through the fields of northern India, draws near to the village, he will see among the trees a low mass of mud-built dwellings. The skyline is apt to be broken by one more imposing erection, of red brick. It is obviously the house of the most prosperous man in the community. "Whose is that house?" he will ask. And nine times out of ten the answer will be "the *bania's.*" The *bania*, the village moneylender and storekeeper, is even in a Moslem village a Hindu. There is the economic aspect of Hindu-Moslem relations in a nutshell. Moslems have been striving for two generations to improve their position. They fear that their progress will be halted, that the present position of inferiority will be frozen, if Hindus add political to economic power. It is not yet a conscious war between the Hindu masses and the Moslem masses; for them the struggle for better living is a common one. To exaggerate the importance of Hindu-Moslem riots is a great mistake. Such open clashes are more incidents of propinquity than symptoms of a condition of mind. But there is bitter and conscious competition for economic opportunity between the upper and middle classes of the two communities, between the professional and business men. The one side is determined to keep and improve upon its lead, the other equally determined to better, or at least to hold, its position. The key to economic security is seen to be the political power which Britain has promised to transfer to Indian hands. Hence the importance of the immediate questions: To which hands? In what shares?

But neither the search for political and economic security nor insistence on their separate nationality has always been enough, in other countries, to compel minorities to choose secession in preference to union or federation. There are two nations in a united Canada and in a united South Africa; there are three in

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Switzerland. Different nations do live together. For material fears there are proved material safeguards. Pakistan is not the only answer. So when we find Indian Moslems declaring that it is, we must look below the material surface of things for some deeper and more compelling cause. We shall not find it simply in religion. Neither Hindus nor Moslems want to convert each other. Hinduism has ever been a tolerant creed and the days of Moslem proselytizing are over. We shall not find it in a simple conflict of cultures, though we are getting nearer to the root of the matter here. It is true that Hinduism is absorbent, but Moslems, set in the midst of Hinduism, have been successful in preserving their own cultural traditions for 900 years. We shall find it in something in the Moslem communal consciousness or perhaps, more correctly, subconsciousness. Fear of political and economic dominance is indeed the formal *casus belli*. But underneath is their idea of themselves both as Moslems in India and also as Moslems in the wider community of Islam.

In India the Moslem tradition is one of rule, and particularly of rule over Hindus. The struggle for power in the eighteenth century was, as we have seen, left undecided. There are Moslems alive who were born when a successor of the Moguls still reigned in Delhi and a Moslem king held court in Lucknow. The tradition is unbroken except for the British incident, and it counts for much, even if only subconsciously, in forming the attitude of the Indian Moslem to the idea of a state in which he occupies only the second place, while the Hindu occupies the first. Historically Pakistan has a basis in the pattern which was emerging in India when British intervention checked natural developments; spiritually it satisfies something deep-rooted in Moslem minds. The Moslem may be a citizen of a particular country; he is also a citizen of the world of Islam. Mr. Mahomed Ali put it well, when, at the Round Table Conference in London, he said, "I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is the Moslem world. . . . We are not nationalists, but supernationalists."

Much derives from this attitude. Looking toward India, the Moslem has a sense of superiority toward the Hindu who belongs to a creed and civilization which are parochial compared with the world community of Islam; he is unwilling to merge himself with the Hindu in this smaller society. Looking outward, on the other hand, he feels himself somewhat inferior to his Moslem brother

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in a Moslem country and longs for the more assured and respected status which citizenship of a free Moslem state would give him. This vague feeling of inferiority shows itself in his quick interest in what is going on in Moslem countries outside India. When the rights of Moslems are threatened the Indian Moslem tends to be more royalist than the king. The delegates of the Turkish press, who visited India during the war, surprised and shocked Indian Moslems by announcing that they were Turks first and Moslems afterward. Pakistan therefore is a symbol of the return of Indian Moslems to full communion with the free Moslem world. They would return, too, as the largest single Moslem state and, though Pakistan would be weak compared with Hindustan or with a Union of India, that inferiority would be satisfyingly compensated by its status in the international society of Moslem states.

It is this complex of scarcely-realized emotions which is the psychological driving force behind Pakistan. It explains that stubborn refusal to compromise on what seem reasonable material terms, which surprises and sometimes antagonizes the foreign observer. No one can help sympathizing with the Hindu vision of a great, united India; most people will believe that such a union would be best both for Indians and for the world. But when we criticize Pakistan, we must concede that it is not only a matter of power and security, of loaves and fishes; there are things of the spirit involved as well. One cannot divorce what is going on in India today from what has happened before. A very old rivalry, which has its roots deep down in the history and traditions of the Moslems in India, finds expression today in Pakistan. It is not only a political platform but a symbol as well.

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THE PATRIOT MOVEMENT IN ITALY

By Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti

IN Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, the Resistance movement against the Nazis was composed of many different elements: workers and industrialists who purposely lowered their production; public officials who did not carry out German orders and gave secret help to active anti-German fighters; people who went into hiding rather than work for the Germans; peasants who refused to turn farm products over to the enemy and who sheltered escaped prisoners of war; and armed guerrillas and saboteurs. The Italian Resistance had one difference from similar movements in other European countries, however, in that it was to a large extent the continuation of an underground anti-Fascist struggle and not a new movement created simply as an answer to the German invasion. For twenty years Italian democrats and Communists had fought Fascism, tenaciously and painfully. The great majority of the population was indifferent, yet there was a considerable minority which consciously and positively refused to accept Mussolini's doctrines. Some ten thousand Italians went into political exile; several times as many were jailed or interned and possibly as many as a quarter of a million people in Italy participated at one time or another in the clandestine activities of democratic organizations and of the Communist Party. Veterans of this underground struggle supplied most of the leadership of the Italian Resistance.

In Italy, the armed branch of the Resistance was called the Partisans, or Patriots. Its activities should be known, not merely because the Patriots gave real assistance to the Allies, but because the special characteristics of the Italian Patriot movement offer clues to political developments in Italy. Most of the administrators in northern Italy today — prefects, mayors and *questori* — are former Patriots. Leadership in some of the important political parties is largely in the hands of veterans of the anti-Fascist movement who were active Patriots. Signor Parri, who succeeded Signor Bonomi as Prime Minister, was one of the leaders of the Patriots in northern Italy. General Cadorna, who was appointed Chief of Staff of the Italian armed forces soon after the liberation of Milan, is the former chief of all Patriot military formations. The Patriots helped the nation regain its self-confidence and self-respect, and in the new Italian state a man's activities as a Patriot overshadow at times his record as a Fascist or anti-Fascist.

The Resistance groups arose amid the general disintegration following the armistice. There were "badogliani" — officials and others who had collaborated with Marshal Badoglio during the "forty-five days" after Mussolini's fall. A larger group included the thousands of anti-Fascists who had just begun to get organized around the Inter-Party Committees (known later as *Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale*, or CLNs). A third group was made up of the officers and men of the Italian armed forces who had attempted to fight the Germans. There were hosts of young people of every class who were afraid of being recruited for the German armed forces or for labor in Italy or Germany. Many people living in the towns left their homes and stayed with rel-

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atives or friends under assumed names. Many more left the towns altogether and went to the hill villages at a safe distance from the main German lines of communication.

The first armed bands were organized from this mass of displaced persons. Democrats, Socialists and Communists had started a workers' armed organization in Milan during the forty-five days; it mustered about 2,000 men when the armistice was announced. A large percentage of these men went to the mountains northeast of the city and formed one of the first groups of Patriots in northern Italy. A certain number of workers from industrial Turin, and the Socialist and Communist organizers who had been trying to set up trade unions, went to the valleys northwest of the city and organized a large Patriot band. When the Army disbanded, officers and men of the Alpine regiments sought their homes in the valleys; if an able officer (as in Val Gesso and in Val Camonica) or non-commissioned officer (as in Val Susa) took the initiative, these troops became the nucleus of Patriot "army," or badogliani bands. Several groups were formed by Allied prisoners of war who found themselves at large soon after September 8. Some of these men tried to reach the Allied lines, but the majority stayed with peasants and waited for the Allied troops. A few, mostly British officers, organized armed bands among the Italian refugees. And Jugoslav and Russian ex-prisoners were sometimes numerous and active enough, particularly in central Italy, to group themselves in bands.

Most of the Patriot bands, however, were organized by members of one of the Italian anti-Fascist parties. These had a double objective: to fight the enemy and to build up an organization which would make it possible for the parties to seize power when the Germans left. The most active organizers were the Democrats of the newly-formed Action Party and the Communists. They were experienced men moved by deep faith; and they were often able to find the money required to maintain armed groups.

In the towns, Patriots were less numerous than in the hills and mountains, but were, at first, better organized and had a more definite political character. Members and sympathizers of the Action Party and of the Communist Party at once organized themselves in military groups. In some of the larger towns, the Socialists also set up their own military organization. Smaller armed groups were formed by Liberals and by Christian Democrats. In some towns, Army and Navy officers tried to build up Patriot organizations linked to the Italian armed forces. Their groups though called "apolitical," had a definite political character, and they were successful only where they found a certain number of active anti-Germans among monarchists and conservatives. Clandestine armed groups were also formed in cities by smaller political parties. The Italian Republican Party (not to be confused with the Fascist Republican Party, organized after the armistice) had a few squads in Milan, Genoa, parts of Romagna and elsewhere. The Anarchists and Anarcho-Syndicalists organized themselves militarily in Leghorn and the Carrarese. The Democratic Labor Party formed bands in Rome. And in Rome also were squads connected with a number of dissident groups: Christian Democrats who called themselves Social Christians, Socialists who called themselves Revolutionary Socialists, monarchical groups, and so on. In parts of Venezia there were squads of Christian Socialists. Here and there a former Fascist organized a Patriot squad.

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While the Patriots were coming into their own, the Resistance was getting organized. Most of the active anti-Fascist leaders in German-occupied territory were in Rome and Milan. In both cities a Committee of National Liberation had been formed, with the five important anti-Fascist tendencies represented on an equal basis: Christian Democrats, Liberals, Democrats (Action Party), Socialists and Communists. In Rome a sixth Party had been added, Labor Democrats, a somewhat Right-wing Socialist group.



Committees of National Liberation were soon organized in every regional capital, in most provincial capitals and in many other towns and villages. Not all had the same composition. Sometimes only three or four of the major anti-Fascist parties were represented; sometimes the committees included smaller organizations which had local political significance, such as Italian Republicans, Social Christians and Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Milan CLN came to exercise authority for all northern Italy; the Rome CLN was supposed to be directly in charge in central Italy and to be the highest authority in the CLN organization, both for German-occupied and Allied-occupied territory. The CLN organization was not synonymous with the Resistance, but as time went on its

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influence increased, and in German-occupied territory it came to be considered the representative of the Italian state.

Patriot formations were a main concern of the CLN. The number of Patriots who could be maintained in any given valley was limited: the peasants were usually willing to share what food they had, but not to the point of starving themselves. The need for funds, arms and food in many cases compelled the leaders of overt bands in the mountains to get in touch with the leaders of the Resistance in the towns and plains, and thus they were brought to accept, at least partly, the authority of the underground centralized organizations. Political bands came more and more to be known by the name which each party gave to its armed formations. The "Garibaldi" were the bands connected with the Communist Party; the "Rosselli" or *Giustizia e Libertà* (GL), were the bands connected with the Action Party; the "Matteotti" were the Socialist Party bands. Christian Democratic Party and Liberal Party bands were called "Popolo" and "Patria;" and there were various other names.

The basic unit in the overt Patriot organization was a detachment which was supposed to include about 50 men, divided into three or four squads. Three detachments made a battalion, and three battalions formed a brigade, with an average strength of about 450 men. Actually the strength of Patriot battalions varied from 250 to 600 men. Three brigades formed a division. In each detachment, battalion, brigade and division the main leaders were the commander and the political commissar. The underground Patriot organization in the cities and towns was similar to the overt one except that formations were usually smaller and the basic unit was not the detachment but the squad, usually called GAP (*Gruppo di Azione Patriottica*) or SAP (*Squadra di Azione Proletaria*).

During the winter of 1943–44, the political bands and the badogliani were sharply distinguished, but the cleavage decreased after April 1944, when Marshal Badoglio formed a new Cabinet which included representatives of the major anti-Fascist parties. In accepting Marshal Badoglio as Prime Minister, the Committee of National Liberation laid the foundations for coöperation among the various elements of the Patriot movement. Unity increased after Signor Bonomi replaced the Marshal as Prime Minister in June 1944.

II

A comparison of the effectiveness of Patriot groups in the south, the center and the north of Italy sheds light on the response of the people of these regions to the political and social problems with which Italy is faced today. No Patriot bands were organized in Sicily or in Sardinia during the Allied invasion, partly because of the speed of the Allied advance, but also because of the lack of political and social consciousness among the people. The same deficiency was to be found in most of southern Italy, with the exception of Naples and Abruzzi. There was a small spontaneous armed insurrection against the Germans in Naples, chiefly on the part of the very young of the lower classes. A few dozen Germans were killed and it is possible that the rioting which went on from September 28 to October 1, 1943, was one of the factors which induced the Nazis to abandon the city. But leadership was significantly lacking in Naples. There were potential leaders there, and they had enough authority to organize and direct the Resistance, but they chose to remain in hiding.

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During the interval between the end of the Allied offensive in southern Italy and the beginning of the drive which liberated the rest of the peninsula in the summer of 1944, the Resistance and the Patriot movements of central Italy took shape and helped considerably to unsettle the Germans and to prevent the consolidation of the Fascist Social Republic. The direct influence of the Rome CLN extended over 15 provinces, with something less than 6,000,000 inhabitants, as far north as a line running approximately from the mouth of the Cecina River on the Tyrrhenian Sea south of Leghorn, to the Marecchia River, near Rimini, on the Adriatic. Political activities were centered in Rome, where the leaders of the main anti-Fascist parties and a number of their supporters lived clandestinely. The areas in central Italy where overt Patriotic groups were organized were rather limited. They included Monte Catria, the Monti Sibillini, the Gran Sasso and, in the early stage, the Maiella, all in the main range of the Apennines. East of the main range, there were smaller areas of concentration, such as Monte San Vicino. Small groups of Patriots could also be found in the sparsely inhabited sections of Lazio, northern Abruzzi and southern Tuscany (Le Cornate and Maremma).

Though there were a considerable number of refugees in the mountainous areas of central Italy Patriots were relatively few. Their numbers decreased during the winter and increased, to a certain extent, only when the Allied troops were approaching. Outside Rome, in this section of Italy, there were probably no more than 4,000 or 5,000 bona fide Patriots. In Rome, there were perhaps 8,000 Patriots, taking into consideration all the groups which had a military organization and which at least tried to engage in anti-German activities. No numerical estimate can be made of the size of the Resistance as a whole, save to say that it was many times larger than its armed branch. Probably only a minority of the members of the overt Patriot groups were motivated by a clear political or national consciousness. Many Patriots simply wished to avoid military or labor conscription. Others were attracted by the idea of adventurous living.

Relations between Patriots and other elements of the Resistance in this section of Italy were sometimes strained. For instance, in the area east of Spoleto the peasants who were sheltering a large number of escaped British and American prisoners of war were not always on good terms with the Patriots among whom the Jugoslav influence was strong. In Rome there was friction between Patriots and the large organization — based mainly on the Italian Army — which had been built up for intelligence purposes. There was rivalry between two central organizations, one set up by the CLN and the other by the Army, each of which tried to control the Patriot bands. More confusion was caused by the establishment in Rome of a political organization opposed to the CLN (the Left Front) and by the activities of Fascists and ex-Fascists who tried to build up their own Resistance and Patriot organizations.

Disunity among the Patriots in this section of central Italy tended to keep the movement small in numbers and comparatively ineffective. It should be borne in mind, however, that in this area the Resistance and Patriots had only a short period in which to organize, and that the region was too poor to support more than a relatively small number of fighters. Other branches of the Resistance proved the willingness of the people to make what contribution they

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could to the Allied cause. The intelligence organization in Rome, already mentioned, did useful work; and a large number of peasants and landowners, at considerable risk, sheltered and fed tens of thousands of Allied prisoners of war for nine months.

From August to November 1944, the Allied Fifth and Eighth Armies moved slowly north until they reached the line on which they stopped until April 1945. The area liberated during those four months included most of northern Tuscany and Romagna. The Patriot groups were more active here than further south, better organized and much more numerous. They operated all along the main range of the Apennines and also in the secondary mountainous regions: Alpe di Catenaia and Casentino, southeast and east of Florence; Pratomagno, Mugello and Monte Pisano a little further north. Some bands, although very small, led an independent existence. Others were grouped, making up as many as 2,000 Patriots.

The political character of the Patriots was more clearly defined here than elsewhere in central Italy. The chief formations among the overt groups were the Garibaldi (Communist Party) and the Rosselli (Action Party). The Garibaldi were the more numerous and better armed, and received more supplies from the Allies. Relations between the two groups were often strained. Among the clandestine Patriots of the towns there were not only Garibaldi and Rosselli GAPs and SAPs but also squads attached to the Christian Democratic Party and to the Liberal Party. The Italian Army did not have its own Resistance and Patriot organization here, as elsewhere in central Italy: only one band of about 400 Patriots northwest of Florence could be considered an "army" group. The authority of the CLN was unchallenged; and in spite of the usual friction among the five parties of the coalition, there was more unity and more Patriot activity. The Patriots suffered and inflicted many more casualties here than further South. Several thousand Patriots coöperated for short periods with the Allied troops, particularly with the Fifth Army.

It was in northern Italy that the Patriots really came into their own. More people in that region were politically conscious and experienced in underground organization; and, possibly, there were more people willing to risk their lives. A few days after the armistice, the first groups of overt Patriots appeared in the mountains of Piedmont and Lombardy, that is to say, towards the frontiers of France and Switzerland. A little later others took the field in the mountains of Emilia and Liguria and in the northeast, in the mountains of Venezia.

There were Patriot bands just a few miles behind the lines held by the Germans during the winter of 1944–1945. In the Alpi Apuane east of Spezia and in the mountainous sections of the provinces of Modena and Reggio were some of the best Patriot formations of northern Italy, mostly Garibaldi. They were generously supplied with arms and ammunition by the Allies and represented a serious threat to the Germans, who undertook several offensives to dislodge them. Patriots, many of them from Genoa, were heavily concentrated in the mountainous sections south of Piacenza and Pavia. Most of the Alpine valleys of Piedmont were the scene of heavy fighting against Germans and Fascists at one time or another. From Val Bormida to Val Locana one met "Autonomi" ("army" bands), Garibaldi and GL formations. Sometimes they coöperated, more often they ignored each other; they seldom transformed their

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friction into open clashes. Garibaldi were numerous in Valsesia, while in the Valdossola, further north, there were large Patriot formations connected with the Christian Democratic Party and smaller ones connected with the Socialist Party and the Action Party. In Lombardy, until the end of summer 1944, Patriots could be found in all the valleys east of Lake Como. Later on Patriot bands survived only in the most eastern valleys — Val Camonica, Val Trompia, Upper Valtellina; mostly Green Flames (an "army" formation which later on accepted allegiance to the Christian Democratic Party) and GL, with smaller groups of Garibaldi, Matteotti and bands connected with the Liberal Party. Among the best known formations in Venezia were the Garibaldi and "Osoppo" (originally an "army" band) in the upper Tagliamento valley.

There were fewer Patriots in the towns of northern Italy than in the mountain areas. Turin had probably the largest percentage of Patriots relative to its population, and they were the best organized. Second came the industrial area of greater Genoa, with Bologna third. The Resistance movement in Milan, Venice and Trieste could rely on a certain number of Patriots, though the number in these cities was not large considering their size. Patriot groups were found in some smaller towns, although usually their activities were limited.

It is difficult to estimate how many Patriots there were in the area of Italy which was liberated in April and May 1945, for the number fluctuated greatly. There were times, for instance, when thousands of Patriots controlled the Valli di Lanzo, northwest of Turin. They disbanded as the result of a German-Fascist offensive and could not come together again. Further south in Piedmont, in the province of Cuneo, there were not less than 4,000 Patriots in October 1944, controlling possibly as much as one-third of the province. At the end of November only a few groups remained, numbering in all a couple of hundred. In the summer of 1944 there were another 4,000 Patriots in the upper provinces of Reggio and Modena. They were dispersed by the Germans and the Fascists, and only small groups were reorganized in later months. Of the sizable bands operating in the Grigna region, east of Lake Como, in the autumn of 1943, and in the Grappa, Pasubio and Asiago areas of western Venezia, practically none remained after savage mopping-up operations by Germans and Fascists.

The same fluctuations characterized the Patriot organizations of the towns. At the beginning of March 1945, the commander of the Patriot forces in Milan was asked how many men were in the various groups. He replied: "Six hundred if things are difficult, six thousand if things are not so difficult — and of course sixty thousand if things are easy."

There were probably not more than 100,000 Patriots at any given moment in northern Italy, except in the summer of 1944, when there were perhaps 150,000 or more; these totals would include both overt bands in the hills and undercover groups in the towns and plains. But since relatively few people were Patriots during the entire period of 20 months, many more than 100,000 to 150,000 took part in the movement. In relationship to the population of northern Italy (from 18,000,000 to 20,000,000 people), there were perhaps three or four times as many Patriots in that region as in central Italy. They gave genuine help to Allied troops and offered a definite threat to the Germans and to their Fascist allies. The Patriot contribution is indicated by the unusually

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high casualty rate, estimated at more than 26,000 dead and about 45,000 wounded and missing. Patriot casualties must be added to the approximately 20,000 other members of the Resistance shot by the Germans and the Fascists from September 1943 to May 1945, and the more than 50,000 casualties suffered by the Italian regular forces in their fight against the Germans.

About two-fifths of the overt Patriots north of the Apennines were in the Communist Garibaldi organization; a little more than one-fourth were in the GL organization of the Action Party; about one-tenth were in the Socialist Party Matteotti groups. This does not mean, however, that out of ten Patriots four were Communists, two or three Democrats of the Action Party, one a Socialist and so on; leaders of the bands were usually party members, but the political views of the rank and file were vague.

III

The degree to which the different Italian political groups participated in the Patriot movement of northern Italy is not an index of the share taken by each party in the work of the Resistance as a whole. The Socialists made their greatest contribution through the clandestine trade unions. The Christian Democrats were extremely active in all forms of assistance work: supplying shelter, food and clothing for people in hiding, providing meeting places for various Resistance groups, and using the influence of secular and religious leaders to obtain better conditions for those who were arrested and to prevent the shooting of hostages and prisoners. The Liberals were especially active in maintaining a communication system which coördinated the work of the Resistance and the Patriots, and in infiltrating and weakening organizations from which Germans and Fascists hoped to receive support.

Though the Resistance was in one sense a continuation of the old anti-Fascist movement, it also had a strong nationalistic basis; and the majority of those who joined it for nationalistic reasons were former Fascists or Fascist sympathizers. This fact is important, because it foreshadows a cleavage among the members of the Resistance who are now politically active in the new Italian state. There is a far greater antipathy toward the ideas and achievements of Fascism among the old underground fighters than among those who turned anti-Fascist during the period of German occupation. And, of course, since liberation there is a political cleavage among the Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, Communists and Christian Democrats of the five anti-Fascist parties which had achieved unity in the Resistance period.

The anti-Fascists of northern Italy gained the leadership of the Resistance and of the Patriot organizations by their organizing ability and their undisputed moral authority. But this is no guarantee that they will exercise a similar influence on the Italian nation, or that they will remain the political leaders of the country. Now, as then, genuine anti-Fascism is only a minority movement among Italians. It can prevail only if the anti-Fascists coöperate. If the anti-Fascist parties fight one another, each will be compelled to seek strength by coming to terms with ex-Fascists. This severe penalty for disunity explains certain of the difficulties which the parties composing the present Government find in carrying out the reforms required by their own ideologies.

Party rivalries in so diversified a movement could not be avoided. Jealousies

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often delayed the needed appointment of commanders; in several cases non-party men were finally chosen to fill responsible posts. Friction between the representatives of the two largest Patriot organizations, the Garibaldi and the GL, was sometimes bitter. Signor Parri, known as Maurizio, was the leader of the GLs; Signor Longo (Italo) was the leader of the Garibaldi. The CLNAI (*Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia* or CLN of northern Italy) appointed General Cadorna of the Italian Army, Commander of the CVL (*Corpo Volontari della Libertà*, the military organization of the CLN) in order to maintain a balance between the two. There was little direct contact between Patriots of the various anti-Fascist parties in the city underground organizations, and the danger of friction was minimized. But it was ever present among the overt Patriot bands, and the fact that it was well controlled, on the whole, is the best evidence of the political maturity of northern Italians and of the moderating influence of the CLN.

More than four-fifths of all Patriots were in the Communist-oriented Garibaldi, the democratic-minded GL and the conservative army bands. Differences were sharp, and were sometimes expressed in open quarrels. There were cases of one band depriving another of its arms; the Patriots of Valdossola once forcibly prevented the Garibaldi of Valsesia from entering their area; the Autonomi decided to occupy Alba in Piedmont and failed to obtain the support of other groups, with resulting friction; once the Osoppo of eastern Venezia were attacked by the Germans and in vain asked for support from other groups. But, on the whole, political differences did not develop into open quarrels. The Patriot movement of northern Italy compares favorably with the Patriot movements of other countries, in coöperation among various groups and in determination and energy.

Relations with the Patriot movements of the neighboring countries were less satisfactory. On the western border, attacks by German and Fascist troops drove considerable numbers of Italian Patriots into French territory after the liberation of France. The French were still bitter about Mussolini's "stab in the back," and the authorities were mostly unfriendly.

On the eastern border, Italian Patriots came into contact with Slovene and Croat Patriots. They found that Tito's followers often acted as violent nationalists. In the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and Fiume overt Italian Patriot organizations were not allowed. Italian Communists joined the Jugoslav Patriot movement, but the Italian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, Christian Democrats or plain nationalists could not participate in the Partisan movement. In the city of Trieste an underground Italian Patriot organization carried on a precarious existence, hounded by Germans, Fascists and Slavs. In the Friuli, Tito's followers sought to control all the territory east of Udine and to infiltrate the upper Tagliamento valley. The result was a sharpening of nationalistic feeling among the Italians of the region.

In the Trentino and Upper Adige areas, bordering on Austria, the Italian Patriot movement remained comparatively weak as a result of the exceptionally strict German occupation. Austrian Patriots did not make an appearance until a few days before the surrender of the German troops, so there was no nationalistic conflict in this region.

The Patriot movement helped ease some old class and religious antagonisms

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in Italy. The Patriots needed money to subsidize the families of those who had been arrested or killed, to buy arms and ammunition from Fascists and Germans who were willing to sell them, and for innumerable other purposes. In Rome, funds were made available to the "army" Patriot organization. In Piedmont, the funds of the Fourth Italian Army (possibly as much as 200,000,000 lire) were turned over to the Patriot movement. In most areas Patriot leaders tried to obtain money from local wealthy people. The contributions were sometimes forced, but voluntary gifts were large: one morning in Turin, for example, three industrialists raised about 120,000,000 lire for the Patriot regional command. The large sums received from the industrialists of Biella were an important factor in the development of the Garibaldi formations in the Biellese and Valsesia. Most landowners in Emilia contributed to Patriot funds, to cite another instance.

The problems of handling great sums of cash were often solved through the coöperation of bank managers who were members of the Resistance. Two of the largest banks in the country and several small ones were used as channels for the clandestine distribution of funds to the Patriots. When direct contact was established between representatives of the Resistance and the Allied Mediterranean Command at the end of 1944, the latter offered to supply enough money to support the members of all Patriot groups connected with the CLN. The sum agreed upon was 160,000,000 lire monthly, a considerable increase over the subsidies given previously by Allied organizations. Payments were made largely through the banks and with the coöperation of some of the best-known bankers of the country.

This explains why few industrialists or bankers who had been closely connected with the Fascist régime were arrested by the Patriots during the interim period after liberation, when CLN was in control of various areas of northern Italy. Their immunity occasioned a good deal of surprise and comment at the time. But the fact is that the majority of bankers and industrialists, whatever their Fascist past, gave valid support to the Resistance. It was impossible for the Patriots to shoot, or even arrest, the very men who had helped them with money, food, arms and shelter, and who had intervened to save their lives when the Germans held them as hostages.

Common participation in the Resistance not only helped smooth class conflicts in northern Italy, temporarily at least, but also deeply changed the attitude of many Italians toward the clergy. Anti-clericalism was a marked feature of pre-Fascist Italy, and it was intensified among anti-Fascists when the clergy supported the Fascist régime during the first years of Mussolini's dictatorship. But shortly after the Concordat was signed, relations between the Catholic hierarchy and the Fascists showed signs of strain, and as years went by the strain became tension. If only in a subdued way, the Catholic hierarchy did uphold that dignity of the individual and respect for the human personality which the Fascist creed sought to destroy. And during the 20 months of German occupation in northern Italy, probably the majority of the clergy collaborated in one way or another with the Resistance. Many priests found their way into overt Patriot formations, which prided themselves in having a chaplain. Vestries, parish houses, religious schools, seminaries, monasteries and convents were used as meeting places by the Resistance.

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Probably every high-ranking member of the Catholic hierarchy intervened to save the lives of Patriots. The most rabid anti-Catholic among Italy's present leaders can hardly forget the help which he or his friends received from the clergy while playing the dangerous game of the Resistance.

Unfortunately, the possibilities of a better understanding and closer friendship between the Patriot forces and the Allies, which existed for a short time immediately after the liberation, were not realized. All during the war, Allied organizations had tried to make contact first with the anti-Fascist underground, later with the Resistance movement and the Patriots. Since shortly after the armistice a good deal of coöperation existed between the British and American military authorities on one hand and the Patriots on the other, about which little is yet known. The coöperation consisted chiefly in efforts to synchronize Patriot and Allied actions; in sending to Patriot formations — usually by plane — arms, ammunition, food, clothing and money. Contact was maintained through missions in which many Allied officers and enlisted men lost their lives. The Allies exerted little or no influence upon the structure and organization of the Patriot movement, partly because of an Allied desire not to "play politics" or to back any particular group. The material aid which they gave the Patriots, however, was helpful. The knowledge that the Allies were willing to send more aid, and the hope of receiving it, also undoubtedly strengthened the morale of the Patriots. They were proud of the contribution they were making to the common cause of freedom. They were praised many times by the Allied commander in Italy; indeed, at Florence and at Turin, for example, the Patriots had fought more like regular troops than guerrillas.

After liberation the Patriots expected a friendly welcome from the Allies and treatment based on equality between brothers in arms. But disillusionment followed fast. Allied officers in the field knew little about the Patriots and apparently received only vague instructions for dealing with them. They often received these ragged, armed men with contempt; the fact that many of the Patriots decorated themselves for the occasion with red ties and scarves shocked Allied personnel, who did not realize that red is used as a symbol of freedom in Italy by a variety of groups many of which could hardly be described as radical. There were exceptions to this general attitude, and as time went on Allied representatives showed more tact; but on the whole relations were not friendly.

After a period of some months most genuine Patriot groups ceased to exist. The average Patriot was hurt because he did not get the recognition to which he felt he was entitled. He found himself in a crowd of newcomers whom no one had ever seen or heard of during the period of German occupation and who were now bragging about non-existent exploits. Some parties tried to maintain cohesion among those of their followers who had been Patriots; as a result they were accused of threatening the security of the newly-established democratic régime. A movement which had been motivated by high ideals, and which had at times been heroic, tended to fade away in resentment and discontent. But it had won for Italy a sound claim to generous understanding by her erstwhile enemies, the Allies.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

ONE WORLD IN THE MAKING. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York: Current Books, 1945, 275 p. $3.00.

A Harvard philosophy professor interprets current world affairs on the high plane of ethics and, despite all the discouraging signs, holds out a prospect not only of survival but of progress.

THE BALANCE OF TOMORROW. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ. New York: Put nam, 1945, 302 p. $3.50.

An honest effort to evaluate the changing distribution of power in the world, especially industrial power, in terms of political rivalries. The inevitable result is to fix attention on the power potential of Russia and of the Far East. Where readers may dissent from the author's analysis is in his use of a rather narrow range of power components, psychological and related factors seemingly being excluded.

FATE AND FREEDOM. By JEROME FRANK. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, 375 p. $3.00.

Judge Frank does battle against those who hold that our future is inevitably decided by an inexorable fate and that there is no room for chance or individual choice.

FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER. EDITED BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, 774 p. $4.25.

These "Readings on World Politics and American Security" are a by-product of a course on world affairs given in the Navy college training program, particularly at Princeton. The editors have grouped their readings under five large headings, both topical and regional, and they have supplied chapter introductions and other original matter of their own in order to provide greater continuity. The material was chosen from many sources — books, pamphlets, atlases and magazines.

PEACE AND SECURITY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Upsala: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1945, 191 p. Kr. 3.75.

This work is the result of a study group organized by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. The five papers of which it consists are, however, the work of as many individual scholars, among them Gunnar Myrdal. The subjects treated are of a general, rather than a national, nature.

TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC NEW ORDER. By DAVID BRYN-JONES. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1945, 288 p. $3.50.

The guiding idea behind this thoughtful book is that if democracy is to become a living reality it will require more than good intentions.

LAS TRES DIMENSIONES DE LA DEMOCRACIA. By EMILIO FRUGONI. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1944, 169 p. Pesos 5.

A collection of 16 articles and addresses dealing with a wide range of political and historical problems of international importance.

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TREASURY FOR THE FREE WORLD. Edited by Ben Raeburn. New York: Arco, 1946, 417 p. $3.50.

Some 70 pieces — prose and poetry — from the files of the American magazine *Free World* selected to present a broad panorama of current problems and ideas. Among the contributors are a number of noted writers, thinkers and statesmen.

LOST CONTINENT? By Noel F. Busch. New York: Harper, 1945, 204 p. $2.50.

An editor of *Life* roams around in Jugoslavia, Italy, Germany, France and England — and finds the prospect far from pleasing, especially in the first two countries.

UNITED NATIONS PRIMER. By Sigrid Arne. New York: Farrar, 1945, 156 p. $1.25.

The essential facts about 15 international conferences — from the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 to San Francisco in 1945 — explained clearly and accurately in terms comprehensible to the layman.

VERS UNE NOUVELLE SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Maurice Bourquin. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1945, 280 p. Swiss Fr. 7.50.

The author has represented his country — Belgium — at the League of Nations. Out of his experience and his mature reflection, he has a number of useful suggestions to make concerning future world organization. His opening chapter concerns the relations between the Great and Small Powers.

LA CARTA DEL ATLÁNTICO Y LA CARTA DE FILADELFIA. By Tomas Elorrieta y Artaza. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1945, 239 p. Ptas. 15.

Lectures delivered by the author at the Escuela Social of Madrid in January 1945 and a number of supporting or illustrative documents. Under the heading "Atlantic Charter" he has included an analysis of Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods.

UNITED NATIONS GOVERNMENT. By Amos J. Peaslee. New York: Putnam, 1945, 183 p. $2.00.

Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, according to Mr. Peaslee, are only way stations on the road to a really effective international organization. He provides a blueprint of what the latter should be.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS. By John D. Tomlinson. Ann Arbor: Edwards, 1945, 314 p. $2.50.

A scholarly monograph on the history, legal problems and current status of a complicated question in international government.

ARMAMENT AND HISTORY. By Major General J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Scribner, 1945, 207 p. $2.50.

General Fuller is the author of numerous works on military and related subjects. He is quite forthright in his prejudices and opinions, which in social and political matters tend far to the Right. In this review of the importance of weapons from the Stone Age to the present, he is on safe ground and has turned in a useful piece of synthesis.

THE ATOMIC AGE OPENS. New York: Pocket Books, 1945, 252 p. 25 cents.

A popular story of the development of atomic energy and its utilization for mass destruction.

THE COMING AGE OF ROCKET POWER. By G. Edward Pendray. New York: Harper, 1945, 244 p. $3.50.

A non-technical review of current rocket progress and some idea of the vistas it opens.

WAR CRIMES. By Manfred Lachs. London: Stevens, 1945, 108 p. 7/6.

This "attempt to define the issues" by a Polish lawyer has the merits of brevity, impartiality and precision. Among other things, Dr. Lachs distinguishes carefully between war crimes and political offenses.

GERMANY'S WAR CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT. By M. H. Myerson. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 272 p. $2.75.

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In this most timely book a Canadian lawyer, after briefly retelling the story of how international law has developed in modern times, demonstrates that this law covers the Nazi atrocities and that those who committed them may therefore be tried. The method for doing so is the subject for his concluding chapters.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1945. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 1479 p. $7.50.

The latest volume in a tried-and-true series. The statistics are as up-to-date as wartime conditions will allow.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1946. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1946, 208 p. $3.00.

This indispensable source of reliable information about governments, programs and leaders of political parties, and the political affiliations of newspapers of all countries, continues its usual high standard in the 1946 edition. The year 1945, which marked the end of the Great War, brought with it more profound and widespread changes in the form, structure and personnel of governments than any year in history. This edition of the "Political Handbook" records these changes. A section on the United Nations Organization has been added and the sections on France, Germany, Japan and many other countries have been entirely rewritten to provide urgently needed material, much of it here published for the first time.

General: Economic and Social

FREEDOM UNDER PLANNING. By Barbara Wootton. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945, 180 p. $2.00.

This temperate book is a welcome relief to much of the doctrinaire literature of recent years. Mrs. Wootton defines her terms sensibly and shows that such things as freedom and planning have many facets and that not all of their values are of the same magnitude. She believes that economic planning by the state, properly conceived and executed, will protect the essential freedoms in our modern industrial society.

THE ROAD TO HIGH EMPLOYMENT. By Douglas Berry Copland. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, 137 p. $1.75.

These essays on the function of "administrative controls in a free economy" were delivered at Harvard as the Godkin Lectures for 1944–45.

POUR UNE ÉCONOMIE RÉALISTE: PRODUCTION LIBRE ET SOLIDARITÉ. By Jean Garric. Paris: Médicis, 1945, 239 p. Fr. 120.

The author is not a trained economist but after doing a lot of solid thinking about such problems as our recurring crises and the theory of value has put his ideas into this book, intended primarily for engineers and other technicians. In conclusion, he sets forth a number of suggestions for reform.

PROBLEMAS ECONÓMICO-SOCIALES DE LA POSTGUERRA. By Tomás Elorrieta Artaza. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1944, 175 p. Ptas. 12.

Lectures on various economic and financial questions, delivered by a professor in the University of Madrid at the Escuela Social of that city in March 1944.

INTERNATIONAL CARTELS. By Erwin Hexner. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945, 555 p. $6.00.

A solid, critical treatise on the political and economic problems raised by cartels, by the author of "The International Steel Cartel." The extensive appendices contain a number of important documents.

A CARTEL POLICY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. By Corwin D. Edwards and Others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 124 p. $1.25.

Five lectures on various phases of the problem, delivered at Columbia in 1945.

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FARMERS OF THE WORLD. Edited by Edmund deS. Brunner and Others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 208 p. $2.50.

Nearly a score of experts contribute chapters to this symposium on the methods employed by various governments to assist rural populations through extension work.

WORLD RUBBER AND ITS REGULATION. By K. E. Knorr. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1945, 265 p. $3.00.

An expert monograph on the economics of the rubber-producing industry primarily in its international aspects. Attention is given to the influence of the synthetic-rubber industry and to problems of American policy.

THE OUTLOOK FOR POSTWAR EUROPE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945, 160 p. $2.00.

These seven lectures, delivered at Los Angeles during the spring of 1944, deal with food and production problems and with the future of European culture.

MAINSPRINGS OF CIVILIZATION. By Ellsworth Huntington. New York: Wiley, 1945, 660 p. $4.75.

Professor Huntington has for many years studied and written about the effects of environmental factors on human conduct. The present work represents the summation of much of his lifetime of research and deals with heredity as well as with environment. Even so, those who cultivate the so-called social sciences will find many things to question among his conclusions.

WORLD ORDER: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New York: Harper, 1945, 247 p. $2.00.

Eighteen lectures delivered by men of diverse faiths under the auspices of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

PSYCHOLOGY AND WORLD ORDER. By Ranyard West. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1945, 125 p. 1/.

A practising physician and psychologist presents his diagnosis of our international ills and his prescription for bringing about a democratic and peaceful world.

A CHRISTIAN GLOBAL STRATEGY. By Walter W. Van Kirk. Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1945, 197 p. $2.00.

Dr. Van Kirk believes that as never before Christianity faces a challenge to rescue what is left of western civilization. He presents much information on what the Churches are already doing, here and abroad, and outlines a program for future action.

AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE: ANTISEMITISM. By James Parkes. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1945, 150 p. 9d.

A concise analysis of the politics of contemporary anti-Semitism and of the social problems it creates. In the last chapter the author briefly sums up the status of Jewish communities throughout the world.

The Second World War

THE WAR: FIFTH YEAR. By Edgar McInnis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 401 p. $2.50.

This is the fifth volume in Professor McInnis' history of the war. In view of the difficulties strewing the path of the historian of contemporary events, he has done a commendable job.

THE STORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Edited by Henry Steele Commager. Boston: Little, Brown, 1945, 578 p. $3.00.

The editor has selected and fitted together a large number of pieces — from the writings of journalists, statesmen, historians and others — to form a somewhat episodic narrative of the military phases of the war.

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HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II. By Francis Trevelyan Miller. Philadelphia: Winston, 1945, 966 p. $5.00.

This massive, illustrated chronicle is packed with day-to-day information, but lacks perspective and in a number of places is not factually accurate.

GENERAL MARSHALL'S REPORT: THE WINNING OF THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC. By General George C. Marshall. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, 123 p. $2.50.

The Chief of Staff's Biennial Report for the period July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1945 (in reality it goes up to the end of the military phase of the war in August), is an historical document of first-rate importance and is so written that the layman as well as the expert may read it with profit and intellectual pleasure.

HISTORY IN THE WRITING. Edited by Gordon Carroll. New York: Duell, 1945, 401 p. $3.00.

Some fourscore selections from the vast accumulation of material, published and unpublished, sent in by the correspondents of the Luce magazines from all over the world between 1941 and 1944.

THE MIGHTIEST ARMY. By Colonel Karl Detzer. Pleasantville (N. Y.): Reader's Digest Association, 1945, 168 p. 35 cents.

Nearly two hundred photographs illustrate this review of the war, especially in Europe and in regard to the problems of supply.

THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN! By Clark Kinnaird. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1945, 160 p. $2.00.

This compilation of photographs documenting German and Japanese atrocities should be avoided by people with weak stomachs but not by those who may wonder what kind of world they have been living in.

TOBRUK, 1941. By Chester Wilmot. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1945, 348 p. 15/.

An illustrated account of the capture, siege and relief of Tobruk in 1941 — and of the general strategic importance of this gallant stand for the course of the war in the Mediterranean. The author participated in both the siege and in its relief.

THEY LEFT THE BACK DOOR OPEN. By Lionel S. B. Shapiro. London: Jarrolds, 1945, 107 p. 12/6.

The author, a Canadian war correspondent, accompanied the Eighth Army into Sicily and southern Italy. This is his rather personal account of what he saw and heard.

THIS IS WHERE I CAME IN. By Robert J. Casey. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945, 307 p. $3.00.

More of Mr. Casey's wit and observations on the war, this time in western Europe.

NIGHT WORK: THE STORY OF TASK FORCE 39. By Fletcher Pratt. New York: Holt, 1946, 267 p. $3.00.

The enthralling story of the achievements of Task Force 39 of the United States Navy in the Solomon Islands in 1943, narrated by a noted naval historian.

U.S.S. SEAWOLF. By Gerold Frank and James D. Horan. New York: Putnam, 1945, 197 p. $2.75.

An account — written in the first person — of the remarkable exploits of an American submarine in Jap-infested waters early in the war in the Pacific.

SILVERSIDES. By Robert Trumbull. New York: Holt, 1945, 217 p. $2.50.

The exciting story of the adventures of another American submarine operating in Far Eastern waters.

IWO JIMA: SPRINGBOARD TO FINAL VICTORY. Text by Captain Raymond Henri. New York: U. S. Camera, 1945, 95 p. $1.75.

Pictures and graphic eyewitness text on the battle for Iwo Jima.

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GUERRILLA WIFE. By Louise Reid Spencer. New York: Crowell, 1945, 209 p. $2.75.

The exciting story of how some American men and women lived a very precarious existence on Japanese-occupied islands in the Philippines.

The United States

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD. By Nathaniel Peffer. New York: Viking, 1945, 236 p. $2.75.

Professor Peffer of Columbia, author of several forthright books on international relations and a recognized authority on Far Eastern affairs, here examines the alternatives, theoretical and practical, open to American foreign policy today. These he narrows down to two: the creation of a war machine supposedly adequate to permit us the dubious luxury of getting our own way in the world by sheer force; or the establishment of an international organization with sufficient power to enforce peace on all states, including even the largest. He rejects the first alternative, and all its connotations of imperialism abroad and autocracy at home, as being unthinkable for a democratic people to choose willingly. He therefore embraces the second alternative as the world's only hope, but warns against allowing any one Power the right to exercise the veto power proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, and accepted at San Francisco after his book went to press. These points Mr. Peffer makes with his customary bluntness.

UNWRITTEN TREATY. By James Warburg. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 186 p. $2.00.

Mr. Warburg, Deputy Director of the Office of War Information, spent considerable time overseas supervising our psychological warfare. He became very much impressed with this weapon as a cause of modern war. He is convinced that it must be outlawed, if we are to have a chance at real peace, and that in its place there must be positive measures to insure the free flow of information throughout the world. To this end he proposes that the United States Government set up a Department of Information with Cabinet rank to tell our story to the world. He opposes letting the State Department do this job, for reasons he does not hesitate to specify. Whether or not one agrees with Mr. Warburg's diagnosis and cure, one cannot but find his ideas stimulating.

THE KILLING OF THE PEACE. By Alan Cranston. New York: Viking, 1945, 304 p. $2.50.

This is the chronological story of how Henry Cabot Lodge and his fellow conspirators carried on the fight against the League of Nations both in and out of the Senate. Mr. Cranston can hardly be called dispassionate; yet the record he has here pieced together provides a powerful answer to recent attempts to whitewash Lodge by detracting from the reputation of Woodrow Wilson.

THE ASIAN LEGACY AND AMERICAN LIFE. Edited by Arthur E. Christy. New York: Day, 1945, 276 p. $3.50.

A symposium by a panel of experts who describe what we owe to the Orient in both ideas and techniques.

OS SOBRINHOS DE TIO SAM. By Arlindo Pasqualini. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Globo, 1944, 290 p.

These impressions of a trip through the United States and Canada in wartime are by the president of the Press Association of Rio Grande do Sul and the director of the *Fôlha da Tarde* of Porto Alegre.

SIXTY MILLION JOBS. By Henry A. Wallace. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, 83 p. $2.00.

The Secretary of Commerce gives his prescription for achieving a $200,000,000,000 national income by 1950 without destroying free enterprise.

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TOMORROW'S TRADE. By Stuart Chase. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945, 156 p. $1.00.

This is Number 5 in the series "When the War Ends" and deals, in Mr. Chase's usually lucid way, with the recent history and the future of American foreign trade.

FINANCING AMERICAN PROSPERITY. Edited by Paul T. Homan and Fritz Machlup. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945, 508 p. $3.00.

A symposium of economists — two editors and six contributors — examine a wide gamut of financial and monetary problems.

ONE NATION. By Wallace Stegner and the Editors of *Look*. Boston: Houghton, 1945, 340 p. $3.75.

A profusely illustrated description of the current status of eight important racial and religious minorities in the United States. The net effect is to make one wonder just how much we really do form "one nation."

TIME BOMB. By E. A. Piller. New York: Arco, 1945, 194 p. $2.00.

Writing under a pseudonym, the author has provided a considerable amount of chapter and verse on the persons and groups in America who are trying to perpetuate the racist and other doctrines of Nazism.

SOLDIER OF DEMOCRACY. By Kenneth S. Davis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 566 p. $3.50.

The first good biography of General Eisenhower, by an admirer who has dug up a lot of interesting things about his early life.

REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN SPEECHES: 1944–1945. Selected by A. Craig Baird. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1945, 328 p. $1.25.

Addresses on political, social, economic and cultural affairs.

SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE C. MARSHALL. Edited by Major H. A. DeWeerd. Washington: *Infantry Journal*, 1945, 263 p. $2.75.

These papers of our wartime Chief of Staff cover the period from October 1938 to June 1945 and constitute an indispensable source for the history of American military policy during seven fateful years.

CALABASHES AND KINGS. By Stanley D. Porteus. Palo Alto (Cal.): Pacific Books, 1945, 245 p. $3.50.

A popular, illustrated excursion through the history, geography, economy and politics of the Hawaiian Islands.

Western Europe

LES ACCORDS PÉTAIN-CHURCHILL: HISTOIRE D'UNE MISSION SECRÈTE. By Louis Rougier. Montreal: Beauchemin, 1945, 435 p. $2.50.

This book was written in a polemical spirit and it is bound to give rise to counter-polemics. The author, a professor at the University at Besançon, served as emissary between the Vichy régime and the British Government in the negotiations which led up to the gentleman's agreement between Pétain and Churchill providing *inter alia* that the former would not make a separate peace with Germany as long as Britain continued at war with the Nazis. He supplies abundant documentation concerning this and other episodes in his career as messenger between Vichy and the Allies. Whether his motives were as pure and his political awareness as keen as he believes is a question best left for history to decide.

ESQUISSE DE L'ÉCONOMIE FRANÇAISE SOUS L'OCCUPATION ALLEMANDE. By Louis Baudin. Paris: Médicis, 1945, 220 p. Fr. 120.

A very interesting study, containing more statistical matter than one might have

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thought would be available, though of course far less than will be required for a definitive history of the subject. The author is a professor in the Law Faculty at Paris.

LA FÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE. By Jean De La Roche and Jean Gottmann. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1945, 635 p. $5.00.

An illustrated and well-informed survey of the human and economic geography of the French colonial empire, and of its political organization and problems.

LA IVème RÉPUBLIQUE. By Emile Hugot. London: Commodore Press, 1944, 244 p. 12/6.

This is a weird mélange of dubious economics, reactionary politics, racial mysticism and general all-around dilettantism.

DOUBLE PRISON. By Alfred Fabre-Luce. Montreal: Variétés, 1945, 245 p. $1.75.

A caustic French political writer, who acquired a reputation as a publicist on international affairs after World War I, recounts his experiences as a prisoner, first of the Nazis during the Occupation, later of the Gaullists after the Liberation.

LA HOLLANDE. By S. de Gorter. London: Hachette, 1944, 80 p. 2/6.

Praise for Holland's fight to regain freedom, to survive against the sea, and to attain economic security.

THE FREE STATE. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Knopf, 1945, 130 p. $2.00.

A highly literate professor of political science at Cambridge addresses this "tract" to "intelligent Germans." In it he discusses the problem of individual freedom and how to protect it, and the capacity of the free state to wage and survive modern wars.

THE CURTAIN FALLS. By Count Folke Bernadotte. New York: Knopf, 1945, 155 p. $2.00.

Count Bernadotte, who was in Germany during the spring of 1945 on behalf of the Swedish Red Cross, involuntarily became involved in Himmler's last-minute attempt to negotiate a surrender to Britain and the United States but not Russia. His brief book relates this story and casts a lurid light on the last days of the Nazi régime.

LA TRAGÉDIE RHÉNANE. By J. A. Dorten. Paris: Laffont, 1945, 269 p. Fr. 125.

In this book, written ten years ago, the former head of the "Rhenish Movement" gives his version, and explanation, of events in the Rhineland from 1918 to 1922.

FEDERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GERMANY. By Arnold Brecht. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 202 p. $2.50.

An authoritative history of the conflict between centrifugal and centripetal forces at work in Republican and Nazi Germany. The author makes a number of interesting revelations and gives for the first time the texts of several important documents from the period of the Weimar Republic.

THE REGIONS OF GERMANY. By Robert E. Dickinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 175 p. $3.50.

The author seeks to show which regions have enough geographical and historical unity to justify making them into provinces of a new Reich. Though he pretends to eschew political problems, he is inevitably drawn into making political judgments, some of which are of dubious validity.

ROSENBERG'S NAZI MYTH. By Albert R. Chandler. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1945, 146 p. $1.75.

A keen, scholarly analysis and critique of Alfred Rosenberg's "Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts" and its place in the creation of the intellectual climate of Nazi Germany, by a professor of philosophy at Ohio State University.

ITALIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE MAKING. By A. William Salomone. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945, 148 p. $2.50.

A carefully documented reconstruction of the course of Italian politics during the

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"Giolittian Era" from 1900 to 1914. Professor Gaetano Salvemini has contributed an illuminating introductory essay.

INSIDE ROME WITH THE GERMANS. By Jane Scrivener. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 204 p. $2.50.

The author, who writes under a pseudonym, is described by Professor C. J. H. Hayes in his preface as a "Catholic religious." She was connected with the Vatican and in this diary records her observations made from that vantage point during the nine months (September 1943 to June 1944) that the city was occupied by the Germans. She has many interesting incidents and impressions to report, though her political horizon is decidedly limited by a distrust of everything even mildly liberal.

WARTIME MISSION IN SPAIN 1942–1945. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 313 p. $3.00.

Carlton Hayes, professor of modern history at Columbia University, served as American Ambassador in Madrid from 1942 to 1945. His primary assignment was to keep Franco from making any more trouble for us than could be helped. Professor Hayes thinks that he accomplished this mission with real success, despite Axis opposition and the sniping of many of his countrymen, who felt that Hayes was not sufficiently critical of Franco and his régime. The record as here set forth will be taken by them to justify their opinion.

HISTORIA DEL NACIONALISMO CATALÁN (1793–1936). By Maximiano García Venero. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944, 607 p. Ptas. 40.

The author of this "history" states that, though he loves Catalonia with a filial passion, he regards Catalan separatism as a crime of "lesa Patria."

Eastern Europe

EUROPE IN REVOLUTION. By John Scott. Boston: Houghton, 1945, 274 p. $3.00.

The author will be remembered for his "Beyond the Urals" (a book based on his personal experiences as a Soviet worker) and his "Duel for Europe." The present volume ranges widely over the face of Europe but inevitably focuses on the enigma of Russia's policy and intentions. Mr. Scott is not quite sure what these are, but he feels that within a generation the Soviet Union will become so strong as to be virtually irresistible and that it behooves the Anglo-American Powers to learn how to live with Russia in peace. He is, however, quite candid in considering the other alternative — war with Russia. Some of the most interesting chapters are those which concern central and northern Europe.

RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD. By Max M. Laserson. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 275 p. $2.50.

A Russian political scientist, who served briefly as a high official in the Kerensky régime, reviews the development of Soviet constitutional and legal institutions and thought. He notes an unmistakable trend to nationalism in contemporary Russia which he believes will continue, thereby minimizing the possibility of a return to a world-wide revolutionary policy. Dr. Laserson is thus sanguine about the future of Soviet coöperation with the west.

I SAW THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. By Ella Winter. Boston: Little, Brown, 1945, 309 p. $3.00.

An intimate, friendly, yet not uncritical panorama of life in Russia after the tide had turned but before victory had been won, by the widow of Lincoln Steffens.

THE RUSSIAN STORY. By Nicholas Mikhailov. New York: Sheridan, 1945, 191 p. $2.75.

A Soviet geographer skips back and forth through Russian history without much

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regard for chronological sequence but with immense pride for the achievements of his people through the centuries.

A PICTURE HISTORY OF RUSSIA. Edited by John Stuart Martin. New York: Crown Publishers, 1945, 376 p. $3.75.

More than 1,200 photographs, maps and other pieces of pictorial material are strung together with a brief text. The editor has been more successful in selecting his illustrations than in making remarks about them.

AN ATLAS OF THE U.S.S.R. Volume I. By J. F. Horrabin and James S. Gregory. New York: Penguin, 1945, 60 p. 25 cents.

Some 50 sketch maps in black and red, with brief explanatory texts, that will be useful for the "average reader" though hardly for the serious student. The booklet measures 5 by 7½ inches.

DÉCOUVERTE DE LA RUSSIE. By Henri Massis. Montreal: Variétés, 1944, 219 p. $1.25.

The author describes some of the industrial achievements of the U.S.S.R. and finds in Soviet policies plenty of things for "Westerners" to worry about.

ONE WHO SURVIVED. By Alexander Barmine. New York: Putnam, 1945, 337 p. $3.75.

This is a translation and revision of the author's memoirs which were originally published in France in 1939. Up until 1937 Barmine had served in various branches of the Soviet bureaucracy, but during that year he "escaped" to Paris from Athens, where he had been Russian *chargé d'affaires*, because he did not want to be "purged." Where his story concerns his personal experiences it has some interest; where it deals with affairs second-hand it is not always reliable.

TALK ABOUT RUSSIA WITH MASHA SCOTT. By Pearl S. Buck. New York: Day, 1945, 128 p. $1.75.

Masha Scott is the wife of John Scott, one of whose books is mentioned above. She was born in Russia and lived there until recently. In these conversations with Pearl Buck we are given an insight into the minds and mode of life of the generation that has grown up under Soviet rule.

THE WAR AND UKRAINIAN DEMOCRACY. By N. Y. Hryhorijiv. Toronto: Committee of Canadian Citizens from the Ukraine, 1945, 206 p.

Material illustrating the struggle of the Ukraine for democratic self-government against the Tsars and the Soviets.

THE COSSACKS: THE STORY OF A WARRIOR PEOPLE. By Maurice Hindus. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 321 p. $3.00.

An appreciation of the rôle of the Cossacks in Russian history, in the recent war, and in the bright future which the author sees for the Soviet Union.

NATIONALITIES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES. By Oscar I. Janowsky. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 232 p. $2.75.

A discussion of minority problems in Eastern Europe. Dr. Janowsky opposes such drastic attempts at solving these problems as plebiscites and transfers of populations. Instead, he wants to see created some form of international supervision for the minorities — racial, religious or national.

I SAW THE NEW POLAND. By Anna Louise Strong. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946, 280 p. $2.50.

Miss Strong has lived in Russia for a number of years and has pretty well identified herself with the Soviet outlook. Between the end of 1944 and the middle of 1945, she made three trips into liberated Poland. Without accepting all of her judgments on Poland's politics, or sharing her enthusiasm for the Lublin régime, one can nevertheless learn from her much about personalities and conditions in that country.

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THE GLORY THAT *IS* GREECE. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1945, 138 p. 8/6.

The unhappy story of the invasion and occupation of Greece by Fascist and Nazi forces, related by a pronounced phil-Hellene.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

WHY NOT TRUST THE TORIES? By "Celticus." London: Gollancz, 1945, 89 p. 2/6.

This hard-hitting arraignment of the failure of the Conservative Party to effect much-needed social reforms was written in 1944. Its author is Aneurin Bevan, a Labor M. P. and at present Minister of Health in the Attlee government.

AMERICA'S STAKE IN BRITAIN'S FUTURE. By George Soule. New York: Viking, 1945, 232 p. $2.75.

This is a most timely and valuable analysis of the realities — political as well as economic — governing Anglo-American relations in the postwar era. What Mr. Soule has to say about Britain's fears of American economic follies may come as a surprise but should serve as a warning that we are the architects, not only of our own economic future, but of that of the world in general. The moral of this book is that either we work with England, or we all go down together.

THRICE AGAINST ENGLAND. By Kurt Stechert. London: Cape, 1945, 307 p. 12/6.

The story of how control of the sea saved Britain in her wars with Napoleon, the Central Powers (1914–1918) and the Axis.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN WAR. By Lord Hankey. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 88 p. $1.50.

The substance of this little volume comes from the Lees Knowles Lectures delivered by the author at Cambridge University in 1945. The subject — how Britain planned and operated the governmental machinery necessary to win both World Wars — is one on which Lord Hankey is an authority from long and intimate experience.

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL. By Gust de Muynck. Brussels: Lumière, 1944, 253 p.

A friendly, but hardly original, review of Churchill's career to the end of 1942, by a Belgian journalist. A second volume is to bring the story down to date.

LAWRENCE, EL ÁRABE. By Horacio Estol. Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1944, 201 p. Pesos 1.

A popular biography of the exploits of Colonel Lawrence in World War I.

IT'S YOUR EMPIRE. By Alexander Campbell. London: Gollancz, 1945, 223 p. 7/6.

Critical comments on economic and social conditions in the West Indies, Africa, Palestine, Ceylon, India, Malaya, Hong Kong and Britain's Pacific possessions.

NEW ZEALAND AND THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER. Edited by J. C. Beaglehole. Wellington (N. Z.): Victoria University College, 1944, 195 p. 10/6.

Five lectures by as many minds, with relevant documents in appendix.

INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 109 p. $1.75.

An interesting essay on the significance of the control of the Indian Ocean in the historical evolution of India. Mr. Panikkar dwells on the importance to his country of an oceanic policy when it shall have become a Great Power.

FEDERATING INDIA. By D. R. Gadgil. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1945, 107 p. 12/.

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An attempt to weigh critically the factors involved in any plan to federalize the government of India. The author has included useful statistical tables and a map.

WITH NO REGRETS. By Krishna Nehru. New York: Day, 1945, 160 p. $2.00.

A charming picture of life in the Nehru family, by a sister of Jawaharlal.

The Near East

THE ARAB ISLAND. By Freya Stark. New York: Knopf, 1945, 235 p. $3.50.

Miss Stark has established herself as one of the foremost living authorities on the Arab peoples. It was thus natural that the British Government should employ her during the war to counteract Axis propaganda in the countries of the "Arab Island." This engaging volume recounts many of her experiences and contains a number of well-considered interpretations and judgments, including her objections to Zionism.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By Alfred Bonné. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 164 p. $4.00.

The Jerusalem edition of this important statistical analysis of the economic and social problems of Turkey, Egypt and the Arab countries (except Saudi Arabia) was noted in the October 1944 issue of Foreign Affairs. It is a most useful addition to the literature of the contemporary Near East.

THE JEWISH DILEMMA. By Elmer Berger. New York: Devin-Adair, 1945, 257 p. $3.00.

A sincere statement of the case against Zionism. The author, a rabbi, objects to the exaggerated nationalism of the Zionists, to their acceptance of the necessity of segregation, and to their confusion of humanitarian with political objectives.

NEW SOCIAL FORMS AND COOPERATIVE PALESTINE. Edited by Samuel Duker. New York: League for Labor Palestine, 1945, 96 p. $1.25.

Nine papers presented at a conference held at the New School for Social Research in New York on October 21 and 22, 1944.

THE JEWS AND PALESTINE: A STUDY IN LABOUR ZIONISM. By S. Levenberg. London: Poale Zion, 1945, 402 p. 7/6.

An historical account of the contribution made by the Socialist movement to Zionist achievements in Palestine.

WASSER ODER OEL. By Hans Boesch. Bern: Kümmerly, 1944, 208 p. Swiss Fr. 11.60.

The author is an oil engineer who in the course of his professional work travelled much in northern 'Iraq. This illustrated account of what he saw and learned of this region and its people constitutes a practical geography of this ancient homeland of the Assyrians and Babylonians.

IRAN. By William S. Haas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946, 273 p. $3.50.

This very superior book is one of the best to appear on the Middle East in several years. The author, a noted German philosopher and educator, served for five years prior to 1940 as adviser to the Persian Ministry of Education. With his wide and intimate knowledge of the Islamic world, Dr. Haas has been able to place the evolution of modern Iran in its proper perspective. His authoritative survey covers cultural, social and economic developments as well as recent political history.

The Far East

MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA. By John B. Powell. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 436 p. $3.50.

During the two decades ending at Pearl Harbor, Mr. Powell was owner and editor of the *China Weekly Review*. His opposition to Japanese expansion into China was consistent and bitter, and carried on at great personal risk. His chapters on this phase of

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recent Chinese history are written at first-hand and are important. It is in his discussion of internal Chinese affairs that he sometimes seems a less reliable guide, being thoroughly committed to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.

THE TEACHINGS OF SUN YAT-SEN. Compiled by N. Gangulee. London: Sylvan Press, 1945, 132 p. 10/6.

Passages from the writings of the Chinese revolutionary leader, chosen to illustrate his political and social doctrines. The editor contributes a 28 page biographical sketch of Dr. Sun.

FLIGHT FROM CHINA. By Edna Lee Booker and John S. Potter. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 236 p. $2.50.

The story of the Japanese invasion and occupation related quite personally by an American who was in Shanghai between 1940 and the end of 1943.

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION. By Pan Wei-tung. Washington: Institute of Chinese Culture, 1945, 327 p. $4.00.

A scholarly monograph on the background of the present constitution.

EARTHBOUND CHINA. By Hsaio-Tung Fei and Chih-I Chang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, 319 p. $3.75.

On the basis of their investigations in typical villages in Yunnan, two Yenching sociologists suggest the wisdom of developing decentralized manufacturing industries in China as the best way to raise agricultural living standards.

JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY. By T. A. Bisson. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 267 p. $3.50.

A documented history of the development of Japan's war economy from 1940 to 1945, in which the domination of the Zaibatsu is clearly demonstrated. There is a documentary appendix. This study is published for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

ERLEBNISSE UND GEDANKEN EINES JAPANFAHRERS. By Arnold Gubler. Bern: Kümmerly, 1944, 184 p. Swiss Fr. 12.60.

The author, a Swiss geographer-historian, went out to teach in the State University of Sapporo (Hokkaido) in 1923 and stayed until 1932. He managed to visit some of the more inaccessible parts of Japan, such as Formosa and the Kurile Islands, concerning which he has interesting text and photographs.

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST. By Edward H. Zabriskie. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946, 226 p. $3.50.

This thoroughly documented monograph on a little-known phase of American diplomatic history covers the period from 1895 to 1914.

SOVIET FAR EASTERN POLICY 1931-1945. By Harriet L. Moore. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, 284 p. $2.50.

A scholarly history, much of it based on Russian sources. The last half of the book contains relevant documents. This study is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN SIBERIA. By Sylvian G. Kindall. New York: R. R. Smith, 1945, 251 p. $2.75.

Interesting personal experiences recorded by an United States Army officer who served in the American Expeditionary force operating in Siberia from 1918 to 1920.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. By W. Cameron Forbes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, 412 p. $5.00.

At the request of President Osmeña this two-volume work on the Islands by former Governor-General Forbes has been condensed and to a certain extent revised.

THE FORTRESS ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC. By William Herbert Hobbs. Ann Arbor: Edwards, 1945, 186 p. $2.50.

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A first-hand description of several score Pacific islands and an evaluation of their strategic importance, by a noted American geologist who was one of the few occidentals permitted by the Japanese to visit their mandated territories. There are many drawings and maps.

Africa

AFRICAN JOURNEY. By Eslanda Goode Robeson. New York: Day, 1945, 154 p. $3.50.

A highly illuminating commentary, by the wife of Paul Robeson, the singer, on various aspects of native life in the Dark Continent. Her observations could justifiably have been prejudiced; instead, they are a masterpiece of reserved understatement and a challenge to "one world" advocates.

CONGO. By John Latouche. New York: Willow, 1945, 192 p. $3.75.

This book is the result of a trip through the Congo, made under the sponsorship of the Belgian Government. Mr. Latouche has supplied the text and André Cauvin the many excellent photographs. The former has opened himself to criticism by trying to play down the evil practices associated with the rule of Leopold II. The text and illustrations show how rapidly the African is adjusting himself to certain aspects of modern industrial life, but Mr. Latouche does not say much about the almost exclusive concern of the Belgian authorities for the physical well-being of the native, to the neglect of his cultural, social and political advancement.

Latin America

THE LATIN AMERICAN FRONT. By Joseph F. Privitera. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945, 212 p. $2.25.

An analysis of recent attitudes and behavior towards Latin America on the part of the United States, and a warning concerning the pitfalls we must avoid in our postwar relations with our southern neighbors. The author is director of studies at the Brazil-United States Institute in São Paulo, Brazil.

INDUSTRY IN LATIN AMERICA. By George Wythe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 371 p. $4.00.

A painstaking compilation and interpretation of evidence concerning the development of industries in each of the Latin American republics.

NEW CROPS FOR THE NEW WORLD. Edited by Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 295 p. $3.50.

Fourteen scientists and research men describe the new plants and trees that have been or are being introduced into tropical and subtropical America, and their effect on the economies of those regions.

HISTORIA ECONÓMICA DE CUBA. By H. E. Friedlaender. Havana: Montero, 1944, 596 p. $6.00.

The concluding chapter of this scholarly and comprehensive work deals with the current century.

NUESTRA AMÉRICA Y LA EVOLUCIÓN DE CUBA. By Ulpiano Vega Cobiellas. Havana: Cultural, 1944, 375 p.

Somewhat random chapters on various aspects of Latin American history and affairs, of which the last deals with the Batista régime in Cuba.

PUERTO RICO: UNSOLVED PROBLEM. By Earl S. Garver and Ernest B. Fincher. Elgin (Ill.): Elgin Press, 1945, 110 p. $1.00.

A popular introduction of the island's history and economy.

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HOMENAJE DEL PUEBLO MEXICANO A LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA. Mexico: Comité Nacional Antinazifascista, 1944, 521 p.

Addresses, statements and other material illustrating the solidarity of the Mexican people with the United Nations, notably Russia.

BRAZIL. By Gilberto Freyre. New York: Knopf, 1945, 179 p. $2.00.

A Brazilian sociologist analyzes the effect of his country's mixed racial heritage on its historical development and its prospects for the future. He very definitely does not hold with the racial snobs, for he finds in mixture a source of national strength rather than of weakness. The substance of this book consists of lectures originally delivered at Indiana University.

ASUNTOS ECÓNOMICOS CONTEMPORÁNEOS: 1925–1940. Volume II. By A. Silva de la Fuente. Santiago de Chile: La Salle, 1944, 320 p.

A compilation of many short articles dealing mostly with Chile's economic and financial problems during the inter-war period, by a Chilean economist and journalist.

EL IMPERATIVO GEOGRÁFICO EN LA MEDITERRANEIDAD DE BOLIVIA. By Rómulo Meneses. La Paz: Renacimiento, 1943, 90 p. Bs. 25.

A study of the geographical factors involved in Bolivia's need for an outlet to the sea, by a writer closely identified with the APRA movement.

UNA REVOLUCIÓN TRAS LOS ANDES. By Alberto Ostría Gutiérrez. Santiago de Chile: Nascimento, 1944, 285 p.

The author served as Foreign Minister of Bolivia under Colonel Busch and under the latter's provisional successor. He pursued an anti-Nazi policy, which he maintains was not fully appreciated either at home or abroad. In this volume he seeks to justify his record, citing various documents and other sources to substantiate his claims.

LA POLÍTICA ARGENTINA Y EL FUTURO DE AMÉRICA. By Enrique Ruiz-Guiñazú. Buenos Aires: Huemul, 1944, 198 p. Pesos 5.

The author is an historian and scholar who has served Argentina in various capacities, including that of Ambassador and Foreign Minister. He is suspicious of American hemispheric solidarity, proclaiming himself to be instead a "universalist." He regards the Atlantic Ocean not as a boundary but as an "interior sea" of the Western World. In this book he seeks to justify his policy, notably in regard to the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers and Argentina's failure to break with the Axis at that time. The last chapter consists of a refutation of Sumner Welles' account of the implications of this Conference as set forth in Chapter 5 of his "The Time for Decision."

DEFENSA NACIONAL. By Jorge A. Giovaneli. Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1944, 185 p. Pesos 3.

The author, Divisional General in the Argentine Army, seeks to impress upon his countrymen the lessons which the recent total war has to teach them concerning the importance of political, economic and psychological elements in national defense.

HISTORIA NAVAL ARGENTINA. By Teodoro Caillet-Bois. Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1944, 552 p. Pesos 25.

An illustrated, documented history, with emphasis on the early period, by an Argentine naval officer.

EL PERIODISMO ARGENTINO. By C. Galván Moreno. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1944, 520 p. Pesos 5.

A factual outline of the history of Argentine journalism since colonial times.

EL DRAMA DE LA TIERRA EN LA ARGENTINA. By Antonio Manuel Molinari. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1944, 252 p. Pesos 3.

A revised edition of an analysis of the Argentine land problem.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Agriculture

Five technical reports on food and agriculture, submitted to the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture by its technical committees on nutrition and food management, agricultural production, fisheries, forestry and primary forest products, statistics. Washington, United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, 1945. 313 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Proposals for expansion of world trade and employment; developed by a technical staff within the government of the United States in preparation for an International Conference on Trade and Employment and presented for consideration by the peoples of the world. Washington, 1945. 28 p. (Dept. of State. Publication 2411.)

Accounts relating to the trade of the United Kingdom during January–June, 1945, compiled by the Board of Trade. London, 1945. 135 p. 2s. 6d.

Foreign contracts act. Joint hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, and the Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources (S. Res. 36), 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 11. May 17–22, 1945. Washington, 1945. 267 p.

Post-War imports and domestic production of major commodities; letters from the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission transmitting a report of the United States Tariff Commission in response to S. Res. 341 (78th Cong.), Apr. 6, 1945. Washington, 1945. 1321 p. (79th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 88.) $1.75.

Reports on economic controls and commercial policy in the American Republics. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1945.

11. Costa Rica. 25 p. *12.* Mexico. 46 p.

Review of commercial conditions. London, 1945.

15. New Zealand. 42 p. 1s. *16.* Colombia. 41 p. 1s. *17.* Egypt. 40 p. 1s. *18.* Australia. 47 p. 1s.

Canada and international cartels; an inquiry into the nature and effects of international cartels and other trade combinations. Ottawa, 1945. 72 p. 25¢.

Brazil's foreign trade; imports and exports according to end use and degree of processing of the products, 1938–1943. Rio de Janeiro, Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior, 1945. 115 p.

Exportación de la República Dominicana, 1944. Ciudad Trujillo, Dirección General de Estadística, Sección de Producción y Economia, 1945. 381 p.

Importación de la República Dominicana, 1944. Ciudad Trujillo, Dirección General de Estadística, Sección de Producción y Economia, 1945. 353 p.

Annotated tabular survey of the trade of Japan proper (including that with Korea and Formosa), prepared for the Foreign Economic Administration. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1945. 228 p. (Japanese Trade Studies.)

Coöperatives

The coöperative movement and present-day problems, with special reference to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945. 232 p. (Studies and Reports. Series H (Coöperation), No. 5.) 4s.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Anglo-American financial and commercial agreements; documents. Washington, 1945. 12 p. (Dept. of State. Publication 2439. Commercial Policy Series 80.) 5¢.

Export-Import Bank act of 1945. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 3464 and H. R. 3490 superseded by H. R. 3771. July 11 and 12, 1945. Washington, 1945. 90 p. 15¢.

———. Report . . . to accompany H. R. 3771. July 19, 1945. Washington, 1945. 7 p. (S. Rept. 490.)

General policy statement, Export-Import Bank of Washington. Washington, 1945. 23 p.

Monetary agreement between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of Denmark. 16th August, 1945. London, 1945. 4 p. (Treaty Series No. 4 (1945). Cmd. 6671.) 1d.

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EXCHANGE of letters and memorandum of agreement regarding payments and the liquidation of indebtedness between the United Kingdom and Finland. August 2, 1945. London, 1945. 6 p. (Cmd. 6664.) 1d.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the Belgian government relating to property in the United Kingdom belonging to persons resident in Belgium. 6th October, 1944. London, 1945. 11 p. (Treaty Series No. 3 (1945). Cmd. 6665.) 2d.

GREAT BRITAIN

AN ANALYSIS of the sources of war finance and estimates of the national income and expenditure in the years 1938 to 1944. London, 1945. 55 p. (Cmd. 6623.) 1s.

REPORT of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies. London, 1945. 119 p. (Cmd. 6647.) 2s.

DEVELOPMENT and welfare in the West Indies, 1943–44, report by Sir Frank Stockdale. London, 1945. 115 p. (Colonial No. 189.) 2s.

WEST INDIA Royal Commission report. London, 1945. 480 p. (Cmd. 6607.) 7s. 6d.

WEST INDIA Royal Commission, 1938–39; statement of action taken on the recommendations. London, 1945. 108 p. (Cmd. 6656.) 2s.

REPORT of the West Indian conference, held in Barbados 21st–30th March, 1944. London, 1944. 21 p. (Colonial No. 187.) 6d.

REPORT of the West Indies Committee of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, prepared by the Colonial Office. London, 1945. 81 p. (Cmd. 6654.) 1s. 3d.

REPORT of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa prepared by the Colonial Office. London, 1945. 190 p. (Cmd. 6655.) 3s.

CEYLON; report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform. London, 1945. 159 p. (Cmd. 6677.) 2s. 6d.

PROPOSALS for the revision of the constitution of Nigeria. London, 1945. 16 p. (Cmd. 6599.) 3d.

LABOR

INTER-AMERICAN handbook of social insurance institutions. Montreal, International Labour Office, Inter-American Committee on Social Security, 1945. 187 p.

TRAINING and employment of disabled persons; a preliminary report. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945. 302 p. $1.50.

PROTECTION of children and young workers (first discussion). Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945. 192 p. (International Labour Conference, 27th Session, Paris, 1945. Report 3.)

MATTERS arising out of the work of the Constitutional Committee; Report 4, Pt. 1, Relationship of the I.L.O. to other international bodies. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945. 165 p. (International Labour Conference, 27th Session, Paris, 1945.)

REPORTS on the application of conventions (article 22 of the Constitution). Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945. 72 p. and appendix. (International Labour Conference, 27th Session, Paris, 1945. Report VI.)

MARITIME Preparatory Technical Conference, Copenhagen, November 1945. Reports. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1945.

LABOUR conditions in Ceylon, Mauritius, and Malaya, report by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, London, 1943. 113 p. (Cmd. 6423.) 2s.

LATIN AMERICA

REPORT of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain for the year 1944. Washington, Commission, [1945?] 46 p.

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